WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

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Volume XXIV, Number 4 July 1972

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Rates: $9.00 per year; $15.00 for two years; $20.50 for three years. Foreign postage, 50 cents additional per year. Single issue, $3.00.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Public Affairs Information Service*, and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Abstracts of articles appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts*, and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

Back issues: WORLD POLITICS is available on microfilm from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Volumes I-XVIII are available from Johnson Reprint Corporation, 111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003, at $20.00 per volume. Volumes XIX on are available from Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

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VOL. XXIV · JULY 1972 · No. 4

CONTENTS

Self-Determination:
The Nigeria/Biafra Case — *Charles R. Nixon* — 473

The Structure of Communist Politics — *Richard C. Thornton* — 498

Incentives for Political Participation — *James L. Payne and Oliver H. Woshinsky* — 518

RESEARCH NOTES

Fascism and Modernization — *Henry Ashby Turner, Jr.* — 547

Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam:
A Further Re-Analysis — *Dennis Paranzino* — 565

REVIEW ARTICLES

Cold-War Revisionism: A Critique — *J. L. Richardson* — 579

After Many a Summer? The Possibilities of
Political Change in South Africa — *Christian P. Potholm* — 613

Index to Volume XXIV — 639

The Contributors — ii

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THE CONTRIBUTORS

CHARLES R. NIXON is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is currently working on a study of problems of political and economic change in Nigeria during the period from 1950 to the outbreak of the Nigeria-Biafra conflict.

RICHARD C. THORNTON is Associate Professor of History and a member of the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies at The George Washington University. He is the author of *The Comintern and the Chinese Communists* (1969), *Bear and Dragon, Sino-Soviet Relations and the Political Evolution of the Chinese People's Republic, 1949–1971* (1972), and is currently completing a major study, *China, the Struggle for Power, 1917–1971*.

JAMES L. PAYNE is Associate Professor of Political Science at the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of *Patterns of Conflict in Colombia* (1968) and is currently working on studies which extend the application of incentive types to the Dominican Republic and to American politicians.

OLIVER H. WOSHINSKY, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Maine at Portland-Gorham, is currently working on a study of incentives and behavior among French Deputies.

HENRY A. TURNER, JR. is Professor of History at Yale University. He is the author of *Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic* (1963) and *Faschismus und Kapitalismus in Deutschland: Studien zum Verhältnis zwischen Nationalsozialismus und Wirtschaft* (forthcoming 1972). At present he is preparing a study entitled *German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler* for publication in this country.

DENNIS PARANZINO is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania. He is currently engaged, with Professor Vincent McHale, in a study of the political consequences of developmental change, focusing on the French experience.

JAMES L. RICHARDSON is Senior Lecturer in Government at the University of Sydney, Australia. He is the author of *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance* (1966) and is at present working on the historical analysis of international crises.

CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM is Associate Professor of Government and Legal Studies at Bowdoin College. He is the author of *Four African Political Systems* (1970) and the forthcoming *Swaziland: The Dynamics of Political Modernization*. He is also the co-editor of *Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics* (1972).

Note: Professor CHONG-DO HAH has requested that JAMES NOBLE be listed as co-author of "The Dynamics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution" (XXIV, No. 2, January 1972). Mr. Noble is a doctoral candidate in political science, and is currently teaching at the University of Rochester.

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SELF-DETERMINATION: THE NIGERIA/BIAFRA CASE

By CHARLES R. NIXON*

IN the history of postcolonial Africa, no country has suffered a more tragic experience than Nigeria. After almost twenty years of gradual constitutional evolution by relatively orderly processes of conferences and negotiations, the structure of constitutional agreement collapsed; the army was broken into regional groups; citizens of Eastern Region origin fled much of the rest of the country during a series of massacres which produced a migration of hundreds of thousands of persons; the central government lost its effective authority over the Eastern Region; and when orderly processes of negotiation were suspended, the Eastern Region sought its own security and survival by declaring its independence, shortly after which the central government sought to reestablish its authority in the area by military action. The resulting war, which lasted two and one-half years, produced over a million casualties from military action, disease, and starvation.

The conflict ended with the collapse of Biafra in January, 1970. The immediate issues of the war were resolved in favor of Nigeria, but the implications of these issues reach beyond political boundaries. An understanding of them, and of the principles and problems involved, is important if similar tragedies are to be avoided in other contexts where similar questions may arise.

The central issue of the war was whether the former Eastern Region could, by its own declaration, become an independent state—the Republic of Biafra. Thus this case presents in its starkest form the question of whether the concept of "self-determination" can have meaning in postcolonial Africa.

Professor Emerson has shown that in spite of the opening article of the *Covenant On Human Rights* to the effect that "All peoples and all nations shall have the right of self-determination," this principle carries much less weight in postcolonial Africa than the seemingly contrary principle of the United Nations Declaration of 1960, *On the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People*, which states among other provisions, "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total

* This is a revised version of a paper originally presented to the Panel on Self-Determination of the American Society of International Law, in New York City, October 1969.

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disruption of the national unit and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."[1]

In addition to the concern of newly independent states to maintain their own unity and integrity and so to restrict the concept of self-determination to the right of colonial peoples to assert their independence, there are inherent difficulties with the concept of self-determination itself. As Professor Emerson points out, "The inescapable heart of the matter is the necessity of establishing what 'self' it is to which the right attaches . . . and, once this determination has been made, who within the designated community has the authority to speak for it, binding the whole?" These are not easy questions, and he observes that probably "they can have no answer of a more universal character than those which are fitted to a given time and place and circumstance."[2]

In the Nigeria/Biafra case the time and the place were clear. The objective of this analysis is to examine the circumstances in which this claim to self-determination was both made and challenged, and, in the light of these circumstances, to understand the problems this case poses for the concept of self-determination and its implications for the international community.

This analysis deals with the following problems:

I. The Biafran claim to independence: Why the Biafrans believed they were entitled to declare their independence and would be successful in that move; and how this action appears in the light of the problems which Professor Emerson raises regarding the nature of "self" and "authoritative determination."

II. The Nigerian challenge to the Biafran claim: The political basis of this challenge, and the problems it raises regarding the issues of "self" and "authoritative determination."

III. Some problems posed by the Nigeria/Biafra case for our understanding of the concept of self-determination in the modern world.

The treatment of these problems must necessarily be selective rather than exhaustive, and focuses primarily on the political rather than on the legal and moral dimensions of the conflict. In addition, it assumes that in this case the time dimension was of considerable importance—that Nigeria was in a state of dynamic transformation through-

[1] Rupert Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization*, Occasional Paper No. 9, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (December 1964), 27-29.

[2] *Ibid.*, 27.

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out the evolution of these issues; and that the complexities of the problems and the dilemmas facing the international community were a function, in part, of the way the issues themselves seemed to be transformed from one period of time to another.

I. The Biafran Claim

The conflicts which underlay the Nigerian federal system and led to its collapse in the military coup of January 15, 1966, have been elaborated elsewhere.[3] They constitute an important background but are not in themselves the critical elements in the moves toward Biafran independence.[4] The distinctive circumstances that led to the Biafran claim to independence began in May, 1966, with a series of attacks against peoples of Eastern Region origin living in the North. These attacks were followed by the coup of July 29, 1966, during which Northern troops systematically killed about 240 Southern officers and men, of whom at least three-quarters were Easterners. This action destroyed the Nigerian army as an effective agent of Nigerian unity. It also destroyed the unity of the military command by which the country had been governed since the original coup of January 15, 1966. Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, who assumed the post of Supreme Commander because he was acceptable to the mutinous Northern troops, was never recognized as commander by Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria.

This rupture in national unity was widened greatly by the new and even more extensive massacres in the North starting September 29, 1966, and by the mass migrations which ensued. From that point on the problem of refugees, of economic support of displaced persons, as well as the intensified fears of Easterners for their physical safety, exacerbated the tension between the Eastern and central governments. None of a series of efforts to find a basis for renewed cooperation between the East and the center brought fruit. Instead, a series of unilateral moves in the areas of economic and political relations by both the East and the center simply served to escalate the conflict until the East proclaimed its independence on May 30, 1967, and the Federal Govern-

[3] J. P. Mackintosh and others, *Nigerian Government and Politics* (London 1966), provides analyses of the Nigerian political scene prior to the coup of January 1966, as well as notes to the extensive literature on Nigerian politics.

[4] S. K. Panter-Brick and others, *Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War* (London 1970), which appeared after this paper was prepared, contains valuable analyses of the events leading to the civil war as well as an appendix of 125 pages containing selected documents and speeches covering the period January 1966–June 1967.

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ment, determined to defeat secession, opened military action against the East on July 5, 1967.

The proclamation of the Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967, reflected a number of convictions held by Eastern leaders on the basis of which they felt secession was a legitimate and necessary action. First, they believed that the security of their lives and property could not be maintained if they were subject to the control of the Nigerian government as then constituted. Second, they believed that orderly processes of negotiation aimed at the reestablishment of a workable pattern of political relationships between the Eastern Region and the rest of the country had been effectively frustrated by the central government and could not fruitfully be resumed. Third, they believed secession was widely recognized throughout Nigeria as a politically legitimate step, and would be acquiesced in, if not actually supported and/or imitated, by the rest of Nigeria. Fourth, they believed that the move to independence had overwhelming popular support in the Eastern Region. As all of these are relevant to the problem of self-determination in this circumstance, they are worth a brief examination.

The problem of physical security had been a central consideration in Eastern Region policy and action from June 29th on. The massacres and migrations of September and October, 1966, were a horrendous experience, the dimensions of which are difficult for others to imagine. The Biafrans viewed the massacres of July and September as deliberately planned by Northern civilians and military leaders to eliminate Easterners permanently from the North, from any role in the army, and from equal status with other Nigerian peoples in the political life of the country. The violation of their rights under the Nigerian constitution and Nigerian law, and the violation of their basic human rights, were fundamental. And these violations not only went unpunished and even uninvestigated, but were carried out, they believed, under the leadership of those who also had exercised effective direction of the government in Lagos from August 1 onward. With this as a background, they viewed the various preparations of the Federal Government to reassert its authority in the Eastern Region as one more step in the destruction of the Eastern Region peoples. Whatever obligations the peoples of Eastern Nigeria had had to Nigeria were dissolved, they believed, by the failure of Nigeria to protect the life and property of its citizens. Only a new independent state which they themselves controlled could insure the protection which was the obligation of a state to provide, and which warranted the obligation of citizens to obey the state.

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The Biafran view of the failure of orderly processes of negotiation to resolve the crisis is summarized in a paragraph of their proclamation.

> It became evident that each time Nigerians came close to a realistic solution to the current crisis by moving towards a loose form of association or confederation, Lt. Col. Gowon unilaterally frustrated their efforts. When the representatives of the Military Governors decided on August 9 that troops be repatriated to their Regions of origin, and it appeared to him that this would lead to confederation, he unilaterally refused to fully implement that decision. When in September the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference appeared near to agreement on a loose Federation, he unilaterally dismissed them indefinitely. When in January, 1967, the Military Leaders agreed at Aburi on what the Federal Permanent Secretaries correctly interpreted as confederation, he unilaterally rejected the Agreement to which he had voluntarily subscribed. When in May, 1967, all the Southern Military Governors and the Leaders of Thought of their Regions spoke out in favor of Confederation, he dismissed the Supreme Military Council and proclaimed himself the dictator of Nigeria—an act which, to say the least, is treasonable.[5]

The Federal Government's position on these negotiations will be explored later. What is important to recognize here is that the Biafrans had become convinced that further negotiations with the Federal Government could no longer be considered a useful way to resolve the crisis.

The belief in the legitimacy of secession had deep roots in Nigerian political thought. It is a concept which was entertained by many groups at various stages of Nigeria's constitutional evolution.[6] One of the ironies of the situation is that it was the Easterners who had given it the least consideration in the past, and the Northerners who had given the concept the most attention and had most frequently asserted this as an option which they might feel forced to adopt. Apart from the long record of secessionist sentiment expressed particularly by Northerners, starting at the time of the amalgamation of the North and South in 1914, the more recent expressions tied to the crisis which finally culminated in the secession of the East are particularly relevant. It is perfectly clear that the May riots of 1966 and the July 29, 1966, coup and mutiny involved strong separatist feelings on the part of the North. The initial demand of the mutinous troops and of Lt. Col. Gowon when he took over as Supreme Commander of the Military Government was that the North be free to withdraw from the Federation. At the *Ad Hoc*

[5] *Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra* (Enugu 1967), 5-6.

[6] See Tekena N. Tamuno, "Separatist Agitations in Nigeria since 1914," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, VIII (December 1970), 563-84.

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Constitutional Conference of September 12, 1966, the North's original memorandum included the following paragraph:

> *Rights of Self-Determination*: Right of self-determination of all people in the country must be accepted and a referendum or plebiscite shall be the method through which the wishes of the people concerned shall be ascertained. These rights include the right of any State within the country to secede. But the implementation of these principles shall not delay the determination of the future of Nigeria. All necessary guarantees shall, however, be written in the future constitution to establish the right of self-determination by any section.[7]

Likewise, the proposal of the Western Region indicated that it preferred the continuation of a federal system, but if this was not acceptable, then a Commonwealth of Nigeria should be created, and under this proposal it recommended: "Each state should have a right unilaterally to secede from the Commonwealth at any time of its own choice."[8]

Though these assertions of a right of secession were dropped by the second set of memoranda presented by the North and the West, there is no doubt that the concept of a right of secession had substantial support in both regions. Some have viewed the Northern riots of September 29, 1966, as partly a response on the part of those Northerners who were disappointed that an effective secession on the part of the North did not occur August 1, and who were disturbed by the trend of events in Lagos which seemed to look toward a continued involvement of the North with the other areas. How strong these separatist views were in the North by May of 1967 is difficult to say. They no longer were being openly voiced at that time, but by then it was no longer the North that felt the fear of domination from the center.

At the end of April and in early May of 1967 several statements, both of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and of the Western Leaders of Thought at the Ibadan Conference on May 1st, expressed a reluctance to see the Federation break up. However, recognizing this possibility, the Leaders of Thought included in their resolution of opposition "if any Region secedes, the Federation as we know it shall cease to exist and Western Nigeria shall automatically become independent and sovereign."[9] Chief Awolowo had insisted in his own address to the Con-

[7] "Form of Association for Nigeria. Paper by the Northern Nigeria Delegation," as printed in *The Ad Hoc Conference on the Nigerian Constitution*, Nigerian Crisis 1966, IV (Eastern Nigeria 1966), 3-4.

[8] "Memorandum by the Western Nigeria and Lagos Delegations to the Ad Hoc Committee on Constitutional Arrangements for Nigeria, 1966," *ibid.*, 26.

[9] As reported in *Africa Research Bulletin*, IV (June 15, 1967), 777.

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ference that if the Eastern Region were allowed "by acts of omission or commission to secede from or opt out of Nigeria, then the Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of the Federation." He recalled that before the Western delegates went to attend the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference meeting in Lagos, they were given a mandate that if any region should opt out of the Federation, then the Federation should be considered to be at an end, and that the Western Region and Lagos should also opt out of it.[10]

One of the underlying premises of Nigerian thought had been that the condition of association in the federal system was that no region would gain domination over the others, and that no region need suffer domination from another. This fear of domination had been a primary consideration in the shaping of the federal system, and the belief that secession was a legitimate response of a Region to a threat of domination was simply one more manifestation of this underlying conception of their relations to each other.

The Eastern memorandum of September, 1966, had also proposed the right of secession. By the end of May, 1967, the Eastern leaders not only believed that in their circumstance secession was a legitimate act and wholly in line with a broad spectrum of Nigerian thinking, but they believed that their secession would be acquiesced in and perhaps followed by the rest of the country. Biafran informants have claimed that when Chief Awolowo met with Lt. Col. Ojukwu as a member of the National Reconciliation Commission in May, 1967, he requested that Lt. Col. Ojukwu give him twenty-four hours' notice before secession so that he could be prepared to take the Western Region out of the Federation at the same time. These informants also claim that the last word which the East had received from Chief Awolowo was to "stand firm," as otherwise the Northerners would dominate them all. Though Lt. Col. Gowon had on several occasions indicated he would insist on holding Nigeria together and was prepared to use force if necessary, the East believed that there were no significant military preparations on the federal side to implement these threats, and did not really believe they would be carried out.

It is clear that in issuing his proclamation of independence, Lt. Col. Ojukwu was not imposing a unilateral judgment on an unwilling people. From August, 1966, onward he had held periodic meetings of a Consultative Assembly to discuss the crisis and the steps which the Eastern Region should take in response to it. This Assembly had met again in Enugu on May 26, 1967, passed a resolution requesting the proclama-

[10] *Ibid.*, 776.

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tion of independence, and mandated the Military Governor of the Eastern Region "to declare at the earliest practicable date Eastern Nigeria a free, sovereign and independent state by the name and title of the Republic of Biafra."[11] This meeting had itself been preceded by two weeks of mass rallies around the region at Enugu, Port Harcourt, Oji River, Nsukka, Calabar, Aba, Uyo, Okigwi, Yenagoa, Umuahia, Abakaliki, and other cities, where demands for secession were given popular voice. The demand was certainly not unanimous, however. There were voices of dissent which seriously challenged the wisdom and necessity of the action, but it is unlikely that more than a small minority took this view in May, 1967.

The question now arises whether, in the context of these circumstances, Eastern Nigeria constituted an appropriate "self" to exercise a right of self-determination if such a right were acknowledged, and whether the Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra constituted an "authoritative determination" of such a self.

In examining the question of "self," it is important to recognize that Eastern Nigeria was not an ethnically homogeneous group. Of a population of twelve to fourteen million, the Ibos constituted about 64 per cent, Efik and Ibibio about 17 per cent, Annang 5.5 per cent, Ijaw and Ogoni 7.5 per cent, Ekoi, Yalla, and Ukelle 3.4 per cent, and others 2.6 per cent.[12]

The Biafran proclamation assumed that the whole of the Eastern Region was covered by the proclamation and was being transformed into an independent state of Biafra. Biafra, therefore, would also have a multi-ethnic character. The proclamation did not assert a historic yearning of the Ibo nation for independent statehood. It was the multi-ethnic region, not a single nation/tribe which was declaring itself a republic. The question, therefore, is: Did the Eastern Region constitute a distinct, identifiable political community, a sub-community of Nigeria, which might legitimately claim recognition as an independent country if any such claims were to be recognized at all?

If an established historical identity as a political community or sub-community is the key to such a claim, the claims of the Eastern Region were nearly as substantial as those of Nigeria itself. The boundary between the Northern Region and the Eastern Region had existed as long as the British exercised direct authority over the Northern and Southern parts of the country, that is, since 1900. The unification of the Northern and Southern provinces in 1914 did not change this boundary.

[11] *Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra* (fn. 5), 14.
[12] *Population Census of Nigeria, 1963, Eastern Region*, II (Lagos 1968).

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The boundary between the East and the West was established in 1939, when the Southern provinces were divided into Western and Eastern Provinces. In 1946, the Richards Constitution provided for a Consultative Assembly to be established in the Eastern Region, and from then onward the Eastern Region was treated as a legally and politically significant component of Nigeria. It sent its own representatives to the constitutional conferences; and in the constitutional agreements of 1953–54 in which the federal system was set forth, it was treated as a region which would have residual powers while the central government had explicit powers provided by the exclusive and concurrent legislative lists. In 1957, three years before the central government received its independence, the Eastern Region gained internal autonomy and in this period maintained its own representation in London. Though at various times minority groups demanded distinctive regions of their own, and the constitutional discussions in 1956–57 included the possibility of new states in the East as well as new states in the West and the North, these discussions were resolved and the demands rejected in 1957. The constitutional system as agreed on at that time recognized the Eastern Region as one of the three component units of Nigeria.

In the crises which emerged from 1966 on, the Eastern Region was the significant operative unit and was viewed as such by the rest of the country. The attacks on military personnel between July 29 and September, 1966, were directed against officers and men of Eastern origin; they were not confined to a single national or tribal group. The massacres in the North and the migration involved the peoples of all the ethnic groups of Eastern origin, not simply the Ibo. The agreement of August 9, 1966, that troops should be returned to their region of origin thus included the various ethnic groups of Eastern origin, not simply the Ibo, and it meant that troops came back to the region, not to the specific province in which their ethnic groups were concentrated. And throughout the period of the crisis, *de facto* authority was exercised by the military government of the Eastern Region, not by the authority of Lagos, and this government did not recognize the authority of Lagos or of Lt. Col. Gowon as Supreme Commander.

Thus, if a particular national or tribal group had sought to declare its own independence on grounds of historical yearning for statehood, and had tried to draw certain *ad hoc* lines to define the boundaries of its own group, some questions might have been raised about the adequacy of this group to constitute a "self" for purposes of self-determination. But in the case of the Eastern Region this was not the case. Its lines, its boundaries, its areas of jurisdiction had long historic roots

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which had in fact been the operative lines and operative jurisdictions throughout a period of conflict with the rest of the country. If any entity in Nigeria was recognized by others as an appropriate entity to exercise self-determination, it was the region as then constituted.

The second part of the problem is whether or not the actions of the Eastern Nigerian Government could be viewed as an "authoritative determination" of this "self." Again the answer is relatively clear. This was the government which had been operating as the government of the Region since the collapse of the system in January, 1966. It had been made the authoritative successor to the civilian government by the federal military government in January, 1966, and Lt. Col. Ojukwu had been appointed by the Supreme Commander. He had not been replaced by the military government in Lagos prior to the action of the Consultative Assembly on May 26, 1967. The overwhelming popular support for the action indicates what is critical with respect to its authoritative character. It had been mandated by the Consultative Assembly, and the proclamation finally came from the Military Governor. There certainly was no other authority in the area at the time which could have claimed to have been an authoritative voice in determining the actions of the area.

Thus, the declaration of the independence of Biafra came from the recognized government of what had been a political community of Nigeria for several decades, from the government which had been the effective *de facto* government since the beginning of the crisis in July 29, 1966, and it came at the behest of a Consultative Assembly which reflected more effectively than any other identifiable agency the will of the people.

II. The Nigerian Challenge to the Biafran Claim

If the East's claims were sound, the real puzzle in the Nigeria/Biafra case lies not in the move to independence on the part of the East, but in the fact that the rest of Nigeria sustained a war to keep the East from leaving. When one considers that the mutiny of the Northern troops on July 29, 1966, had as one of its major objectives the secession of the North, and that the massacres in September were intended to free the North from its involvement with the Easterners and thus rid the North of its own fears of Eastern domination, it seems paradoxical that a year later the North should be actively engaged in a war to prevent the East from carrying out that very separation which elements in the North itself had sought. Biafrans, however, maintained that no real

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paradox existed, as the real objective all along was the complete destruction of the Easterners, and that genocide was the underlying continuity between the two sets of events.

Though hostility toward the Easterners and particularly toward the Ibo was certainly an important facet of the situation, the charge of genocide distorted the true picture in very fundamental ways. The real key to the puzzle must be found not in anti-Ibo feeling, but in a significant transformation in the rest of Nigeria between August 1, 1966, and July 1, 1967. It is this transformation which must be understood if one is to understand the Nigerian challenge to the Biafran claim.

This transformation involved the evolution of a new conception of Nigeria that is fundamentally different from previous ones. This conception of Nigeria, which I believe served as the foundation of the federal case in the Nigeria/Biafra conflict, and certainly was the foundation of the Nigerian challenge to the Biafran claim for independence, I will refer to as Nigeria_3. The choice of the subscript 3 is symbolic rather than literal. I think it misleading to talk simply of the old Nigeria and the new Nigeria, not only because there is a certain euphoric tone to those designations, but because there are more than two Nigerias that have been operative concepts. There may well indeed be more than three. The important point is to recognize that, to understand the issue of self-determination, we must view Nigeria as a country involved in a series of dynamic transformations. It is to symbolize this process that I use subscripts to designate various stages of change. If the present Nigeria, that is, the Federal Government and the conception with which it operates, is Nigeria_3, then Nigeria_1 was the Nigeria of the three or four regions which had residual powers under the federal system and which were large enough to be economically viable units and to have exercised very significant powers in the processes of regional economic development. It was Nigeria_1 which collapsed on January 15, 1966. Nigeria_2 is the concept of a unified Nigeria as articulated in the decrees of May 24, 1966, without regions and without autonomous regional authority. It was this Nigeria against which the North revolted first with the May 29th riots, then with a series of protest meetings by Leaders of Thought, and finally with the coup of July 29, 1966. If Nigeria meant Nigeria_2 with Southerners in predominant positions in Lagos, the North wanted out. The coup and the elimination of Eastern military personnel was to enable the North to free itself from the South and to render the army incapable of preventing Northern secession or of punishing Northern leaders for the May 29th riots. The conception of Nigeria_3 was, I believe, definitely not a

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part of the plan of the coup, and was not in the minds of those who brought it about. It was not in Lt. Col. Gowon's mind at the time he took over responsibility on August 1, 1966. Rather it is a conception which grew gradually in his mind and in the minds of others. Many of the ambiguities and difficulties, contradictions and frustrations of the year following July 29, 1966, are explained by the fact that there was no clear conception of what Nigeria should be at the beginning of this period, but rather that Nigerian leaders and particularly Lt. Col. Gowon were searching for a pattern which was gradually evolving. At each stage of development this meant rejecting notions to which they had made tentative commitments a short time earlier. Yet over the year's time there did develop a conception which was successfully sold to a sufficient number of leaders in the North to win their acquiescence if not active support, and which by the end of the year was finally sold to leaders in the West and the Mid-West so as to win their cooperation in the military effort to defeat the Biafran secession.

It is not necessary here to explore all the twists and turns in the evolution of Nigeria_3. Rather, it should be sufficient to identify the major elements in its conception, to see briefly how they relate to some of the critical turning points in the development of the controversy between Nigeria and the Eastern Region, and then finally to see the implications of this conception for the fundamental problems of "self" and "authoritative determination" of the Biafran proclamation.

The basic conception of Nigeria_3 contains two fundamental propositions.

1. Instead of three or four relatively large autonomous and economically strong regions with residual powers as in Nigeria_1, there are a number of states—a minimum of twelve, but possibly a larger number at some time in the future when conditions permit a sorting out of popular attitudes and an exploration of the political and economic problems posed by alternative patterns of division. This proposition was essentially enunciated by the Twelve-State decree of May 27, 1967.

2. A relatively strong central government will have primary responsibility for economic development. This will in fact be stronger than the central government under Nigeria_1; the states, being smaller, will have fewer economic resources and less effective power, especially regarding economic development, than the regions under Nigeria_1. This proposition is expressed in the papers presented to the Ibadan Conference on Rehabilitation and Recon-

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struction in March, 1969, and in the Dina Report on Revenue Allocation, June, 1969.

Proponents of $Nigeria_3$ see it as a way to correct two features of the old $Nigeria_1$ which they believe were fundamentally responsible for its collapse and for the series of crises into which Nigeria had fallen. First, it greatly reduces the constraints on national economic development which were imposed by regional rivalries and interests, by vesting more economic powers and resources in the central government. Second, it reduces the possibility that any one region can dominate either the center or any of the other regions because the North, which previously held half the seats in the Federal House of Assembly, is now divided into at least six parts. Thus $Nigeria_3$ should meet the Easterners' and especially the Ibos' fear of being dominated by the North, and should provide a much more effective arrangement for the rapid economic development of the whole country than a collection of independent sovereign states cooperating through a common services organization as envisioned by Biafran leaders.[13]

I am not concerned here to evaluate the pros and cons of the conception of $Nigeria_3$. Rather, I am concerned to see how the development of this conception was related to the rejection of the Biafran claim to independence.

In political terms the two underlying propositions of the conception of $Nigeria_3$ reflected the interest of two quite different groups in the country. The second proposition, that of a strong central government with enlarged powers and resources for economic planning and development, represented a conviction held for a long time by economic planners and the top federal civil service, and probably by representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, who were concerned with economic development and their economic relations with Nigeria. The first proposition, emphasizing the division of the older regions into a number of states, reflected the demands of minority groups which had been present in Nigerian politics for a long period and had come into public focus in 1956 when the Minorities Commission held a series of hearings, examined their demands, and finally rejected them in the Commission Report of 1957. But the demands remained and had particular appeal to the Middle Belt peoples who, in fact, constituted a very large proportion of the personnel of the army. These two propositions, representing the twin foundations of

[13] See the "Memorandum on Future Association between Biafra and the rest of the former Federation of Nigeria," (Enugu 1967).

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the conception of $Nigeria_3$, also represented a political alliance between the minorities who were in a dominant position in the army after July 29, 1966, and thus had a new position of power and influence, and the top civil service and diplomatic representatives in Lagos.

In the first few months following the July 29 coup there was a basic tension between the interests centered in Lagos and the Leaders of Thought in the North, the West, and the East. The Lagos group was determined that Nigeria not be broken up and therefore played a very active role in convincing Lt. Col. Gowon and the army leadership who came from Middle Belt backgrounds that secession should not be allowed. Thus, when negotiations and conferences involving the Leaders of Thought from the various regions expressed orientations in the direction of a loose federation, of confederation or secession, the response of the interests centered in Lagos was to veto that line of development. On the other hand, there had not yet evolved a clear enough conception of the alternatives which could be presented and discussed, debated and evaluated in an open way by the Leaders of Thought from the various regions. It is this tension, I believe, that accounts for the effective frustration and ultimate suspension of the orderly process of conferences and negotiations for reaching a settlement of the differences within the country.

As time went on, the army command succeeded in convincing enough Northern leaders that the gradually emerging conception of $Nigeria_3$ was not fundamentally detrimental to Northern interests. Many Northern leaders had become convinced that a division of the North was essential, and they saw in the process of fragmentation a scheme with sufficient flexibility to allow Northern skills at maneuver and manipulation to be successful in protecting the North from the Southern coalition which they had previously feared might dominate the central government.

On the other hand, these processes of persuasion and consultation in the North were not repeated with the leaders in the East. Consequently the Eastern leadership continued to see the veto of the processes of negotiation as essentially a procedure whereby the North continued to dominate the center and to insist on maintaining a hold over affairs which ultimately would enable it to dominate the East. In addition, the North was not only consulted and persuaded, and perhaps even held a veto in the evolution of the conception of $Nigeria_3$, but Northern troops remained stationed in Lagos and the Western Region. Though Chief Awolowo and Western Leaders of Thought protested this stationing of Northern troops in the West and continued to de-

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mand their withdrawal even into early May, 1967, the troops remained, and the result was that Easterners suspected that the potential Western support for the conception of $Nigeria_3$ was a support given under the constraint which the presence of Northern troops imposed on Western leadership.

In the context of this interplay between a gradually evolving conception of $Nigeria_3$ and the traditional fears of domination of one region by another, it is possible to understand the critical events such as the reversal of the North's position between September 12, 1966, and the reconvening of the *Ad Hoc* Conference on September 20, 1966, the suspension of that conference by Lt. Col. Gowon in November, and the opposition of the Permanent Secretaries to the Aburi Agreements. And it is also possible to see the bases for the conflicting interpretations of these developments by those who supported the federal system in Lagos and by the Eastern Nigerian leaders who were primarily concerned with reestablishing conditions under which their peoples could be assured of their personal security.

By February, 1967, the minority group leaders, the army leadership, and the centralizing interests in Lagos had gained a sufficient understanding of each other and of the potentials offered by the emerging conception of $Nigeria_3$ that they could agree that the reassertion of federal authority over Eastern Nigeria had become of primary importance. They were prepared to seek this through economic pressures, such as denying Easterners the payment of their federal salaries or wages up to March 31st (which had earlier been agreed upon), by refusing to reallocate financial resources in order to enable the East to meet the burden of refugees and displaced persons, and finally by imposing an economic blockade when the East sought to take matters into its own hands by collecting directly what had previously been federal revenues in the region. Thus the conflict between the center and the East escalated and finally culminated in the open break at the end of May, 1967. At that point the Federal Government moved to crystallize and implement the conception of $Nigeria_3$ by issuing the Twelve-State Decree on May 27, 1967, and by bringing Chief Awolowo of the West, Chief Enahoro of the Mid-West, Mr. J. S. Tarka of the Middle Belt, and others into the Federal Executive Council, thus cementing an alliance between the center, the minority groups, the West and Mid-West into a more solid base for opposing the Biafran move to independence.

On June 1, 1967, $Nigeria_3$ was a newborn infant which had just completed a nine-month gestation, and the twelve states were but legal

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concepts, not operating entities. Yet the conception of $Nigeria_3$ had now been given independent life and was sufficiently well developed to provide a challenge to the Biafran claims. The challenge of $Nigeria_3$ was not simply the legal challenge that there is no right of secession. It was also a political challenge—the challenge of an alternative view of Nigeria, an alternative prospect for the future which its proponents claimed held brighter promise for all its peoples, large nationalities and small ones, major groups and minorities alike, than did the prospect of an association of independent sovereign states that was offered by an independent Biafra. It was in pursuit of $Nigeria_3$ that Major General Gowon mobilized the diverse communities within Nigeria to defeat the Biafran move to independence.

There are two important questions about $Nigeria_3$ that need to be raised in order to evaluate its relationship to Biafra. The first is: Would the promise of $Nigeria_3$ become a reality? And second: Was the defeat of Biafran secession essential to the existence of $Nigeria_3$?

Time proved that $Nigeria_3$ was indeed to become real. The details of the administrative transformation of the North were worked out during the ten months following the decree, and the six states of the North came into being April 1, 1968. A commission under Chief Dina was appointed in July of 1968 to work out a more equitable allocation of revenues between the twelve states, and its report, in June, 1969, further elaborated the thinking for the new structure of Nigeria, as did a series of papers exploring various problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation prepared for a conference in Ibadan, in March, 1969. Thus, $Nigeria_3$ did grow into a reality and it did so during the course of the military conflict itself.

The more critical question, however, involved not the sincerity of the commitment to $Nigeria_3$, but the question: Was Biafran independence fundamentally incompatible with $Nigeria_3$? In one sense one could argue, as some Biafrans did, that if Biafra were independent, the rest of Nigeria could organize itself in any way it pleased. At least three options seemed logically available: to maintain a limited version of $Nigeria_1$ but with three regions instead of four; to adopt a limited version of $Nigeria_3$ but with nine states instead of twelve; or to follow Biafra's lead and divide into several independent states. This matter of options was much more than a matter of formal logic, however. In the Nigerian context, it was a matter of the economic, political, and military consequences that would go with the various options. It was the prospect of these consequences which shaped the Federal Government's challenge to the Biafran claim and led it to the conclusion that Biafran

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independence was not compatible with the evolution of $Nigeria_3$, even on a limited basis.

From the point of view of Northerners alert to the nature of the economic relations between the North and the South, and the North's future prospects for development, any political arrangement which meant the complete separation of the North from the South would be considered a disaster. Access to the sea has always been a critical factor in the economic development of the North. It was the building of the railway linking the North to Lagos in 1912 and to Port Harcourt in 1926 that brought about an economic revolution in the North and enabled it to increase the value of its exports from about £180,000 in 1910 to about £65,000,000 in 1962. A return to the trans-Saharan routes of the precolonial days may have been a romantic dream held by some Northern secessionists, but the economic reality is that the North is utterly dependent on the Southern ports for its economic ties to the outside world; those who were conscious of this would not willingly let complete control of these ports, and the rail links to them, fall into entirely separate and potentially hostile political hands.

For growth in the future, the North's ties to the South promised to be even more vital than in the past. By 1966, it was clear that Nigeria had the greatest known petroleum reserves south of the Sahara—a potential 600–1200 million tons.[14] All of this was located in the coastal areas, some of it offshore, and much of it in the Eastern Region. Under the constitutional arrangements of $Nigeria_1$, control of this resource rested with the Federal Government rather than with the regions, and the major share of the public revenue derived from this resource went to the nation as a whole rather than to the region of origin. Any political arrangement for the future which isolated the North from the South also threatened to deprive the North of its expected share in the benefits of this financial resource, a resource which promised to reach an annual figure equal to the annual federal expenditure of prewar years. For an agricultural economy such as the North, this resource was vital for the expansion of education and other social services on a broad scale.

Furthermore, leaders in the West were divided over the prospect of remaining in a political association with the North if the East were allowed to secede. Even more than the East, the West had felt the heavy hand of Northern domination of the Federal Government and

[14] Mourtada Diallo, "The Power and Energy Resources and Utilization of Nigeria," a paper presented to the Conference on National Reconstruction and Development in Nigeria, March 25, 1969, 25.

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its intervention in the internal politics of the West during the emergency of 1962 and the regional election of 1965. An alliance with the East to restrain Northern political power had a high place in the hopes of many Westerners. Hence, if Biafra were permitted its independence, many Westerners would seek independence too. This is what Chief Awolowo and the Leaders of Thought in the West had asserted in May, 1967, and it was what was proposed by the Biafrans in their "Memorandum of Future Association between Biafra and the rest of the former Federation of Nigeria," issued August 29, 1967. The alternatives to this, whether in the form of a reduced Nigeria_1 or of Nigeria_3, meant, with the East gone, an even more overwhelming Northern dominance of the West than was experienced during the period 1960–1965.

For the leaders of the minority peoples of the Middle Belt areas of the North, an independent North drawn on the old regional lines in which they remained subject to continued political domination from the far North was an even less satisfactory option than the old structure of Nigeria_1. For these groups, some version of Nigeria_3 which also included the minority groups of the Rivers and Calabar areas was clearly the most satisfactory arrangement from both an economic and a political perspective.

The Mid-West, with its extensive petroleum fields, did not need an economic tie with the North. But its earlier separation from the West had come about through its political alliances with the far North; its public finances depended heavily on federal support; and it had real fears that if Biafran secession were allowed, it would be reabsorbed by a seceding Western Region or by a Southern State dominated by the larger Southern groups, the Ibo and the Yoruba. The Mid-West was the only state which did not include a right of secession in its initial proposal to the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference in August-September, 1966, an omission which reflected a view that its interests were better served by participating in a system of alliance politics in the larger Nigerian Federation than by a fragmentation of parts of Nigeria into independent units which would leave it to deal with its larger and more powerful neighbors to the South without the political support of friends in the North.

The future of the Mid-West was particularly ambiguous if Biafran secession were accepted, both because of its oil fields which others might covet, and because it had a divided population which included a large group of Ibo with sympathetic ties to the East. The possibility that it could become a battlefield for future struggles over boundaries was realized with the Biafran military thrust into the Mid-West in

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August, 1967. This event magnified the problems of living with an independent Biafra. It evoked the specter of an independent and oil-rich military power which might continue to be expansive, might seek to absorb the Ibos of the Mid-West, and might extend itself over the whole of southern Nigeria and, in the minds of some, even absorb some parts of the North. Certainly the Western commitment to the military effort was intensified by this experience, and the Federal Government's mobilization and war effort was given a real impetus by the threat which Biafra then seemed to offer to the rest of the country.

Thus, as the prospect of Eastern independence and secession became more likely, the detrimental consequences of this for other areas became clearer. These concerns, plus the already strong commitment of many leaders to the principle of Nigerian unity—which they viewed as being as vital to Nigeria's future development as the preservation of the American Union in 1861 was to America's future—served to build support for the conviction that Biafran independence was indeed incompatible with the development of Nigeria_3.

Did the emergence of Nigeria_3 alter in any way the Biafran claim of being morally entitled to its independence, of being an adequate "self," and of having "authoritatively determined" its own independence?

In some respects it did not alter the status of the Biafran claim. The massacres, migrations, and various abuses to which the Eastern peoples had been subjected were not undone. The historical basis of the Eastern Region was not altered. Nor were orderly processes of negotiation restored. The expectation that the rest of Nigeria would acquiesce in the secession was proved false, but this only served to confirm the Biafrans' conviction of the intensity of the Federal Government's hostility toward them, and thus seemed to strengthen rather than weaken the righteousness of their cause.

Yet there were ways in which the emergence of Nigeria_3 did alter the Biafran claims. First, the division of the country into twelve states asserted that in the East there were several political sub-communities in Nigeria that were separately entitled to self-determination if not to secession. By seeking to extend internal self-determination to the minority communities, Nigeria_3 staked out for itself a moral position which might serve as a counterweight to the moral claims of Biafra.

Second, by dividing the North, Nigeria_3 promised to remove the threat of domination of one region by another, and thus to remove the source of the abuses which the Easterners had suffered. It maintained that security for the Easterners was assured and that the citizens of

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each of the twelve states had equal rights in the new system. Thus, though the past could not be erased, the future under $Nigeria_3$ promised as much security as a future under a collection of independent sovereign states.

Finally, by presenting itself as an entity which either must include the three new states of Eastern Nigeria or else must fall apart—depriving the minorities of their newly promised internal independence and threatening the whole country with a broadened conflict in a scramble for power, jurisdiction, and control—it posed the issue as a choice between a solution which suited the Ibos but sacrificed the rest of the country, or a solution which could protect the future interests and rights of all.

Thus, in a fundamental way, the emergence of $Nigeria_3$ challenged the manner in which Biafra was posing the issues. The Biafran claim rested essentially on a conception of $Nigeria_1$ of strong, fairly autonomous regions, each of which had historical roots as entities, as "selves," each of which could be economically viable if separated from the others, and each of which could therefore choose on its own whether it would or would not be associated with the others in a single Nigeria. The emergence of $Nigeria_3$ challenged that conception, insisted that there was now a different context in which the alternative of secession was no longer a feasible one, and that the alternatives were the survival of $Nigeria_3$ or the survival of Biafra with the rest of the country plunged into a potentially violent struggle over the political forms available to it. In Professor Emerson's terms, the ambiguities of "self" were reintroduced into the Nigerian scene by the emergence of $Nigeria_3$. The "self" of the new $Nigeria_3$ was made to appear as much at stake as the "self" of the East, now called Biafra. It was in pursuit of these conflicting conceptions of "self" that Nigeria and Biafra fought for two and one-half years.

III. Self-Determination: A Reappraisal

The defeat of Biafra resolved the immediate conflict over which of the competing claims to nationhood would predominate. But the conflict as a whole raised a series of critical problems for the concept of self-determination and its use as a principle governing the claims of people caught in the processes of political change. There are three problems highlighted by this particular case: the problem of the new contexts in which claims to self-determination may arise, the problem

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of the multilateral character of the claims involved, and the problem of the international character of the responsibilities generated by such claims.

The Nigeria/Biafra conflict is the first case in which the claim for self-determination was brought to the forefront of world attention after a process of decolonization had presumably been completed. It thus lay outside the presumptions of earlier UN declarations and actions which applied the concept of self-determination to the process of decolonization.[15] It has been the assumption of many that the principle of self-determination applied to all colonial territories, but that once independence was attained, the principle of self-determination was fulfilled, and the concept had no further applicability to subsequent political changes in former colonial areas. Certainly it was not to apply in cases of secession. The Biafran claim challenged this view, and it gained substantial recognition for its position, including verbal support from France for the application of the principle in this case, as well as formal recognition and support from four African states and Haiti. Though the Biafran effort ultimately failed, can one be sure that no similar claims will be made by others in the future? The fear that a Biafran success would stimulate such claims was one important constraint on further recognitions of Biafra. And this fear was probably well founded. With a world still largely illiterate and with many political systems shaped by a minority of politically conscious people, with the great masses still largely unmobilized politically, but with a prospect for growing literacy, growing political awareness, and new forms of national consciousness emerging in the future, it is not impossible that the Biafran claims are harbingers of other claims yet to come. The careful efforts to exclude secessions, rebellions, and similar challenges to the structure of new African states from the meaning of the phrase "self-determination" in UN documents may have helped to inhibit the United Nations from assuming jurisdiction in this case, but they did not prevent the Biafrans from making their appeals—nor the French, the Tanzanians, and others from responding to them.

Thus, the Nigeria/Biafra case has raised the specter many have feared: that the concept of self-determination may be attached to new contexts, and that its moral appeal will not be spent when the last vestiges of colonial rule have been replaced by self-governing states. If this is so,

[15] See Harold S. Johnson, *Self-determination within the Community of Nations* (Leyden 1967), for an account of the United Nations efforts to implement its declarations regarding self-determination. Also Emerson (fn. 1).

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then the nature of the claims which arise under it, and the international responsibilities generated by them, are of vital importance for the future.

The underlying assumption of the Biafran claim was that the concept of self-determination provided a unilateral right. A viable "self" could unilaterally proclaim its own independence. The response of $Nigeria_3$ not only challenged the Biafran claim to independence, but also exposed the difficulties inherent in the notion that the right to self-determination can be implemented by unilateral action. Whatever the final forms of settlement of the Nigerian difficulties, many more interests than those of the Biafrans were entitled to be given attention. This is neither surprising nor unique. The creation of new sovereign states has always been a complex enterprise in which many interests have legitimate moral, economic, and political claims which must be given attention if a stable, viable, and just arrangement is to be attained. In those instances in the past where the principle of self-determination has been more or less openly (even successfully) applied and has gained wide international acceptance, it has been in a context not of unilateral declarations, but rather in contexts such as that following World War I, or in the decolonization process following World War II: Here the concept of self-determination was a principle accepted by the major powers and international organizations as a basis for negotiating the details of competing claims for new political arrangements and new patterns of sovereignty. This multilateral character of the claims which must be given attention in the actual implementation of the concept of self-determination is often ignored in the rhetoric which asserts the principle. And it certainly was ignored by Biafra. But the Nigeria/Biafra case shows how crucial this multilateral dimension is. It serves as a tragic reminder that the concept of self-determination must be understood, not as a principle for unilateral implementation, but as a principle guiding the adjustment of competing claims for national recognition in a system of international order.

If the principle of self-determination is understood in this way, the character and location of the international responsibilities generated by these claims become of major importance. The Nigeria/Biafra case revealed how inadequate the present mode of dealing with these responsibilities is. In this case a forthright examination of these responsibilities was hindered by two doctrines which proved to be largely mythological.

The first is the doctrine that the Nigeria/Biafra conflict was "an internal affair" and therefore not the concern of the international

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community. From the very beginning of this crisis, however, there was international involvement on both an informal and a formal basis. The conceptions that Britain and the United States had of what Nigeria should be were active factors in the emergence of $Nigeria_3$, and the open access to British and Russian military material, including planes, armored cars, and howitzers were critical to Nigeria's military success. On the other side, Portugal let the Biafrans use Lisbon as a base from which to communicate with the outside world and to organize a whole range of activities including the purchase of arms, and France became a major source of both arms and relief supplies for Biafra. As one journalist summarized the situation,

> The Nigerian civil war is far more than a bloody story of blacks against blacks. Almost all the white-ruled powers of the world have enmeshed themselves in it, one way or another.
>
> The lineup of the outsiders is a strange one. It pits Britain, Russia and the United States against France, the Catholic Church and Portugal. All have become involved in different ways on different sides for different reasons.[16]

The doctrine of "an internal affair" was certainly useful to the Federal Government, as it permitted that government an open role in international discussions but forced the Biafrans and their supporters into covert roles. However, it did not bar support for Biafra, although in many ways it may have barred systematic, organized, open international consideration and joint international action to cope with the crisis. Whatever the utility to some parties, it clearly was not an accurate description of the relationships involved.

The other mythological doctrine is that it was "an African affair." The warring parties were African, and it was assumed that the major international agency for dealing with it must be the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.). Though Ghana offered its facilities at Aburi for a conference in January, 1967, that was aimed at avoiding the ultimate secession, and the Commonwealth Secretariate organized peace talks at Kampala in May of 1968, the continuing responsibility for international action was assumed to rest with the O.A.U. However, although its actions may have limited the extent to which Biafra gained recognition from African states, and certainly served to inhibit the UN from taking any direct role in the case, the O.A.U. was a largely ineffective and irrelevant organization in dealing with the foreign powers that were most actively involved—the United Kingdom, the USSR,

[16] Stanley Meisler in the *Los Angeles Times*, May 4, 1969.

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France, and Portugal, none of whom were members of the O.A.U. If there was to be collective international action to deal with the real pattern of international involvement, it clearly needed to come from a stronger agency which could bring more pressure to bear on the powers involved than the O.A.U. was able to do.

But the ambiguous character of the response of the international community to this conflict had other roots as well. One of the obvious reasons why claims to self-determination generate international responsibilities is that such claims are demands for international recognition. Whether recognition is given or denied is a vital factor in the success or failure of such claims. However, there is considerable ambiguity over the meaning of recognition and nonrecognition, and like the doctrines of "an internal affair" or "an African affair," recognition and nonrecognition may involve a substantial fictional component. Portugal and France, who were the strongest supporters of Biafra, did not recognize it. And the O.A.U. countries which were placed on the consultative committee found it difficult to deal openly with Biafra because they had not recognized it. Those who recognized Biafra, in the hope of facilitating a return to peaceful negotiations and a peaceful settlement that would re-establish Nigerian unity, found their relations with Nigeria itself formally suspended.

Thus the Nigeria/Biafra conflict was clearly a supranational and supra-African affair. Yet the denial that this was so, and the ambiguities surrounding the patterns of involvement of various nations, barred an open discussion of the nature of the responsibilities of various nations. Moreover, it prevented orderly negotiation and concerted action which would have resolved the conflicting interests of these external powers as well as the competing interests of the Nigerians and Biafrans.

IV. Conclusion

This conflict has exposed in a most tragic way the fact that the concept of self-determination is not merely a historical relic which we can afford to ignore except when we wish to celebrate *former* struggles for independence. Nor is it a simple moral concept which an abused people can invoke unilaterally to impose its own solutions on others, regardless of the consequences such solutions may have for others. Rather, it is a concept which may have relevance when old political arrangements are being radically reordered, and the alternative patterns for reordering involve relations with the international community. And this is so even in contexts in which the principle of self-determination has not been formally applied and implemented by the UN. In

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such contexts, however, one must recognize both the variety of the competing claims and the concern and responsibilities of the international community for a viable settlement. As yet, neither of these dimensions of the concept, as applied in such contexts, have been well explored. Nor has the international community come to grips with the question of how it can effectively discharge the responsibilities such situations might pose for it in the future. It may be that the ambiguous and *ad hoc* processes followed in the Nigeria/Biafra case are the only ones that can be used in dealing with such a fundamentally political matter as a secession. But whether this is so is a question to which the international community needs to devote more explicit attention. Surely the life of modern states has not suddenly become so stable that the issues will not arise again.

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THE STRUCTURE OF COMMUNIST POLITICS

By RICHARD C. THORNTON*

THE past decade has witnessed a general advancement in comparative studies of communism. Yet, in comparing the conceptual development of the Soviet-East European and Chinese Communist fields, one is struck by the peculiarly arrested state of the Chinese side. By comparison, the "Kremlinologists" have produced a veritable storehouse of analytical tools with which they have contributed to the explanation of the nature and functioning of the Soviet political process and Soviet–East European interrelationship.[1] Relatively little conceptual development is discernible in the China field. In this brief essay on comparative developments in the study of communism, I will attempt to compare the concepts which Western scholars have evolved to analyze the politics of the Communist world, account for different approaches, and analyze Chinese political history to determine the most meaningful approach. I speak of the nature and functioning of the political process in a restricted sense—the ways in which leaders interact, how political positions are attained and maintained, and, in general, the structure of leadership politics in the Communist world.

SOVIET STUDIES

In 1964 an important debate reached its climax in the field of Soviet studies over the nature of the Soviet political process. Two schools of thought, which may be termed the stable-dictatorship and constant-conflict schools, represented basically different approaches to the study of post-Stalinist leadership politics in the Soviet Union.[2]

The stable-dictatorship school argued that, once a succession crisis had been resolved, the victorious leader assumed the position of a Stalinist dictator without the dead leader's terror apparatus. The concept posited a two-stage development of the Soviet political process, each stage qualitatively different from the other. During the succession crisis, con-

* I am indebted to Mae Esterline, Lee Houchins, Frances Jones, and Harvey Nelsen for their valuable and incisive comments on the manuscript.

[1] The most recent attempt to bring together these analytical concepts is by Sidney I. Ploss, ed., *The Soviet Political Process: Aims, Techniques, and Examples of Analysis* (Waltham, Mass. 1971).

[2] For a summary and bibliography of the debate, see Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957–1964* (Baltimore 1966), 2-7.

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flict over power and policy raged, but, once a victor emerged, a qualitative change took place in the political process, bringing stability to the top leadership. In the second stage a united leadership ruled; conflict no longer occurred at the top but among subordinates, who vied for the favor of the leader.

The stable-dictatorship school assumed the existence of a totalitarian, political monolith. Under such an assumption, the leader was above challenge, and policy became the product of the leader's decree rather than the result of internal pressure and conflict. This school of thought emphasized the formal structure of power which, by definition, gave the leader the necessary authority to ensure his preeminent position and the execution of his policies. The elementary flaw in this conception was the inability to account for the renewal of struggle within the leadership once the stability stage was reached. If the victor were above challenge, how was one to explain repeated challenges to apparent victors? The fall of Khrushchev raised serious doubts about the validity of this concept in explaining the nature and workings of the Soviet political process.

The constant-conflict school, as the term indicates, viewed conflict among the ruling group as a constant factor in Soviet political life. In this conception, Soviet politics was dynamic and unstable, with political struggle shaping Soviet institutions and policies. The accent being on power and policy, a Soviet leader's political position was a delicately balanced combination of factors rather than an assumed entity. Factors which determined a leader's strength were the ever-changing conditions of his political machine, coalitions with others in the leadership who represented political and organizational interests of their own, and the success or failure of the policies he pursued. Ultimately, a leader's power depended upon the extent to which he was able, by virtue of his position, policies, and organization, to reconcile or control the divergent political interests of other leaders. The formal structure of power was considered as only one element in this matrix—the barometer of his success. This school viewed the concept of totalitarianism as essential for understanding the psychological outlook of a Communist leadership and as helping to explain a leader's policies toward society, but hardly adequate for explaining the way in which politics is played within the leadership itself.

The underlying conceptual basis of the constant-conflict school is the theory of games. Communist politics is best described in terms of an *n*-person game of shifting coalitions under changing circumstances. Theoretically, three kinds of alignments are possible. First there may

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be a one-person outcome (Stalin's reign most closely approximates this). Second, two groups may coalesce to form a two-person outcome (the current coalition of Brezhnev and Kosygin). Finally, there is the pure *n*-person outcome with each on his own against the others (a highly unstable situation of "collective leadership" which eventually evolves into some variation of the two-person outcome). The most important possibility is the second, which involves the formation of coalitions. Each player must assume that a coalition may be formed against him and he must therefore attempt to form one himself. This may be the unwritten law of survival in Communist politics: Combine or risk defeat by a rival combination.

Over time, circumstances affect the fortunes of the players and therefore the strength of the coalitions. It is always in the interest, but not always within the capability, of the players to prevent any one of them from achieving complete victory—the one-person outcome. (In the Soviet case, the one-person outcome—the basis of the stable-dictatorship concept—appears to have been ruled out by the mutual consent of Stalin's successors when they disposed of Beria and established collective control over the police apparatus. Control over the secret police is perhaps the decisive element necessary to maintain the one-person outcome.) It remains the ideal solution for all players for which all strive and against which all must guard. The concept of bargaining and payoffs is implicit here. The players attempt to improve their positions by offering payoffs for support. The player in the dominant position strives to retain and improve that position, offering payoffs to other players, while those on the outside attempt to build a coalition capable of challenging the incumbent leadership. The advantage, of course, lies with those in power, but the result is an unstable balance of contending forces.

Such is the general theory of Communist politics that underlies the constant-conflict school. Application of the theory has led to a greater appreciation of the kinds of payoffs, both positive and negative, that are possible in a Communist political system. It has drawn attention to the political effects of institutional, organizational, and ideological change, and to the decisive importance of the structure of power.

CHINESE COMMUNIST STUDIES

Something very much like the stable-dictatorship conception underlies virtually all analyses of Chinese Communist politics. The pervasiveness of this concept is not immediately apparent because of the existence of a seemingly wide variety of interpretations of the role of Mao Tse-

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tung. But whether one conceives of Mao Tse-tung as a beneficent dictator, revolutionary romantic, cruel despot, aging leader craving for revolutionary immortality, or master social engineer seeking the rejuvenation and perpetuation of Chinese society's revolutionary élan, each concept is firmly rooted in the initial assumption of the Chinese Communist political system as a stable, totalitarian dictatorship.[3] Even the cataclysmic Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution failed to foster an alternative analytical concept, although a certain awareness of conceptual inadequacy is becoming increasingly apparent.[4] In a very real sense, the field has been characterized by the application of Butterfield's "whig" principle of exclusion, by which all focus is on Mao Tse-tung as leader of a highly unified party apparatus, making the troublesome task of examining Chinese Communist history in all its complexity unnecessary.

Although they are similar, the origins of the stable-dictatorship conception for the China field are more complex than for the Russian, the former being rooted in two beliefs about China and communism. First is the "uniqueness" of China's Confucian heritage. A stable, Confucianist social organization gave China a distinction not shared by other societies. Aside from the question of the extent to which contemporary China's social organization is residually "Confucianist" or stable, Communist China is obviously unique in many ways—but not decisively so in its political system. Social organization must not be confused with political organization.[5] Second is the assumption of a monolithic, totalitarian political system, based on what can perhaps best be described as the cult of Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party. However, I believe that to assume an "integrated" leadership based on a Communist Party led by a charismatic Mao is a fundamental misreading of the nature of Chinese Communist politics. To assume unity of leadership and to ignore or to minimize differences as mere expressions of opinion are among the most serious errors a student of

[3] Respectively, Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the Cultural Revolution," *China Quarterly*, No. 35 (July-September 1968), 1-17; Stuart Schram, "The Man and His Doctrines," *Problems of Communism*, XV (September-October 1966), 1-7; Richard L. Walker, *China Under Communism: The First Five Years* (New Haven 1955); Robert Jay Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality* (New York 1968); Tang Tsou, "Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in Communist China: A Framework for Analysis," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China in Crisis* (Chicago 1968), Vol. I, Book 1, 277-347.

[4] See Parris H. Chang, "Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the Chinese Communist Party," *China Quarterly*, No. 44 (October-December 1970), 169-94.

[5] I am not concerned in this essay with the question of the extent of integration between the two, or with social organization, but with the workings of the political system among the leadership.

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Communist politics can make. In studying Communist China, they lead to a focus on the development of the thought of Mao Tse-tung instead of on the system as a whole. This, in turn, leads directly to "oriental whiggism."

The resultant conception of the Chinese Communist political system as a stable dictatorship bears the following outlines. Mao won a prolonged struggle for leadership of the party during the pre-revolutionary period, assuming the role of a Stalin-like dictator, who, however, generally abjured the use of terror and force, particularly in regard to early opponents within the party. Since the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, Mao has been sitting atop a highly integrated, stable party elite. Conflict, if admitted to be serious, was the result of actions by "anti-party" elements (and therefore an aberration from the norm), or by conscious design of Mao himself to "test" the loyalty of his subordinates. Some have gone so far as to assert that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution itself was Mao's grandest "test."[6] The elementary flaw in this conception, as in its Soviet counterpart, lies in the inability to explain, in satisfying terms, the eruption of conflict and the breakdown of stability.

What I propose to do in the remainder of this essay is to apply the constant-conflict concept to what is considered to be the most stable period of Chinese Communist history, the first decade. I hope to demonstrate that, far from being an "integrated monolith," Chinese leadership politics exhibited continuous conflict, that several groups vied for political power and advancement, and that Mao Tse-tung, contrary to the dominant impression that he stands above the political struggle, has been deeply immersed in it from the beginning as the leader of one, albeit the dominant one, of those groups.

PRIMITIVE COMMUNISM, 1949–1954

On the eve of victory, the Chinese Communists were an entity comprising essentially five large, relatively independent armies and a highly developed central party apparatus. Of course, in each of the army systems there existed a party command structure. In fact, the commanders of each army were both military and party leaders. In command of the field armies were: Ho Lung, First Field Army (some sources state it

[6] See Harry Gelman, "Mao and the Permanent Purge," *Problems of Communism*, XV (November-December 1966), 2-14, and Philip Bridgman, "Mao's Cultural Revolution: Origins and Development," *China Quarterly*, No. 29 (January-March 1967), 1-35.

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was P'eng Teh-huai); Liu Po-ch'eng, Second Field Army; Ch'en Yi, Third Field Army; Lin Piao, Fourth Field Army. The Fifth Field Army, or North-China Field Army, was presumably under central command.

The initial administrative structure of the Chinese People's Republic derived directly from the military situation as it had evolved during the civil war. At that time there were seven "liberated" areas, each of which was ruled by a military control committee: North-East, Inner Mongolia, East-China, North-West, North-China, Chungyuan, and Chiungya, a small area in Kwangtung province. With the occupation of China after the defeat of the Nationalists, this schema was extended to cover the entire country. Inner Mongolia became an autonomous area; North-China was placed directly under the Peking government; the North-East (Manchuria) and East-China (Shantung and the east coast) became "Great Areas." Chungyuan was made a province and renamed P'ingyuan, and Chiungya was amalgamated into Kwangtung province. As troops moved outward from the central areas, the North-West, South-West, and Central-South Great Areas were established. The status of the Great Areas, of which there were five, was formalized in three laws promulgated by the central government: The Organic Law of the People's Central Government (September 27, 1949), the Cabinet Ordinance on Appointments and Dismissals (November 28, 1949), and the Organic Law of the Great Administrative Areas' Governments (December 16, 1949).

The field armies occupied regions which roughly corresponded to the Great Areas, but each army's power position was balanced by a trade-off of military units with other field armies. This arrangement was temporarily upset by the Korean War, in which two-thirds of the People's Liberation Army units eventually saw action, but was restored afterwards. The system of counterbalancing field armies bore the following general outlines. Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army units were assigned to the North-East and Central-South. All units of the North-China Field Army, except three corps, were returned to the North-China command (Peking) after the war. The remaining three corps were assigned to the South-West, East, and North-East regional commands. Ho Lung's First Field Army returned to Sinkiang, but one unit was assigned to Central-South. Liu Po-ch'eng's Second Field Army returned to the South-West, but one unit remained in the North-East and two others were reassigned to Central-South. Of Ch'en Yi's Third Field Army, six corps returned to East-China, but one corps remained

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in the North-East, while two others were assigned to North-China. The placement of these units remained stable until the outbreak of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.[7]

The Peking governmental structure was initially established in September 1949 with the promulgation of the Organic Law and Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The Government Council, headed by the Chairman, Mao Tse-tung, and six Vice-Chairmen, Chu Teh, Liu Shao-ch'i, Kao Kang, Soong Ching-ling, Li Chi-shen, and Chang Lan, held supreme state power. Below the Government Council stood five additional organs, all presumably equal in rank—the Cabinet, Military Council, State Planning Committee, Supreme Court, and Procurator-General's office. These five organs functioned directly under the Government Council and wielded not only executive but legislative power.

Theoretically, the Government Council held the power of appointment in the Great Areas, but in practice the regional military commanders were vested with the authority of the central government. The Great Area governments for the most part functioned independently of the central government apparatus. The only direct link between the two was in the North-East, where Kao Kang held concurrent party, state, and military posts in both the region and central government. Of course, the party's own organizations served to ensure a continuity of policy, but the party's presence varied according to region. In 1950, before the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War, the distribution of party members was roughly as follows: Of a total of 5.8 million, one million were in the PLA; 3.4 million non-military members were in the North-East, East, and North-China; only 1.4 million were in the vast areas of Central-South, South-West, and North-West.[8]

It was during the Korean War, when the Great Areas were weakened by the transfer of troops, that the party's organizations in the Areas expanded considerably. The party was organized along the same geographical lines as the Great Area governments, and was directed from regional bureaus. From the start, tension was evident between center and region. For example, as early as March 1950, Peking transferred the taxing power of the Great Area governments to itself, but, because of resistance by regional leaders as well as an inadequately functioning central collection system, part of this authority was returned to the

[7] William Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," *China Quarterly*, No. 37 (January-March 1969), 1-30.
[8] *Jen Min Jih Pao* [People's Daily], July 1, 1950.

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Great Areas the following year.[9] The first step taken by the central government to abolish the Great Areas altogether occurred at the height of the Korean War. In November 1952, Peking decreed that civil rather than military rule should prevail over the Great Areas.[10] At this time the titles changed from Great Areas Peoples' Governments to Great Area Administrative Councils subordinate to Peking. The ministries of the Great Area governments were also reduced in status to departments or offices, some being removed from regional control entirely and placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministries in Peking.[11]

INSTITUTIONAL REGENERATION, 1954–1958

The year 1954 is not the best dividing line for the decade 1949–1958. Critical events that affected the second half of the decade had their origins before 1954, but it is from 1954 onward that the almost continuous reorganization of party, state, military, and economic structures from the national to the provincial levels and below took place. These structural changes directly affected the political fortunes of the highest-ranking leaders.

In January 1953, it was announced that a People's Congress would be convened at an early (but unspecified) date to approve the first constitution of the Chinese People's Republic.[12] That same month a drafting committee was set up under the chairmanship of Mao Tse-tung. The congress actually convened over a year and a half later (September 1954); the delay indicates disagreement among the top leaders over the form and substance of the proposed reorganization of the state structure.

By 1953, if not earlier, several high-ranking leaders had become disaffected with Mao's plans and formed a coalition against him and others in top positions. This was the so-called Kao–Jao "anti-party" alliance. As we now know, the coalition consisted of more than Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih. Numbered among the supporters of Kao and Jao, with varying degrees of commitment, were Chu Teh, P'eng Teh-huai, T'an Chen-lin, Chen Pei-hsien, possibly Tao Chu, several other important figures in the North-East party and state organizations, and certain members of the Soviet leadership.

The Kao–Jao episode was a matter of coalition politics in action. Several groups, based on the military systems and party organizations,

[9] *China News Analysis*, No. 43, July 9, 1954, p. 5.
[10] *Hsin Hua Yüeh Pao* [Hsinhua Monthly] (December 1952), p. 3.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *China News Analysis*, No. 41, June 25, 1954, p. 2.

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vied for positions in the soon-to-be-reorganized state structure. Mao's group was only one, but clearly the dominant one, in this political constellation. As chairman of the constitution drafting committee, Mao had a strong voice in shaping the future structure of the state. Reorganization of the state structure implied changes for the military and party structures and, in fact, greatly affected them.

The main outlines of the struggle within the leadership now seem clear. A new state structure was to be built at the expense of the Great Areas and the military establishment. The entire apparatus would become centralized, resulting in fewer command positions at the regional level. Competition for positions in the central apparatus was therefore keen. Mao sought to undercut Kao's growing power in the North-East, possibly by excluding him from a top position in the Center. Kao had similar intentions regarding Mao, seeking to persuade or pressure him to relinquish one of his leadership positions—either the top party or state post. The later party resolution condemning the "anti-party alliance" claimed that Kao and Jao, by conspiratorial means, sought "to split our Party and to overthrow the leading core—the long-tested Central Committee of the Party headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung—with the aim of seizing the supreme power of the Party and the State."[13]

Although the party resolution condemning Kao and Jao was published in 1955, action against Kao had been taken much earlier, probably some time after January 1954. From that date on Kao's whereabouts were unknown.[14] In February 1954, at the Central Committee's Fourth Plenum, Liu Shao-ch'i gave the first official hint that a crisis existed when he said that there were those who "looked on their own region or department as 'personal property or an independent kingdom'" and charged that "those who cause dissension and stir up factionalism will be 'fought mercilessly'; they will be subjected to severe punitive action and will eventually be expelled from the Party."[15] By this time Kao and Jao had probably already been defeated.

To the extent that the events can now be reconstructed, Kao had called for the replacement of several top leaders. His choice for the chairmanship of the state post, the one Mao would most likely have given up if necessary, was Chu Teh, hero of the revolutionary war and founder of the Red Army, who was known to be dissatisfied with his subordinate status under Mao. (In 1959 Lin Piao accused Chu Teh,

[13] *Jen Min Jih Pao*, April 10, 1955.

[14] The last official mention of Kao Kang occurs on January 1, 1954, when his name headed the list of guests at a banquet feting the visiting Soviet Minister of Metallurgy, I. F. Tevosyan. *Survey of the China Mainland Press*, No. 719, January 1-4, 1954, p. 18.

[15] *Jen Min Jih Pao*, February 18, 1954.

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among other things, of wanting to become Chairman in place of Mao.) Kao himself had planned to fill two other positions: General Secretary or Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party and premiership of the State Council.[16]

To support his claim for advancement, Kao had elaborated the "theory of two parties," the party of the revolutionary bases and army and the party of the white areas (those controlled by the Nationalists).[17] He argued that the party was the creation of the army and that therefore those who represented the party of the revolutionary bases should receive greater consideration for positions of leadership than those who represented the party of the white areas. This interpretation of party history struck directly at Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai, who had spent much of the war years in the white areas and who occupied the very posts to which Kao aspired.

Kao had also managed to obtain at least the tacit support of P'eng Teh-huai, the hero of the Korean War. (Some charges appeared during the Cultural Revolution which actually attributed to P'eng the leadership of the Kao–Jao coalition.) But he had failed to obtain the support of one other key military man, Lin Piao. Lin declined to support Kao and Jao, siding instead with Mao, Liu, and Chou; for this he was well rewarded. At the meeting which accepted the resolution condemning the opposition coalition, Lin (and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, about whom more will be said below) was elected to the Politburo in the twelfth position (of thirteen).[18] Later that year he was promoted to Marshal, along with nine others, including P'eng Teh-huai who had evidently shifted away from Kao's group in time.

The reasons for Lin's decision to support the Mao group against Kao are undoubtedly numerous, but the history of Lin's relations with Kao provides part of the answer. Kao had become secretary of the Central Committee's North-Eastern Party Bureau in 1940, but until 1948 played a subordinate role in that area's affairs. The land reform carried out after 1945 in Manchuria was actually the work of Lin Piao, not Kao Kang. It was only after the collapse of the Nationalist forces in 1948, when, late that year, Lin moved his troops southward toward T'ientsin and Peking, that Kao assumed control of the area. Even though part of Lin's forces returned to Manchuria after 1949 (and part were assigned to Kwangtung), Kao remained in command.[19] The elimination of Kao Kang was therefore in Lin Piao's direct interest.

[16] *Ibid.*, 6. [17] *Ibid.*
[18] *China News Analysis*, No. 80, April 22, 1955, p. 2.
[19] *Ibid.*, 6.

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Teng Hsiao-p'ing also played a role in the defeat of the Kao–Jao coalition. Teng led the attack against Kao and Jao at the meeting in March 1955, for which he was promoted, but had evidently opposed this group earlier. Teng's role centered around his opposition to Kao's demands for preferential treatment of the North-East in the allocation of economic resources. Kao argued that the North-East had a "special character," being more economically advanced, and therefore deserved high priority.[20] This was in opposition to the view of the Mao group which felt that, while the Manchurian industrial base was to be maintained, as was the East-China base, higher priority should be given to North- and West-Central China for the industrial development of those parts of the country. Here is one probable reason for Jao Shu-shih's support of Kao Kang, for Jao was chairman of East-China as well as a member of the State Planning Committee of which Kao was chairman. In Mao's view, East-China, too, was to receive fewer resources relative to other areas.[21]

The contest over resource allocation in the State Planning Committee suggests that that body was one of the principal organizational vehicles for the Kao–Jao coalition. The subsequent history of the Committee as an organization, as well as that of its members, strongly supports this hypothesis. Membership in the Committee included Kao Kang, Chairman; Teng Tzu-hui, Vice-Chairman; Lin Piao, Jao Shu-shih, Ch'en Yün, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Li Fu-ch'un, Po I-po, P'eng Chen, Huang K'o-ch'eng, Liu Lan-tao, Hsi Chung-hsün, Chang Hsi, An Chih-wen, Ma Hung, Hsüeh Mu-ch'iao, and P'eng Teh-huai.[22] P'eng Teh-huai's appointment to the Committee seems largely to have been honorific, since he was in Korea at this time.

Mao Tse-tung was not a member of the Committee, but managed to obtain sufficient support from its members to defeat the Kao–Jao group there. If promotions of Committee members can be interpreted as a political reward for supporting Mao, then it is clear that the majority of the Committee membership sided with Mao. The promotions of Lin Piao, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and P'eng Teh-huai have already been noted. Huang K'o-ch'eng was named a General of the People's Liberation Army. P'eng Chen became Mayor of Peking. That same month, January 1953, Teng Tzu-hui, Ch'en Yün, Po I-po, Hsi Chung-hsün,

[20] *Jen Min Jih Pao*, April 5, 1955.

[21] Jao Shu-shih was also Director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee from 1953, and was accused of having "actively carried out activities to split the Party" in his capacity as Director. Afterwards, the Organization Department was dissolved and replaced by a Control Department.

[22] *Survey of the China Mainland Press*, No. 453, November 15-17, 1952, p. 20.

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and Liu Lan-tao all were named to the constitution-drafting committee with Mao Tse-tung.[23] In addition, Ch'en Yün became Chairman of the Economic and Finance Committee of the Cabinet, an organization which replaced, in function, the State Planning Committee when the state structure was reorganized in 1954. The State Planning Committee itself was disestablished and reorganized as the State Planning Commission under the Cabinet, losing its formerly independent and equal status. Li Fu-ch'un was named chairman of the Commission.[24] By this reckoning, at least eleven of the seventeen members of the Committee supported Mao Tse-tung against the Kao–Jao group.

THE SOVIET ROLE

The issue of resource allocation leads directly to the question of the Soviet role. Stalin had apparently followed the policy of concentrating Soviet aid in the North-East, possibly in the hope of being able to influence decisions in the area close to Soviet borders. Consequently, he had dealt directly with Kao Kang as well as with Mao Tse-tung. During the initial negotiations for the Sino-Soviet treaty, Kao had preceded Mao to Moscow and signed a separate agreement between the USSR and the Manchurian People's Government. Clearly, Kao permitted the Soviets to exercise a strong influence in Manchuria. Until 1952, the Russians administered the Manchurian railway system and directed the reconstruction of the area's industrial base. Hence, the charge that Kao had maintained "illicit relations with foreign countries" had considerable substance from Mao's point of view.

Stalin's death affected policy toward Manchuria drastically and Kao Kang's position fatally. In the struggle over succession which evolved after the dictator's death, both Malenkov and Khrushchev strove to obtain the support of the Chinese Communists for their respective candidacies. Malenkov apparently sought to perpetuate the Stalinist policy of favoring Manchuria. Khrushchev, in his drive for the support of Mao Tse-tung, recognized that Stalin's Manchurian policy was a liability and turned that realization to political advantage.

In the early months after Stalin's death the Chinese supported Malenkov. In March 1953, in an article eulogizing Stalin, Mao expressed his support for Malenkov, saying "we profoundly believe that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government, headed by Comrade Malenkov, will certainly be

[23] Biographical data were obtained from *Chung Kung Jen Ming Lü* [Who's Who in Communist China] (Taipei 1967).
[24] *China News Analysis*, No. 80, April 22, 1955, p. 4.

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able to continue the work of Comrade Stalin."[25] Over the course of the following year, however, the Chinese shifted their support from Malenkov to Khrushchev. An important step was the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to Peking in September 1954, during which a wide-ranging aid agreement was concluded. The Soviet Union extended a loan of 520 million rubles and raised the number of industrial enterprises it was to build for China from 141 to 156. The Soviet Union was to assist in the construction of two railroad lines linking the two countries, one through Outer Mongolia and one through Sinkiang. Most important, Khrushchev agreed to withdraw Soviet troops from the Port Arthur area by the following May and to abrogate Soviet interests in the four Sino-Soviet joint-stock companies that had been formed in 1950.[26]

Economic assistance undoubtedly helped Khrushchev to gain the support of the Chinese, in particular the Mao group; but it was his position on strategic defense policy, coupled with his willingness to withdraw from Manchuria (and thereby from support of Kao Kang!), which decisively turned them away from Malenkov. Malenkov, at the nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, following Stalin's initiation of the "soft line" toward the West, had asserted that "in peaceful competition with capitalism the socialist economic system will prove its superiority over the capitalistic system more and more vividly year by year."[27] After Stalin's death, Malenkov stated that a nuclear world war would result in the destruction of world civilization and therefore there were "no objective impediments" to the improvement of Soviet-American relations. Shortly thereafter, he moved toward a settlement of the Korean conflict, saying that a "new epoch" had begun in which he saw China as a "mighty stabilizing factor" in Asia, supported by Soviet deterrent strength. Malenkov's "new course" also affected Soviet domestic policy. The easing of tension abroad would permit improvements at home. No longer would heavy industry receive top priority. Now light industries and food industries would develop "at the same rate as heavy industry."

Khrushchev, although he later championed "peaceful coexistence," took an almost diametrically opposite position from Malenkov early in 1954. The Soviet Union, he said, should not merely avoid war but should actively deter it through a strong military posture. A nuclear

[25] *Pravda*, March 10, 1953.

[26] *Sovetsko-Kitaiskie Otnoshenniia 1917–1957, sbornik dokumentov* [Sino-Soviet Relations 1917–1957, a collection of documents] (Moscow 1959), 284-308.

[27] Georgi M. Malenkov, "Report of the Central Committee," in Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record of the Nineteenth Party Congress and the Reorganization After Stalin's Death* (New York 1953), 105-6.

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world war would result only in the destruction of capitalism, not world civilization. He saw the Sino-Soviet relationship as a "powerful factor in the struggle for peace in the Far East." Domestically, Khrushchev called for continued stress on heavy over light industry, at the expense of the consumer sector.

It was obvious which of these two positions Mao and his followers preferred. The Malenkov position of pure deterrence implied acceptance of the status quo, while Khrushchev's hard line indicated a far greater willingness to honor a strategic commitment to China. Early in 1955, Mao publicly endorsed Khrushchev's position that nuclear war would not mean the destruction of the world but only of capitalism; the following year, on the eve of the Twentieth Party Congress, Mao said in a telegram that "the great successes of the USSR in foreign and domestic policy in recent years are inseparable from the correct leadership of the well-tried Central Committee of the CPSU headed by Comrade Khrushchev."[28] But this gets us somewhat ahead of the story.

The Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to Peking, in September of 1954, came at what was probably the lowest point of Mao's power up to that time. The National People's Congress had just ended, resulting in the reorganization not only of the state but of the military, economic, and party structures, and in the radical redistribution of political power among the Chinese leaders. On the state level Mao had lost considerable power as evidenced by the fact that, at the Congress, he opened and closed the ceremonies with a few words, but gave no major report.

Until 1954, as official head of the Central People's Government, Mao had had the power of "1) enacting and interpreting the laws, promulgating decrees and supervising their execution. . . . 2) annulling or revising any decisions or orders of the Government Administrative Council not in conformity with the laws. . . . 3) ratifying . . . treaties and agreements . . . with foreign countries. . . . 4) dealing with questions of war and peace, appointing the Premier, members of the Cabinet and all other important officials."[29]

Under the new structure, as Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, Mao's powers were severely limited by the Standing Committee, whose chairman was Liu Shao-ch'i.[30] Mao could promulgate laws and decrees only "in accordance with the decisions of the Congress, or,

[28] George Paloczi-Horvath, *Khrushchev: The Making of a Dictator* (Boston 1960), 193.

[29] Organic Law of the Central People's Government, art. 7; promulgated September 29, 1949.

[30] Organic Law, National People's Congress, art. 20; promulgated September 28, 1954.

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when not in session, of its Standing Committee" (art. 40 of the constitution). He could not annul or revise any decision or order of any government organ. He could ratify treaties with foreign states only "in accordance with the decisions of the Standing Committee" (art. 41). He did not have independent power to make appointments to any post.

The Chairman of the Republic "appoints or removes the Premier, Vice-Premiers, Ministers . . . in accordance with the decision of the Congress or its Standing Committee." The only power which Mao exercised independently of the Standing Committee was command of the armed forces (art. 42), and this, too, was qualified. Finally, the Chairman of the Republic had no veto power over the decisions of the Congress and its Standing Committee. The Standing Committee enacted decrees, interpreted laws made by the Congress, and supervised the Cabinet, the Supreme Court, and the Prosecutor-General's office. It had the power to annul laws and to appoint Vice-Premiers and Ministers. When the Congress was not in session, the Standing Committee assumed its prerogatives relating to the negotiation of treaties with foreign countries, proclamations of war, and so forth (arts. 31–33).

Essentially, what had taken place in the state reorganization was that the Standing Committee was interposed between Mao and the major administrative organs of the new state structure. The Standing Committee became responsible for supervision of the day-to-day workings of the Cabinet, Defense Council (even though Mao retained command of the armed forces), Supreme Court, Prosecutor-General, and the General Office. In sum, the reorganization of the state severely limited Mao Tse-tung's power.

The military apparatus was also radically restructured. The six military regions were replaced by thirteen smaller ones. The large field armies were broken up, and each of their approximately thirty-five component units was designated a field army and placed directly under control of the newly established (state) Ministry of Defense and (party) Military Affairs Committee. The redesignated military units remained in place, but the many regional commanders and the Marshals (after 1955) were brought to Peking. The military reorganization stripped military, and therefore political, power from regional commands and centralized it in Peking. The restructuring of the state organization also had its effect on the party. When the Great Areas were abolished, the party's regional bureaus were also reorganized, the line of command now running from Peking direct to the party organizations at the provincial level.

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As a result of the major restructuring of the Chinese state, military, and party organizations, there was a significant redistribution of political power among the top leaders. Of the few which I have chosen to note in this essay, two were completely removed from authority (Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih), several others advanced in the new power structure (Lin Piao, Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, P'eng Teh-huai), some made no apparent gains (Chou En-lai, Chu Teh), and one suffered a partial eclipse of power but retained a dominant position (Mao Tse-tung). In the next phase, some of those who had supported Mao against the challenge of Kao Kang and had been promoted for their service used their positions to obtain even greater power at Mao's expense. The party's Eighth National Congress, the first to be held since the establishment of the Communist regime, saw a further realignment of political forces and erosion of Mao Tse-tung's position.

EIGHTH PARTY CONGRESS, 1956–1958

The first and second sessions of the Eighth Party Congress, convened eighteen months apart (September 1956 and May 1958), revealed several marked power shifts among the top leaders. At the first session, Mao's position as head of the party was seriously weakened ideologically and organizationally. Aside from brief opening remarks to the Congress, Mao made no major address. The important political report was delivered by Liu Shao-ch'i, and the report on the revision of the party constitution by Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the two leaders who had made the most significant gains at this time.

Ideologically, *collective* leadership was emphasized, which was undoubtedly in part a reaction to the de-Stalinization campaign begun at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU earlier that year. At the first session, the Marxist-Leninist basis of the Chinese Communist Party was emphasized, omitting the phrase "Thought of Mao Tse-tung," which had been incorporated into the 1945 party constitution. Organizationally, several key changes took place. The Central Committee was enlarged from sixty-four to ninety-seven members, and the Politburo from thirteen to seventeen, with six candidate members. (There had been no candidate-member category previously.) Two new organizations were established for the Central Committee and Politburo, clearly reflecting the rise in status of Liu and Teng, and the further weakening of Mao.

Liu had assumed the Chairmanship of the Standing Committee of the reorganized state structure in 1954—his payoff for support of Mao against Kao. He now became senior Vice-Chairman of another newly

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established organ, the Standing Committee of the Party Politburo. Since 1949, Standing Committees had existed only at the provincial level. The first six men in the Politburo comprised the Politburo Standing Committee. They were: Mao, Chairman; Liu, senior Vice-Chairman; Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yün, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. The seventh man was Lin Piao, who did not become a member of the Standing Committee until 1958, when altered political circumstances enabled Mao to enlarge the Standing Committee and bring him in. Clearly, if Chu Teh or Ch'en Yün, for instance, had sided with Liu and Teng on any issue, it would have been impossible for Mao to obtain a majority vote.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing was also advanced in rank at the first session. Placed at the head of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, Teng was charged with "attending the daily work of the Central Committee."[31] It is not clear whether the Secretariat of the Central Committee had existed previously or not, but this was a newly assigned function for that body. In any case, at every level from the national down through the provincial, local, and branch levels, there now existed twin party control mechanisms commanded by Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

It was at this time that the decision to establish the first and second lines was made, a decision which apparently relates to the distinction between policy and command. In a speech in October 1966, Mao asserted that it had been his idea to establish the "two lines" so that Liu and Teng could preside over important conferences and take charge of the party's daily operations.[32] Viewed in terms of the conflict hypothesis, Mao's "idea" indicates an attempt to preserve a policy-making prerogative for himself while relinquishing the power of command to Liu and Teng, rather than an attempt to develop some sort of succession mechanism. Mao also charged in the 1966 speech that Liu and Teng had established "independent kingdoms" like Kao and Jao before them, and that for this reason it had been necessary to initiate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Mao no longer commanded the power to ensure that his policies would be carried out.

Two major developments occurred between the first and second sessions of the Eighth Congress. First, Mao managed to purge the party organizations, particularly at the provincial level. His speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," delivered in February 1957, provided the justification for this move by implying

[31] Mao Tse-tung, speech to the Central Committee Work Conference, October 23, 1966.
[32] *Ibid.*

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that the party could err. Second, following and perhaps accompanying the personnel shifts, the party as a whole assumed direction of the functions of the state organizations. The "rectification campaign," or purge, also permitted Mao to identify, if not eliminate, his opposition and prepare the ground for the second session of the Eighth Party Congress, in May 1958.

The second session of the Eighth Congress convened from May 5 through 23 and had not been pre-announced. Its tone differed sharply from that of the first session. The Congress communiqué, carried in the *People's Daily* of May 25, called it a "cheng-feng reform session." Indeed, the expulsions of eight members of provincial party standing committees, two members of provincial party committees, and one member of a provincial party secretariat were announced. The communiqué also noted the existence of "anti-party groups" among the highest ranks of party members in several provinces, and said that several party provincial leaders were under investigation for "regionalistic" and "nationalistic" activities.[33]

At the first session in September 1956, the creation of the Politburo Standing Committee had seen the transfer of power from the Politburo to the Standing Committee in which Mao had been unable to outvote his opponents. At the second session, Mao, presumably as a result of the purge of the provincial party organizations, was able to enlarge the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. Added to the Politburo at this time were K'o Ch'ing-shih, party First Secretary of Shanghai city; T'an Chen-lin, member of the Central Committee Secretariat; and Li Ching-ch'uan, party First Secretary of Szech'uan province. Lin Piao was added to the Politburo Standing Committee.

Whether or not the addition of three men affected the power relationship in the Politburo, the addition of Lin Piao to the Politburo Standing Committee gave Mao at least a four-to-three edge in voting in that body, assuming that Mao, Lin, Chou En-lai, and either Ch'en Yün or Chu Teh voted together. This voting edge was sufficient at the second session for Mao to obtain a favorable decision on his program of the three red banners—the General Line, the Communes, and the Great Leap Forward.[34]

However, the almost immediate and obvious failure of the "Great Leap" gave Mao's opponents the necessary political leverage to pry him out of his post as Chairman of the Republic—one of the objectives which Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih had sought to achieve a few years

[33] *Jen Min Jih Pao*, May 25, 1958.
[34] *China News Analysis*, No. 231, June 6, 1958, p. 6.

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earlier. It seems clear that Mao did not step down voluntarily and apparently exerted all his efforts in an attempt to garner sufficient support to beat off the challenge at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, which was held in Wuchang from November 28 to December 10, 1958.

The plenum communiqué, issued one week after the close of the session, pointedly noted that Mao had personally called two meetings, one from November 2 to 10 and a second from November 21 to 27, which "prepared for the plenary session."[35] He had evidently not succeeded in convincing the majority that he should not step down. Eighty-four of the ninety-seven regular members of the Central Committee and all of the Politburo attended the session. Eighty-two of the ninety-eight candidate members also attended. According to the communiqué, the "plenary session approved the proposal of Comrade Mao Tse-tung not to stand as candidate for Chairman of the People's Republic of China for the next term of office."[36] From this point on, as Mao said in a recent talk, Liu (who became Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic) and Teng began to treat him as if he were already dead.

Up to this point, the struggle had not been polarized between two "factions." Several groups had contended. By splitting them, pitting one against another, and allying himself with one against another, Mao managed to remain the leader of the single most powerful group, and in overall control. He has never risen above the political struggle; he has always been deeply involved in it. His political strength has been directly related to his ability to build his own political machine and to prevent the consolidation of opposing coalitions.

The policy decision to embark upon the Great Leap program marked an elemental change in the nature of Chinese Communist leadership politics, for it raised crucial issues for the several contending groups. Representing, as it did, the decision to disengage from Soviet economic dominance, the Great Leap policy posed a central question: What should be the nature of the future Sino-Soviet relationship? Purely domestic problems, such as the type of industrialization program and military system, were directly related to this larger issue, which became the touchstone of the developing process of polarization during the sixties. But that story is beyond the scope of this paper.

[35] "Communiqué of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee," December 17, 1958, in Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank, *Communist China 1955–1959, Policy Documents With Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass. 1962), 484.
[36] *Ibid.*

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CONCLUSIONS

The major thesis of this essay is that the structure of leadership politics in the Communist world is essentially similar. The idea that a Communist leader can build a political position which places him above the political struggle is, in my view, untenable. Stalin came closest, but even he did not fully enjoy such a position. If leadership politics is essentially similar throughout the Communist world, it follows that conceptual techniques developed to study one country can usefully be applied to study other Communist countries. Communist China from 1949 to 1958 was selected as a test case.

The application of a constant-conflict hypothesis to Chinese Communist politics yields an impression of the nature of the political process quite different from the conventional one. Instead of depicting Mao Tse-tung as the great helmsman serenely steering the Chinese ship of state on a steady course, it suggests a free-for-all on the bridge for control of the wheel, and the opportunity for the winner to chart a course according to his own vision.

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INCENTIVES FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

By JAMES L. PAYNE and OLIVER H. WOSHINSKY

WHY are people in politics? Behind this deceptively simple question lies a promising realm of research and analysis. A satisfactory understanding of political motivation can provide a powerful analytical tool for explaining why different groups of participants behave as they do; ultimately it can suggest why they adopt and sustain different political institutions. The basic axiom which, in principle, yields such explanations is simple: participants behave in a manner consistent with their incentives.

The axiom is simple and alluring, but to make use of it in empirical analysis poses certain difficulties. Two of the more vexing problems standing in the way of motivational analysis are (1) How are "motives" to be defined? and (2) What motives, or incentives, actually exist among politicians? While we are far from any conclusive answers to these questions—which only generations of scholars can provide—our research to date has turned up some findings which we feel would be of interest to others.

For several years we, and others, have been conducting field research on political motivation in numerous settings—in particular, Colombia, Connecticut, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and France.[1] After interviewing scores of politicians in these different systems, we have gradually elaborated a principle of incentive classification and have identified several distinct incentive types. Each of these types has been encountered in more than one setting by more than one investigator. Hence, while we are far from any complete or final incentive classification, we

[1] The research which explicitly pursues the incentive approach advanced here includes: James L. Payne, *Patterns of Conflict in Colombia* (New Haven 1968); Oliver H. Woshinsky, "Incentives to Political Action: Connecticut Legislators" (unpublished, 1968); Payne, "Toward the Valid and Reliable Determination of the Incentives of Political Participants" (unpublished, 1968); Michael P. McCullough, "The Brazilian Congress" (unpublished, 1969); Woshinsky, "The Political Incentives of French Deputies" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University 1971); Payne, "The Dominican Politician; An Incentive Analysis of Political Leaders in the Dominican Republic" (unpub., 1971).

Two other works which, while not explicitly focused on incentives, have identified politicians who correspond to one or more of our incentive types are James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven 1965), and the study by Aaron Wildavsky (in which the senior author participated), "The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians, and the Two-Party System," *The Review of Politics*, XXVII (July 1965), 386-413.

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believe the types described below are quite widespread; other investigators may expect to find them in other settings.

We encountered these incentive types in the study of political leaders active in electoral and party politics in nondictatorial environments: national and state legislators, city councilmen, mayors, governors, high party officials, and high, politically-appointed administrative officials. We do not yet know whether these incentive types apply to bureaucrats, judges, military men, or active followers; nor do we know whether they apply to political personnel in dictatorial environments.

As we interviewed and observed these politicians, we became aware that they made substantial sacrifices of the usual human values in order to be active in politics. Their work is physically and intellectually taxing, extremely time-consuming, not lucrative, insecure, and (in a place like the Dominican Republic) even physically dangerous. The formal working conditions cannot explain what attracts these men to politics.

In attempting to explain the sustained sacrifices these politicians make, we found it necessary to discount their superficial verbal statements of purpose: "I'm in politics to end water pollution"; "I want to transform our socioeconomic structure"; or, "I'm here to work for the good of the country." We do not imply that such statements are hypocritical; they are simply too shallow, too intellectualized, to explain the driving energy that propels these men into sustained and wearing activity. Our respondents miss meals, neglect children, and lose sleep for politics. For them, politics is a central, vibrant, and continuing preoccupation. Formal statements of purpose cannot adequately account for their involvement.

Observations of this nature and continuous field research gradually led us to think of motivation in terms of fundamental emotional needs. Our respondents, it appeared, engaged in politics because they gained deep personal satisfactions from such activity. Or, conversely, if they could not engage in politics, they would have feelings of anxiety or unhappiness. Their motives were not intellectual "reasons," but "drives" or "needs."

We have defined incentives, therefore, as the emotional needs which individuals seek to fill, or the satisfactions they get, through political participation.[2] This definition is novel, since we usually think of motives as specific desired "things out there" (money, "power," laws, reforms)

[2] Under this definition specific aims, such as the desire for employment, are not "incentives," since they are instrumental values and not emotional needs. To avoid confusion, we suggest that desired instrumental or external values in politics be called "goals."

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rather than as needs or compulsions that the individual constantly carries around in himself. If the definition seems strange, we can only note that we did not select it arbitrarily at the outset. After several years of research, we came to feel that it provided the most accurate summary of our findings.

We found it unproductive and misleading, then, to treat simple attitudes, formal goals, or instrumental values as incentives for participation at the leadership level. On the other hand, we also found it unnecessary to seek a total psychological or personality interpretation of motives. An incentive was simply one facet of the individual: a salient emotional need. Above and beyond this characteristic, individual politicians differed in many ways; each was a complex and unique person. Again, the decision to avoid a personality-level definition of incentives was not made arbitrarily, but evolved as research progressed. We simply found that this common element which recurred among politicians (the incentive) by no means described the whole person. Precisely because they are single dimensions, and not entire personality packages, incentives have a specificity and utility which more inclusive variables lack.

One determines emotional needs, or incentives, from interviews in which respondents are encouraged to speak freely about their personal interests, satisfactions, and experiences in politics. The interview reveals, first, the central interest or concern of the participant. He talks about this subject more than any other; he is enthusiastic and knowledgeable about it; and he voluntarily returns to it during the interview. Because a person's attention focuses upon objects relevant to his satisfactions, these foci indicate his area of satisfaction. This area of central concern is the *main identifying characteristic* of the incentive.

The individuals of each incentive type exhibit numerous other orientations and concerns which are consistent with the emotional satisfaction they find in politics. These attitudes thus form an integral part of the incentive. We consider them *secondary identifying characteristics* because they further identify and distinguish the incentive types. They also serve as useful starting points when one attempts to predict how the incentive type will behave in particular situations.

In our investigations thus far we have encountered six different incentives: adulation, status, program, mission, obligation, and game.[3]

[3] The reader will notice that neither "power" nor "money" appear as incentives on our list, even though they are most commonly—and superficially—advanced as "motives" in politics. Space limitations preclude a lengthy discussion of the complex issues involved here. We simply note that we found neither of these terms appropriate for describing fundamental emotional needs of political leaders. Both terms generally

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It should be emphasized that none of these types were arbitrarily proposed or even suspected at the outset of our research. In each case it was the actual interview findings which suggested, even dictated, the construction of the incentive types.[4]

Incentive Types

1. *Adulation.* This participant needs the direct affection and praise of those with whom he interacts on a face-to-face basis. His focus is the trust of those he knows and meets—in contrast to the status participants whose view is upon *societal* evaluations. The adulation participant receives this satisfaction from politics by using his position to deliver psychic and material benefits to friends and followers who, in consequence, repay him with their praise.

The main identifying characteristic of the adulation type is his preoccupation, in the interview, with having "friends," with being popular.[5]

Dominican Deputy (Reformista):

Q: Then you don't have any enemies?

R: No! I don't have any enemies anywhere. Not one! (Leaping to his feet) See! (Lifting his loose shirt up to reveal no revolver.) I don't have to carry a pistol as some do. Everyone is my friend.

That's because I give everything I have to whoever needs it. Everything! (Still on his feet.) If a boy needs shoes, I give him my own shoes! (Taking off his loafer and making a handing motion.) I give him my own shoes! My shirt! (Starting to unbutton his shirt.) Is

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connote *instrumental* goals or resources which men wish to obtain *in order to* satisfy basic drives (incentives). They are not themselves incentives as we define them.

[4] Readers may wish to consult the following autobiographies for illustrations of incentive types.

Status: *The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan* (Philadelphia 1925).

Program: *The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin* (New York 1955); *The Autobiography of Sol Bloom* (New York 1948); Frank E. Smith, *Congressman from Mississippi* (New York 1964).

Mission: Whittaker Chambers, *Witness* (New York 1952); Arthur Koestler, *Arrow in the Blue* (New York 1952).

Obligation: William F. Buckley, Jr., *The Unmaking of a Mayor* (New York 1967); Stephen Spender, in Richard Crossman, ed., *The God that Failed* (New York 1952); M. K. Gandhi, *Gandhi's Autobiography* (Washington 1960).

Game: James A. Farley, *Behind the Ballots* (New York 1938).

[5] The incentives of all respondents have been classified on the basis of the totality of the interview. We give excerpts only as illustrative of specific attitudes of each type of participant. The excerpts in themselves would be inadequate to determine incentives.

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there a boy there (pointing) who doesn't have a shirt? Then I give him mine! (Making a motion as if to take off his shirt.) And I'll walk home barefoot and without a shirt. And people who see me walking without shoes and without a shirt, say, "What is this, a Deputy walking around without shoes and without a shirt, why? Because he loves his people, because he gives everything he has to others!"

In interviews, the adulation participant dwells upon experiences which reflect his personal appeal: a nomination which adoring followers forced upon him; an election victory clearly demonstrating his own popularity; a problem or conflict which he patched up, thereby receiving the gratitude of all concerned.

Dominican Senator (Reformista):

Q: How did you come to be a Senator?

R: I didn't want to be in politics. [This is contradicted elsewhere in the interview.] But some friends of mine came from the capital and said: "We have chosen you to be President of the party in Buena Vista Province." I said, "No, I don't want to. Why don't you name Fulano?" They said, "No, it's you we want. It has to be you." I said, "But here are other people (gesticulating) who are well-qualified: X, Y, Z. Why don't you pick them?" They said, "No, no—they have this or that position. It's you we want."

"You always said you wouldn't accept a political post unless people came and said they needed you"—and that was true, what I had said; and they said—"Here we are and we are saying we need you." They had me there! So finally, I kept protesting, but then. . . . (Acting: reluctantly leaning up to the table and signing an imaginary document which presumably made him provincial President of the party.)

Notice, incidentally, that it is unimportant whether this event actually took place. The respondent probably embellished it. What is significant is that he wanted to remember it in this fashion.

The following excerpt from an interview with a Brazilian Deputy with an adulation incentive illustrates not only the preoccupation of this incentive type with popularity, but also indicates why we feel it is unproductive to look for intellectualized reasons to explain participation at the leadership level.

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Brazilian Deputy (ARENA):

Q: It seems to me that politics here takes a lot of time . . . ?

R: Oh, it does. Absolutely all the time. There is no time left for anything else.

Q: Then why does a man stay in it?

R: It's like being hooked on something—as with drugs or alcohol. . . . It's exactly like being on drugs for many people and I know it's that way for myself. And besides that, people follow me, they listen to me. These are the people who vote for me and need me. They have a trust in me. . . . With them and with other people, politicians and friends, I have formed a web of obligations and *compromissos* [promises], so I really couldn't get out of politics if I wanted to. *E simplesmente inpossível sair* [It's simply impossible to leave]. . . .

It really is a lot like LSD: you know that if you keep taking it you will die . . . but you keep on taking LSD. . . .

I am always fleeing people, every minute of every day someone is after me: a Deputy, a friend, a relative, some people I don't even know asking for information or favors. . . . If you were in my house right now in Minas, you would not believe it. It would look like the proclamation of the Republic and it's always like that. All of these people want me for one reason or another . . . but I like it like that. Deep inside I truly want it that way. If there is not all of this being busy and sought-after . . . then I have a bad feeling. Things just aren't right for me; I become sad, melancholy, bored, upset, lonely. . . .

I like people around me and for this reason I like campaigns. That is when you have an unusual amount of this kind of activity.

One of the secondary characteristics of the adulation participants, noted at the end of the above excerpt, is a great enjoyment of electoral campaigns. In these events they are surrounded by followers, friends, and cheering crowds and therefore directly experience the adulation they seek.

Another secondary characteristic of the adulation participant is an extremely warm, gregarious orientation toward other individuals, including interviewers. Whereas the status type, for example, feels uncomfortable in the dependent role of interviewee, the adulation type revels in the interview. He will break appointments to be interviewed

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and resist efforts to terminate the conversation. Long-winded and candid during the interview, the adulation participant will attempt (usually successfully) to gain the trust and affection of the interviewer.

The adulation participant reveals another striking secondary characteristic: preoccupation with his own integrity, honesty, and good intentions in the eyes of others. He adopts almost a defensive position, as if the interviewer had accused him of taking bribes or behaving improperly.

Dominican Senator (Reformista):

> In my house we don't eat from my salary. Not a penny of my salary goes for my food in my own house. It's all spent on politics, on being with the people. . . .
>
> They say I will be Senator for life, that I have the complete support of my people. I don't want to accept deals to run again. If they come to me, [as he clearly expected they would] and say, "You have been the best Senator, you have constantly exerted yourself for us, you have worked for us, we want you for Senator, we want to reelect you," then I would run again.
>
> But I don't want to make corrupt deals. I don't do that.
>
> I will be rich. But later. Now we have to work for the country. I remember the humble place of my father, and his honorability. I always am honest. I don't want anyone to step on my tail—I don't want to leave a tail of misdoing and then they step on it and say, "Look! Look!" and say that I am not an honest man. I don't want to leave any tail. No. No!

For the individual preoccupied with garnering the trust and praise of others, to be called, or thought, selfish (dishonest, demagogic) represents the exact opposite of adulation and is therefore deeply wounding. Politicians are invariably accused, publicly or by innuendo, of wrongdoing; the adulation participant, who is extremely sensitive to such charges, is constantly attempting to convince himself that they are unfair, that he really is unselfish and well-intentioned.

2. *Status.* This participant needs prestige or respect; he is in politics to "succeed." The status participant's focus is upon judgments of worth or "success" made by the society at large. Since holding higher public offices confers status in virtually all societies, an individual particularly concerned about societal evaluations may find an outlet for this anxiety in political participation.

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The main identifying characteristic of the status incentive type is a preoccupation with political positions, personal political history, and the strategy and mechanics of attaining positions. For these participants, the political world is a ladder of positions. Often they will recount their personal political history, giving each precise position they have occupied, telling exactly how they came to occupy it, and even giving specific dates. They may volunteer other precise dates in their career, such as the day they got their law degree. If sufficient rapport exists during the interview, these men may relate their future plans—detailed blueprints often covering many years in the future—for gaining higher office.

The following excerpts from interviews with status participants are illustrative of this personal, career-ladder orientation:

State Representative, Connecticut (*Democrat*):

Q: Why did you decide to run for Representative (in the last election)?

R: Well, there was a vacancy (joking). Seriously, I don't want to sound pompous, but it was a stepping-stone. I have aspirations beyond the House, and I think any politician who only wants to go to the House must be pretty bored.

Dominican large-town Mayor (*Reformista*):

R: [unsolicited] In the next election, I hope to postulate myself for Congress, either Deputy or Senator—assuming that those in now withdraw. They are my friends, so it's up to them. I don't want to make trouble. But if they withdraw, I want to go to Congress.

Q: Do you think they will?

R: They talk of moving to . . . of wanting to be sub-secretaries.

Q: Have you thought of being Mayor a second time?

R: No, I don't want that. Because if you stay in the same place the people start to lose confidence. You can't stay as Mayor and keep your popularity.

And besides, I can't stand still [*no puedo pararme*]. I can't rest. If I don't go to Congress, then it will be four years later. Four years! (holding up four fingers) I'm thirty now. If I don't go, then it will be four years later. I can't stand still. (Shaking his head) I can't stand still.

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Same respondent, elsewhere in the interview:

R: I chose the Reformist Party because it is a party of the center. It's not extreme left nor extreme right. In this country the extreme left won't succeed; it has no future. And neither will the extreme right. That means that those of us in the center will be the ones to have the opportunities. We "moderate" men will go far. The moderate man has a whole future ahead of him.

One cannot resist speculating, incidentally, what this participant's ideological sympathies would be if the extreme left *did* appear to have a future.

Closely related to the status participants' interest in offices and positions is their concern with the techniques and strategies they themselves have used for attaining positions. They will describe at length how *they* went about building up party committees or gaining a nomination. Their interest centers on their own action, not on general rules of political conduct. Note how a French Deputy with a status incentive explains why he invites voters into his home:

French Deputy (*Gaullist*):

Q: You say you receive constituents in your home every week?

R: Yes. I'm in my district every week, and it makes a better impression on people if you do this. They like to be received at the home of a Deputy. I also receive many Mayors and local personalities there. They appreciate this. It goes over better than meeting with them in some dreary town hall.

A strikingly similar comment was made by the Dominican mayor quoted above. Driving along the highway he waved to occupants in a passing car. Turning to the interviewer, he said:

Dominican large-town Mayor (*Reformista*):

You see, I wave all the time. That's one thing here. You must greet people. Otherwise they think you are unfriendly. They say, "Why isn't he greeting us anymore? Oh, it's because now we have put him in power, he doesn't care about us anymore." So you must be careful and wave all the time. Even if you are sad and crying with tears running down your face (drawing his finger below his eye) you must greet people with a smile. . . .

This personal, calculating perspective on politics and an emphasis on the techniques for obtaining positions is the main identifying char-

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acteristic of the status incentive. It reveals the respondent's area of satisfaction: acquiring political positions for the status that adheres to them.

One of the secondary characteristics of the status participant is his tendency to be brisk and formal in the interview situation. He is late to the interview appointment or fails to show up at all; he deliberately interrupts the interview with other business; he takes no interest in the interviewer as a person; he terminates the interview early. This reserve apparently reflects his need to establish his own importance, to impress others with his status, and to escape the dependent role of respondent. Consistent with the need for status, he usually dresses well and exhibits an unusual preoccupation with owning and displaying status symbols, from his elite make of automobile to personal copies of books autographed by their authors.

Another secondary characteristic of the status participant is his cool or hostile attitude toward leaders immediately above him. When asked to evaluate legislative leaders, for example, the legislator with a status incentive will offer a negative opinion, or at best a grudging and clearly insincere, "Oh, they're all right."[6] A French legislator offers a typical comment:

French Deputy (*Socialist*):

> What our party leaders are doing is a complete joke. It amuses me to see the leaders of our movement play at being revolutionaries—brandishing their slogans, shaking their fists, all that nonsense. It's a complete charade.

This antipathy toward those immediately above him apparently reflects the status participant's annoyance at being located in an "inferior" position, as well as, perhaps, his frustration at having "failed" where these leaders—because they have higher positions than he—have succeeded.

A third characteristic of the status participant is his cynical view of other participants' motives and a rather jaundiced perspective on politics as a selfish and unfriendly enterprise. This attitude flows, perhaps, from self-projection: the status participant assumes that others, too, have his own climbing orientation. Furthermore, the status incentive implies a competitive orientation to the world; others exist to be stepped on or stepped over—or to step on him. Hence he rarely thinks in terms of cooperation or close collaboration with others.

[6] Barber (fn. 1), 94-95, encountered the same negative attitude toward leaders among his "Advertisers" who, we believe, correspond to status incentive participants.

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A Dominican leader had just finished recounting how a former friend of his had "betrayed" him.

Dominican Assistant Secretary for Development (*Reformista Youth Party*):

Q: But I thought you said he was your friend?

R: That's it (morosely). He even went so far as to make declarations that we were bad people, dishonest . . . (Downhearted): Have you ever been in politics?

Q: Me? No, never.

R: Then you don't know what politics does. It breaks relations not only with one's friends but even with members of one's own family. In politics friendships are easily broken (sadly, shaking his head). It's a very nasty business.

Even the voters are included in the status participant's jaundiced view:

State Representative, Connecticut (*Democrat*):

Q: Do you have any future goals in politics beyond the House?

R: . . . I might try to run for Congress some time, but it's tough for a poor man. Look at all the trouble Senator Dodd got into. It seems as if elections are nothing but popularity campaigns these days. Nobody looks at a man's qualifications any more. And besides, there's a lot of apathy around here. I'll bet 50 per cent of the people in this town don't even know the name of their State Representative.

This negative attitude toward politics leads us to the conclusion that status participants rarely enjoy politics, even though they usually say that they do.

3. *Program.* This participant gains satisfaction from devising and managing public policy. He enjoys learning about substantive issues, piecing together his preferred policies, and shepherding their implementation and work-a-day operation. He is a problem-solver, but, it must be emphasized, his incentive is not the solution itself (which is simply a goal) but the satisfaction of engaging in the solving.

The main identifying characteristic of this type is an expressed interest in the substance of policy and the policy-making processes. This interest goes well beyond the broad clichés which other participants

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utter. The program politician talks at length about specific policy issues, the details and side issues.

French Deputy (Gaullist):

R: I've been especially active on a project for reforming the social security system.

Q: What kind of reform would this be?

R: It would make a standard system for *all* French citizens, eliminating the multiplicity of different laws and measures we now have. I've been working with my colleague, X, on a test to elucidate the exact means for financing this new reform. At present, labor-intensive industries finance the greater part of the system. This is a handicap. It's all right in a period of full employment, but it does not provide enough money in times of underemployment. So we propose a different means of financing the system. It would be based on the value-added tax paid by industry. This would make for a more just system. [Goes on to explain how it would work.]

Deeply interested in working on public policies, the program participant enjoys describing the complexities of social problems and measures to tackle those problems. Focusing on particular issues, he will often talk not about a major national problem, but about only one aspect of it. He emphasizes minor but specific activities: straightening out a curve in a highway; acquiring a school playground; keeping the municipal budget in balance; or eliminating red tape from income tax collection.

State Representative, Connecticut (Democrat):

R: The towns of Mudville and Poker Flats in my district both had a problem in public health nursing. The state gives so much for each town to support a nurse. They used to give 70 per cent of the cost, but under a 1964 law they made it a flat rate, and these towns were paying a lot more from their own budget than they used to. Well, I checked with the State Public Health Agency on this law, and we finally got the Attorney General's office to issue an interpretation of it: no town could get *less* from the state than it had been getting before the law was passed. So that was taken care of, and these towns started getting help from the state at the previous rate again.

This respondent later named this effort as his most satisfying experience in his first term of office.

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Work on policy-making and administrative management provides the central attraction of politics for program participants, while most other politicians find these matters tedious or trivial. The complexity of public problems and the need for expert knowledge of policy details attract the program participant. Working on laws is fun for these men. Eliminating the bugs from the draft of a law; persuading others to co-sponsor an important reform bill; visiting one agency head after another to get funds for a new schoolhouse—the program participant recalls such moments with pleasure.

One secondary characteristic of the program participant follows directly from his interest in policy: he is aware of and concerned about the implications and indirect consequences of policies. He is an analyzer. Whereas most other participants react to proposals on the basis of their superficial appeal, the program participant looks behind the surface to real-world consequences.

Dominican Senator (Reformista):

Q: . . . if you want a highway, for example, can a Senator just write the law and have it?

R: (slowly) Yes . . . yes, it could be done. But the law specifies that any law providing for expenditures must also carry a specification of where the funds are to come from. Because there may be no money; the executive may have obligated the money for something else.

This provision is necessary, because if you didn't have it, Congressmen would advance innumerable measures for projects which didn't have any money.

Instead of self-centeredly complaining about the inability of a Congressman to get things for his people—the stance of adulation Dominican Congressmen—this respondent adopts an objective and analytical view of the problem.

When asked whether the usurpation of municipal functions by the Dominican national government made any difference, the mayor of a large town (status incentive) said, "Well, no, it's the same thing. I'm a member of the party of the government and the government is doing it. So it's the same thing." But a councilman in the same town, with a program incentive, had a more thoughtful view:

Dominican Town Councilman (Reformista):

. . . It's true that before when the municipalities were with the 20

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per cent [an automatic income provision], they spent it unwisely and wasted it. That was true in many cases.

But now what has happened is that the municipalities have lost control of the expenditures. For example, the national government built the boardwalk, the highway, and the new water system. Now with the 20 per cent in effect, the amount of money might be the same, but *we* could decide what to do with it. For example, Espinal Street, where there are two schools, should be paved. The children come out and play and then track dirt and mud into the schools. We might have spent the money for paving that street rather than for some of these other things. . . .

Another characteristic of the program politician is his tendency to give specific, concrete examples to illustrate his policy points. This characteristic follows from his genuine preoccupation with the external world.

A third characteristic of the program type is a positive orientation toward compromise. He will accept small, slow steps toward desired ends rather than refuse to compromise and thus gain nothing at all. This attitude follows from his informed understanding of the magnitude and complexity of the issues, as well as his desire not to cut himself off, through intransigence, from a continuing role as policy-maker. With the exception of the game incentive (see below), the other incentive types, who have no special appreciation of real-world complexities and no desire to be continuously involved in policy management, view compromise and incremental problem-solving as unnecessary or even immoral.

The program participant shares another secondary characteristic with the game participant that sets both types off from other politicians. They both show concern for the stability and orderliness of political institutions. The program politician's reasons for this attitude are easy to discern. His satisfactions stem from intelligent policy-management which requires a stable and structured environment of roles and procedures. If the political process becomes unpredictable—through force, fiat, or abrupt change—he loses the satisfaction of deliberately and rationally shaping the outside world. Consequently, the program participant views existing institutional arrangements favorably, greeting proposals for radical change with skepticism or hostility.

The following excerpt from an interview with a program participant in the Dominican Republic, formerly the head of the Agrarian Reform

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Institute, illustrates how political instability interferes with program satisfactions:

Dominican Party Leader (*National Conciliation Movement*):

R: . . . What we did was begin pilot projects, demonstration projects. We had one in San Pedro and another in Los Matos. We would pick in each place the fifty most apt people, people most capable of using the land so that others could see and learn. . . . (etc.)

Q: Didn't you find it frustrating at times? For example, you didn't accomplish all you hoped for . . . ?

R: Of course not, but we were making a good beginning.

But at that time it was impossible to do anything. There were mobs in the streets, they were killing the *calie*, the informers of Trujillo . . . people were getting shot. Everything was in confusion—I had to leave it.

In the following excerpt a Connecticut legislator interweaves three program characteristics: an interest in policy-making structures; an incisive, analytic view of these structures; and a preoccupation with orderliness.

State Representative, Connecticut (*Democrat*):

The prime purpose of the legislature is *not* initiating policy. Our job is to evaluate the executive, evaluate his programs and act on what he proposes. The Governor is the only person who can take a broad view of the whole state; he has to be planning for all the state all the time. He can see where the trade-offs come in, whether one area should get *A* and another area get *B*. The broad planning has to be done by the executive. Each Representative should not be a policy-maker. If everybody up there was trying to be a policy-maker, you'd see such chaos that it would make the French Governments of the 1930's seem stable.

Now if you're a legislator who's been there long enough, you might be able to come up with a good idea, but you need a lot of experience for that.

This respondent defended a system that other types would detest—an orderly, structured one in which the individual has little impact unless he has "a lot of experience."

We should note that program types do occasionally show some dis-

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content with existing institutions—when those institutions *really* hamper their ability to be involved in policy-making. Some program incentive non-Gaullist French Deputies, for example, made disparaging comments about Fifth Republic institutions. Yet, the drive of the program politicians for policy activities led them to find other outlets for their interests, such as satisfying work at the local or departmental levels. Furthermore, their suggestions for institutional changes involved minor points which would help to involve legislators more fully in policy-making. They suggested no wholesale constitutional revisions.

4. *Mission.* This participant has a need to attach himself to a transcendental cause and thereby achieve a sense of ultimate purpose for his life. This anxiety to find meaning for one's existence, to give one's self a "faith and a vision, something for which to live and something for which to die,"[7] is commonly considered a religious need. It becomes an incentive for political participation when the transcendental mission has a secular political focus, such as the establishment of a real-world utopia. Marxism-Leninism affords the obvious illustration of such a secular religion; but other, less defined ideologies, such as Christian Socialism or Gaullism, may also have mission-incentive adherents.[8]

The main identifying characteristic of the mission type is his focus upon the doctrine or ideology of his cause and his tendency to consider other issues in terms of it. The ideology is central to this participant and he continually refers to it in the interviews.

French Deputy (*Communist*):

Q: You've been a Deputy for many years, so I'd like to ask you first what, in your opinion, is the role of the Deputy in France today?

R: When you say "the role of the Deputy" that means only one thing to me: the role of the *Communist* Deputy. Now, this role has several aspects. First, the Deputy is the representative of the most advanced faction of the working class. Thus, his job is to use the Assembly as a tribune where our ideas, the voice of our movement, can be heard by all. . . .

[7] This phrase comes from Chambers (fn. 4), 196, whose autobiography provides an illustration of the mission participant. Chambers' religious need appears obvious when he writes: "The ultimate choice I made [to accept Communism] was not for a theory or a party. It was—and I submit that this is true for almost every man and woman who has made it—a choice against death and for life. I asked only the privilege of serving humbly and selflessly that force which from death could evoke life, that might save, as I then supposed, what was savable in a society that had lost the will to save itself."

[8] It does not follow, of course, that all Gaullists, Social Christians, or Marxist-Leninists in politics have a mission incentive.

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Dominican Party Leader (Revolutionary Social Christian Party):

Q: Would you say in the last seven or eight years of political activity, you have changed your views about politics, your perspectives . . . ?

R: No, not at all.

Q: But surely there must be some change?

R: But you must realize that a party like ours doesn't have changes (making a curving motion with his hand); it continues straight . . . it doesn't change.

Q: (insisting) But I mean in your *personal* case, your *own* views . . . ?

R: No, I can't think of any change. I would say if anything, I have come to accept more completely the doctrine of Christian Socialism. That's the only change I can see—and if there would be any change in the future it would be a growth to greater understanding and acceptance of Social Christian doctrine.

These mission respondents were unable to separate their personal views from the doctrine of their movement.

In trying to orient the interviewer, the mission participant refers constantly to his ideology, for it provides real meaning for his life and his political actions. This is still true even when the outside observer finds the ideology vague. When, for example, Dominican Social Christians tried to explain their ideology, they could go no further than express their belief in the need for "a complete transformation of the social and economic structures of this country," or "technification of agriculture based on scientific studies." To others, then, the mission participant's ideology may appear threadbare, inconsistent, or even unintelligible. What really matters to him is his *belief* that there exists an extensive, self-contained, intellectual superstructure which gives meaning to his activity.

The mission participant exhibits numerous secondary characteristics which follow from his orientation toward a transcendental mission. For example, he is intellectually dependent on higher leaders. He looks upon them as priests—dedicated and learned men who are capable of interpreting and expounding the ideology. They show the way at difficult moments, as this Gaullist with a mission incentive points out:

French Deputy (Gaullist):

Q: What attracted you to Gaullism?

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R: I became politically aware toward the end of the 1930's when I was in school. That period was the darkest era imaginable for France. Governments falling every day and the country facing grave dangers with no leadership! I looked around and saw nothing but chaos and incapable politicians. I asked myself, "Why did I have the misfortune of being born in this century?" There was simply no noble cause in which a dedicated young man could work for the good of his country.

Then I heard the call of June 18, 1940, by General de Gaulle and a great sense of relief broke over me! Here at last was a dedicated man who was pointing the way, who provided a cause into which Frenchmen could throw themselves with fervor and good conscience. De Gaulle awoke in me a sense of dedication to my country and my beliefs which has never left me since that day.

This dependent attitude toward leaders flows from the mission type's need to avoid deciding for himself "what is to be done." Having to grapple with such a question exposes him to all the complexities and compromises that real-world action entails. It therefore undermines his belief in the absolute and transcendental character of his doctrine.

Another characteristic of the mission participant is his desire to make converts. He often sees the task of gaining new adherents to the cause as fundamental, even more important than coming to power and carrying out radical changes. The desire to "spread the gospel" stems from a conviction of its absolute validity as well as from a need to prove, by the addition of new believers, that his doctrine is the correct one.

Another characteristic of the mission type is a disinterest bordering on hostility toward small, practical steps for progress:

Dominican Party Leader (Revolutionary Social Christian Party):

R: That's the difference between you [Americans] and us. We have to plan in the distant future; and we have to be concerned with the entire transformation of the society. . . .

Q: Then you aren't interested in a plan for, say, building 5,000 housing units?

R: Not at all! Such things don't matter. Why even a plan to create housing for all of the slums surrounding Santo Domingo wouldn't be anything. It would have to be done in the entire country. . . .

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> You can't think in the short run here; you have to effect a total change in the country, to give everyone a sense of dignity, education for all. . . .

The mission participant's antipathy toward incremental problem-solving stems from his belief that he possesses a unique, transcendental solution to the country's problems. To the degree that this solution is divisible into specific, concrete steps—which others can carry out—the doctrine loses its utopian character and, hence, its psychological function for participants with a mission incentive. Consequently the mission type avoids consideration of specific solutions and keeps his view on a glowing sunrise. In this respect, he is the opposite of the program type.

Another characteristic of the mission participant is at first puzzling: he feels particularly stimulated when his ostensible goals most clearly clash with the existing state of affairs. The blacker things look, the more enthusiastic he becomes. French mission-incentive Communists, for example, showed a tendency to mobilize their energies at difficult moments for the Party. One Deputy described a period of extreme suffering in his life; imprisonment, underground hideouts, near-starvation, isolation. Asked if he had grown discouraged during that period or begun to question his reasons for supporting a revolutionary organization, he affirmed the opposite feelings:

> *French Deputy (Communist)*:
>
> Discouraged? Never! In the worst of times less than ever. These moments give you the exaltation to keep going! In the midst of struggle you can't give up. Then it's most important *and most enjoyable* to continue. [Emphasis ours.]

Similar remarks were made by Dominican leaders with a mission incentive.

> *Dominican Party Leader (Revolutionary Social Christian Party)*:
>
> Q: [Following respondent's statement on the magnitude of the country's problems] Then you don't feel frustrated . . . ?
>
> R: Not at all, not at all. In fact, the more difficult it becomes, the harder we work, because it means that the degraded forms are in control. Our job is more necessary.

A bleak picture of the existing situation reinforces the mission participant's belief in his doctrine as a necessary salvation. At the darkest

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moments he enjoys, as do good Christians, the chance to witness for his faith. It would follow that the mission incentive will be stimulated by the *perception* of grave national problems, crises, or disasters; hence one is likely to find this type more numerous when such perceptions are prevalent. It also follows that the mission participant has a fundamental emotional stake in believing the worst about the existing situation and is therefore likely to exaggerate the negative aspects of the national scene.

5. *Obligation.* This participant has a need to relieve feelings of conscience or guilt, to resolve an anxiety created by the discrepancy between his normative beliefs and his failure to act in support of them. He is preoccupied with consistency, with upright conduct. This preoccupation becomes a political incentive when the individual holds certain attitudes or principles which, if he is to be consistent about them, imply participation.

The focus of the obligation participant is upon normative principles and behavior consistent with them; this focus or preoccupation is his main identifying characteristic. In interviews these participants refer constantly to how things ought to be done, to the moral principles which should govern action. Words like "duty," "obligation," "should," and "ought" appear frequently. This orientation is illustrated in the following excerpts from interviews with obligation participants.

Pennsylvania Delegate, 1964 Republican Convention (pro-Goldwater):

Q: What qualities should a presidential candidate have?

R: Moral integrity.

Q: Should he be able to win elections?

R: No; principles are more important. I would rather be one against 20,000 and believe I was right. That's what I admire about Goldwater. He's like that. . . .

I am in sympathy with many of his philosophies of government, but I like him personally for his moral integrity. I always believed that a candidate should carry out his promises. Scranton didn't do that. But now, for the first time in my life, we have a candidate who acts as he believes. He doesn't change his position when it is expedient.[9]

[9] In Wildavsky (fn. 1), 394; the "Purist" type corresponds to our obligation incentive.

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New Jersey Delegate, 1964 Republican Convention (pro-Goldwater):

I think everything should be an issue (in the presidential campaign), civil rights should be an issue, Cuba should be an issue. This is the first time a campaign will be on issues; I think it's wonderful. It's just terrible the way personality has been in politics, like Kennedy, winning on his hair and teeth. . . .[10]

Stressing a normative view of political behavior, obligation participants emphasize style and symbols rather than concrete outcomes. A French Deputy with an obligation incentive, for example, disliked the manner in which de Gaulle handled the Algerian problem, even though he agreed with the actual policy.

French Deputy (Gaullist):

I wasn't necessarily against Algerian independence. But I was against his *manner* of doing it: making the Army think it was fighting for a French Algeria while all the time it was actually being used to promote an Algeria free of French influence. [Emphasis his.]

An obligation, pro-Goldwater delegate to the 1964 Republican National Convention indicated that he supported Goldwater not for his *stand* on issues, but for the *way* he took his stand.

Washington Delegate, 1964 Republican Convention (pro-Goldwater):

Q: If you had been in the Senate, how would you have voted on the 1964 Civil Rights Act?

R: I would have voted for it.

Q: But how then can you support Goldwater who voted against it?

R: That's just it. That's what I like about him. He doesn't do what is popular. He stands up for his principles.

This respondent is more concerned that politicians have integrity and high moral principles than that they accomplish his preferred policies. The strict emphasis which obligation participants place on principles and moral behavior leads them, naturally, to feel little sympathy for the practical constraints upon politics and political systems.

An important secondary characteristic of the obligation type is that he reports his recruitment into politics as a moral decision.

French Deputy (Gaullist):

In 1967 I at first refused to run for the Assembly. Then Monsieur X [a Gaullist leader] came to see me. Well, Monsieur X asked me:

[10] *Ibid.*, 397-98.

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"Do you think things have been getting better in France for the past eight or nine years?" Naturally, I said, "Yes." Then he asked: "Have things been getting better for you personally?" I said again: "Yes." Then he said, "Well, up to now you have been getting all of the benefits of our action. Now it's time to take on some of the responsibilities." I said, "Ah, I hadn't thought of it like that. But now that you put it that way. . . ." [He agreed to run.]

A Dominican city councilman with an obligation incentive gave a similar explanation for his participation.

Dominican City Councilman (*Reformista*):

Q: Were you in politics before (1966)?

R: (shaking his head) No. No. I'm not a politician. Politics I don't like. I'm always apart from politics.

Q: Then how did you come to be councilman?

R: Well, in 1966, it was right after the revolution and the PRD [Dominican Revolutionary Party] was very strong here. And I didn't like that. Several of us . . . thought we should oppose the PRD because it's for revolution and violence and upheaval and all kinds of nasty maneuvers. . . . And so I felt obligated to help out in this.

Q: So you went into politics to defeat the PRD?

R: Exactly. I did it out of a sense of obligation.

In passing, it should be noted that adulation participants also often report being pressed into participation, but the "obligation" they see is to a concrete group of clamoring, adoring followers. The obligation participant has internal or intrinsic standards of obligation which are divorced from the issue of popularity.

Another characteristic of the obligation politician is a hostile attitude toward compromise, since compromise entails retreating from one's principles. Since in practice one compromises to obtain a better outcome than what one would get if one reached no agreement at all with others, the hostility toward compromise reveals the obligation type's orientation toward symbols and forms rather than results. He prefers to have pure hands and end up with nothing, rather than to compromise and get half of what he *says* he wants.

Another secondary characteristic of the obligation type is an aversion to politics. He does not enjoy this form of activity and would like to leave it. The following comments are typical:

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French Deputy (Independent):

Satisfactions? I've had very few. It's a duty, a job someone had to do. I happened to be the one who took it on.

Dominican City Councilman (Reformista):

Q: Do you plan to continue being councilman?

R: I doubt it very much. I'm not political. I don't like politics and I really don't know much about it. It often puzzles me (laughing wryly). No, I don't want to be anything, not councilman, not mayor —nothing.

With the partial exception of the status type (noted above), all the other incentive types enjoy being in politics. The obligation participant is in politics from a sense of duty, not for any positive satisfaction he finds there.[11]

6. *Game.* This participant seeks the satisfaction of applying and demonstrating his intellectual prowess in a highly structured, challenging, and competitive situation. His focus is upon the interactive structure of politics and upon his own role as an actor in it. It is secondary (though not unimportant) to him what office he formally occupies (the status participant's main preoccupation), or what the content of the decision is (the program participant's focus). The game participant enjoys pitting his talents and his wits against other men. Offices and policies enter as elements of the game: they represent the seats at the table and (in a policy-oriented system, anyway) the coveted chips.

The main identifying characteristic of the game participant is his extensive discussion of the practical rules for successful political action and the norms necessary for productive collective interaction. To the player of any game, the most important subject is how to play it well, or how it was played well or badly in a given instance. Consequently, one finds the game participant recounting do's and don'ts—not the abstract should's of the obligation participant, or the personal calculations of the status participant, but practical principles which, if not followed, will get one into practical trouble and undermine the game of politics.

State Representative, Connecticut (Republican):

You see, what's important is an issue, not a person. You may fight over a bill, but afterwards you forget it. You fight over issues, not

[11] Barber (fn. 1), 130-54, reports that his "Reluctants," who correspond to our obligation type, found politics distasteful and alien.

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over people. After the fight is over, you get along with the others, depending on their personalities, not their politics. . . . When you give your word, that's it; you have to stick by it no matter what happens. Unless you go to the person and ask him to release you. Otherwise, you've got to keep your word.

Frequently the game participant's practical principles are embedded in highly analytic discussions of specific events. Game participants enjoy setting up problems in political analysis, delineating the variables, listing the relevant factors and considerations: in short, describing the parameters of the game. One game participant's analysis begins like this:

State Representative, Connecticut (*Democrat*):

Q: Why did you decide to run for the legislature?

R: There were several reasons for running. First it was for my personal ego satisfaction, I can't deny that.

Second, of the three districts in Smithville, my district was the swing district. The others were solidly Republican and solidly Democratic. I come from the Republican neighborhood in my district, and as a student of politics, it made sense that Democrats should nominate someone from the Republican neighborhood to get extra votes. As you go down the scale of offices, you find that personal contacts become more important for people's votes. . . . [continues through "sixth" point]

Although the game participant's interest in strategy resembles that of the status participant, there is an important difference: the game type can see himself as others see him. He has a neutral, objective view in which his own resources and liabilities are simply more of the factors in the game.

State Representative, Connecticut (*Democrat*):

I'm a good talker, but the trouble is I talk too much. So when I conducted my campaign for the General Assembly, I decided against a door-to-door strategy. I'd never get very far that way. I might talk three hours to the first person I met and see only a few people a day. Instead, I got the local party wives to organize neighborhood teas, where thirty or so people would be invited to come and meet me. Then I could talk and have a good audience, and these people could later tell their friends about me.

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The status participant, concerned with *succeeding*—not *interacting* as is the case with the game type—does not develop the detachment required to view himself objectively. Nor does he, feeling himself in constant competition with other participants, have the game politician's ability to place himself objectively in the shoes of other participants.

A secondary characteristic of the game incentive (shared only by the program participant) is a concern for the stability and orderliness of political institutions. The game participant is a supporter of rules and procedures, formal and informal. Rules set limits to the number of possible actions, they define the resources of the actors, they make calculations and strategies possible. When "everything goes," the game degenerates into a free-for-all in which chance or naked force determine outcomes. Politics then loses its intellectual challenge because victory goes to the loud, the brutal, or the dishonest. One game participant made the point explicitly:

State Representative, Connecticut (Republican):

> You have to have rules. If you're going to have a game, if you're going to get along, you need rules.

The game participant shares another secondary characteristic with the program type: a positive orientation toward compromise. There is a difference in emphasis, however. The program participant conceives of compromise as a practical necessity for transacting business among men of conflicting views. The game participant sees compromise as a central, intrinsically challenging phase of the political game. It is something he likes to do, as Turkish bazaar merchants enjoy haggling. For the program participant a "good" compromise is a *result* that includes most of the policy aspects he feels are desirable. For the game participant, a "good" compromise is a *process* in which he defended his position with skill, conciliated others with care, and ended up on the winning side. The game participant is therefore more willing to shift his position if a shift will maintain him as a central actor in the game.

Another secondary characteristic of the game participant is his evaluation of offices or positions in terms of the scope they afford for manipulation, rather than the prestige that attaches to them.

State Representative, Connecticut (Democrat):

> . . . In 1963 I was nominated to run for town Treasurer; this is a do-nothing job, an honorary position.

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State Representative, Connecticut (Republican):

Q: Do you have other plans in politics?

R: No . . . I don't think the (State) Senate is so important these days. The real action is in the House.

We would expect, incidentally, that local and regional political party chairmen or campaign managers would quite frequently be game participants. Those posts offer the opportunity for calculation and competition the game participant enjoys while not offering what status or program participants need: prestige or a direct role in policy management, respectively.

The Distribution of Incentives

While the incentive types just described are found in various settings, there are clear variations in the relative frequency with which they occur in different countries or sub-units. Such variations in incentive proportions are profoundly important, for they result in marked structural and behavioral differences between systems.

Thus far, our explicit incentive investigations—which are purely exploratory and not standardized for cross-national comparisons—have yielded the following findings about the distribution of incentives:

1. Connecticut State House of Representatives, random sample (Woshinsky, 1968)

Status	3	(19%)
Program	6	(37%)
Game	5	(31%)
Other[12]	2	(13%)
Total known	16	(100%)
Unknown[13]	1	
Total sample	17	

[12] The other incentive was conviviality—a need for friendly interaction with, and personal acceptance by, others. We have omitted discussion of conviviality because it seems so rare at the higher leadership level.

[13] The use of the "unknown" category is a function of the level of confidence the investigator requires for his incentive identifications. Rarely will the investigator be wholly unable to make a judgment about a respondent's incentive, and in this sense "unknowns" need never appear (e.g., the Woshinsky French Deputy study). If, however, one desires to sacrifice comprehensiveness for a higher level of reliability, then one places in the "unknown" category those interviews which might be unclear to other evaluators (e.g., the Payne Dominican study).

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2. Dominican Republic, general upper leadership sample (Payne, 1968-69)

Adulation	16	(50%)
Status	4	(13%)
Program	6	(19%)
Mission	3	(9%)
Obligation	2	(6%)
Other[14]	1	(3%)
Total known	32	(100%)
Unknown	5	
Total sample	37	

3. French Deputies, random sample (Woshinsky, 1969)

Status	10	(20%)
Program	14	(28%)
Mission	19	(38%)
Obligation	7	(14%)
Total known	50	(100%)
Unknown	0	
Total sample	50	

We may summarize other findings and reflections about the relative distribution of incentive types as follows.

1. *Adulation.* Our findings thus far suggest that this incentive is largely confined to underdeveloped countries. No adulation participants were found in either Connecticut or France. In addition to the Dominican Republic, Brazil may have a high proportion of this type: five of nine Brazilian Deputies interviewed in 1969 by McCullough had an adulation incentive.

2. *Status.* This appears to be one of the more ubiquitous incentives, apparently occurring just about everywhere, at least in small numbers. In Colombia it was judged to be the predominant incentive. Since the incentive notion developed out of and during the Colombian research, the study itself did not have the interview schedule or detailed write-ups which would permit fixing the exact proportion of status types. We suspect that status may be a predominant incentive in some other Latin American countries, and possibly in Spain.[15]

[14] Conviviality, see footnote 12.

[15] This expectation follows from an analysis of the determinants of the status incentive found in Payne, *Patterns of Conflict in Colombia* (fn. 1), 27-41.

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3. *Program.* This incentive appears to be, along with the status incentive, ubiquitous, occurring at least in small numbers in most systems and sub-systems. In the Western democracies, the program incentive appears to be important, though—as the French data indicate—not necessarily predominant. In the United States it seems to be the most frequently encountered, although the game incentive apparently runs a close second.

In less developed countries the program incentive is probably a minor incentive, although peculiar exceptions may exist. In the Colombian department of Antioquia, for example, the program incentive appears to be more frequently encountered than elsewhere in Colombia—possibly accounting for the numerous political contrasts between that department and others in Colombia.

4. *Mission.* The proportion of this incentive appears to be determined by circumstances and perceptions, and therefore varies over time. As a rough rule of thumb, we might suggest that the greater the dissatisfaction with the performance of the polity, the greater the proportion of mission participants. It is quite possible, therefore, for a country at one time (perhaps Germany in the early 1930's) to have a substantial number of mission participants, but to have very few twenty or thirty years later.

5. *Obligation.* The proportion of participants with this incentive varies sharply over time. As perceptions of clear-cut moralistic issues or "principled" leaders come and go, obligation participants may correspondingly enter and leave political activity. Thus, for example, the proportion of obligation-incentive delegates at the Republican National Convention could drop from, say, 60 per cent in 1964 when a "principled" leader (Goldwater) stimulated this type to, say, 20 per cent in 1968 when that stimulus was removed.[16] It is possible that somewhat the reverse phenomenon occurred in the Democratic Party over this period, as obligation participants entered political activity in response to the Vietnam issue.[17]

[16] For this reason, we suspect, it was astonishingly easy for "pragmatic moderates" to regain control of the Republican Party which many believed was permanently and fatally captured by "dogmatic conservatives."

[17] Our guess about obligation participants in the Democratic (McCarthy) anti-war movement is somewhat supported by Kenneth Keniston's *Young Radicals* (New York 1968). This study of twelve leaders of the 1967 Vietnam Summer is rather skimpy on incentive-relevant information (and is not, of course, aimed at incentives), but several quotations are suggestive; see, for example, pp. 114-15, 123, 135, 158-59, 210-11, 216. Also see Aaron Wildavsky, "The Meaning of 'Youth' in the Struggle for Control of the Democratic Party" (mimeo 1969), and John W. Soule and James W. Clarke, "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention," *American Political Science Review,* LXIV (September 1970), 888-98.

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6. *Game*. The only places where we have thus far observed the game incentive are in the Connecticut legislature and among higher-level federal administrators in Washington. We also suspect that this type is frequently encountered among party officials in the United States and in the U.S. Congress.[18]

Conclusion

In closing we should note two limitations to the use of incentives in analysis. First, an incentive describes only a fraction of any individual politician; it is not a total picture of him. Consequently, incentive hypotheses are statements of tendencies or probabilities; they are not ironclad or comprehensive predictions of behavior.

Second, all politicians act in an institutional setting which shapes the alternatives open to them and the implications of these alternatives for the different incentive satisfactions. A knowledge of the motivational disposition of the actors—their incentives—cannot, therefore, be employed predictively unless the implications of their choices *in the setting* is known—or at least assumed. That is, incentive analysis emphatically recognizes the importance of institutional variables in shaping patterns of political behavior.

Despite these limitations we believe the study of incentives can contribute much toward the understanding of politics. We cannot, in this introductory account, explore the actual and potential uses of incentives in political analysis. It is not difficult to see, however, that a motivational typology such as this readily lends itself to the elaboration of hypotheses about the behavior of the different incentive types in many distinct areas of political life. Our own investigations have treated the effects of incentives on, among other things, career profiles, legislative behavior, political party structure and cohesion, and electoral fraud.[19] These investigations show clearly that participants with different incentives often do behave differently, and that, in fact, one can predict these differences from a knowledge of incentives.

[18] For suggestive illustrations see: James Boyd, "Harry Dent, the President's Political Coordinator," *New York Times Magazine*, February 1, 1970, p. 12; John F. Manley, "Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (June 1969), 442-64; and Joseph I. Lieberman, *The Power Broker* (Boston 1966)—a political biography of John Bailey.

[19] See: Payne, *Patterns of Conflict in Colombia* (fn. 1); Woshinsky, "The Political Incentives of French Deputies" (fn. 1); Payne, "The Determinants of Electoral Fraud: An Analysis of Colombian Elections, 1930–1966" (unpub. 1970).

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Research Notes

FASCISM AND MODERNIZATION

By HENRY ASHBY TURNER, JR.

IF the number of publications is an accurate gauge, there was a conspicuous revival of interest in fascism during the past decade. One obvious reason for this was the erosion of the theories of totalitarianism that had dominated discussions of political extremism during the 1950's. By linking German National Socialism and, in some cases, Italian Fascism with Russian Communism, these theories inhibited consideration of fascism as a distinctive generic phenomenon in its own right. But in the wake of the thaw in Khrushchev's Soviet Union and the general relaxation of cold-war tensions during the 1960's, the various theories of totalitarianism became less compelling.[1] As a result, many students of twentieth-century politics became aware of the absence of a concept suitable for characterizing those interwar authoritarian movements and regimes in Europe that were neither conservative nor Communist. For some, fascism provided the solution.

As conspicuous as the revival of interest in fascism is the lack of agreement about it. Close to a decade of scholarly discussion has yielded nothing even approaching a consensus on the essential characteristics of fascism as a generic phenomenon, its causes, or even which movements and regimes properly deserve the label. Indeed, there are almost as many differing theories about fascism as there are treatments of the subject.[2] To complicate matters further, the discussion has spawned

[1] For two examples of the criticism to which those theories were subjected during the 1960's, see Klaus Hildebrand, "Stufen der Totalitarismus-Forschung," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, IX (September 1968), 397-422; Robert Burrowes, "Totalitarianism: The Revised Standard Version," *World Politics*, XXI (January 1969), 272-94.

[2] By far the most ambitious and impressive attempt to arrive at a definition of fascism is Ernst Nolte's *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York 1966; German edition, 1963), to which this article owes much. Yet three volumes of scholarly essays on the subject published since the appearance of Nolte's work reveal that there is still little in the way of agreement among the experts: Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, eds., *International Fascism, 1920–1945* (New York 1966; also published as Vol. 1, No. 1 of *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1966); S. J. Woolf, ed., *European Fascism* (London 1968); S. J. Woolf, ed., *The Nature of Fascism* (London 1968, New York 1969). Similarly diverse views can be found in the following: F. L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism* (Berkeley 1967); H. R. Kedward, *Fascism in Western Europe 1900–45* (London 1969); Arno J. Mayer, *Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe* (New York 1971); Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., *The European Right: A Historical Profile* (Berkeley 1966); Peter Sugar, ed., *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945* (Santa Barbara 1971); John Weiss, *The Fascist Tradition* (New York 1967).

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a luxuriant cluster of epiphenomena, variously designated as proto-fascist, quasi-fascist, semi-fascist, fascistic, fascoid, and fascistoid. There remains, however, a continuing awareness of the need to come to grips conceptually with what are undeniably some of the most important and perplexing political phenomena of the recent past. Until now, the most common approach has been to employ concepts and categories that have been developed to deal with other political phenomena. These efforts have produced a wide variety of conflicting and sometimes self-contradictory formulations such as "radical rightists," "reactionary revolutionaries," and "revolutionary conservatives." It may be that the correct formula has simply not yet been found. But another possibility is that these conventional concepts and categories are wholly inadequate for getting at the essence of fascism. It may be, in other words, that what is needed is a new frame of reference altogether.

Such a frame of reference may possibly be provided by the theory of modernization, which, in general outlines at least, has gained wide acceptance among social scientists. According to this theory, the one underlying development of recent history is the displacement of traditional societies by an unprecedentedly thorough and rapid process of change, basically similar everywhere, involving industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and rationalization. If there is validity to this analysis, an examination of the relationship of fascism to the process of modernization seems long overdue. Thus far, none of the theorists of modernization has explored this problem with any degree of thoroughness. Moreover, there is sharp disagreement among those who have taken a stand on the subject. Some have characterized the Italian Fascist and German National Socialist regimes as agents of modernization.[3] Others have looked upon them as examples of breakdowns of that process or as attempts at "de-modernization."[4] What follows here is not an attempt to resolve the problem. Rather, it is an effort to stimulate further analysis by posing certain questions that may be germane, by suggesting some possible solutions, and by exploring their implications for the study of fascism as a generic phenomenon.

Initially, the focus of this inquiry will be on Italian Fascism and

[3] David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965); C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York 1966); A. F. K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (New York 1965).

[4] S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XII (July 1964), 345-67; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs 1966), 132-35, 160; J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, *International Systems and the Modernization of Societies* (New York 1968), 48.

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German National Socialism. These were the two movements that originally gave rise to the notion that there was a generic phenomenon that could and should be called fascism. Today they remain its only universally accepted paradigmatic manifestations. To include other putative fascisms at the outset would be to repeat an error that mars much of the existing literature, where one encounters numerous studies of fascism based on the assumption that it encompassed a sizeable number of cases. By a circular process, such studies almost always arrive at definitions of fascism tailored to accommodate all the cases included.[5] But since authors have differed widely on the cases to be included, and since the legitimacy of virtually all putative fascisms other than those of Italy and Germany has been challenged, this inquiry will begin with an examination of the relationship of these two paradigmatic cases to modernization. Then, the implications for other movements and regimes also alleged to be fascist will be considered.

Italian Fascism and German National Socialism will be treated here as autonomous political phenomena, not as mere agents or tools of privileged conservative or reactionary forces. In Soviet-bloc countries, where the investigation of fascism has yet to benefit from de-Stalinization, scholarship remains fettered by the Comintern's 1933 definition of fascism as "the openly terroristic dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialistic elements of finance capital."[6] As a result, little light has been cast on the subject by publications produced there. In non-Communist societies, too, fascism continues to be viewed in some quarters as only a front for other forces or, as one much-acclaimed recent study puts it, "an attempt to make reaction and conservatism popular and plebian."[7] Since this viewpoint has been effectively refuted elsewhere, it will not be accorded further consideration here.[8] Instead, Italian Fascism and Nazism will be regarded as

[5] This practice has been analyzed by George Macklin Wilson in an article rejecting application of the term fascism to Japan: "A New Look at the Problem of 'Japanese Fascism,'" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, x (July 1968), 407. For an example, see Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York 1960), 131-76.

[6] John M. Cammett, "Communist Theories of Fascism, 1920–1935," *Science and Society*, xxxi (Spring 1967), 155.

[7] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston 1966), 447. As a study of fascism, Moore's book labors under a considerable handicap as a consequence of his virtual exclusion of the paradigmatic Italian and German cases, which are alluded to, but never thoroughly analyzed.

[8] See Iring Fetscher, "Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, III (March 1962), 42-63; Roland Sarti, *Fascism and the Industrial Leadership in Italy, 1919–1940* (Berkeley 1971); H. A. Turner, Jr., "Big Business and the Rise of Hitler," *American Historical Review*, LXXV (October 1969), 56-70. For an arresting independent Marxist challenge to the orthodox view, see T. W. Mason, "The primacy of politics—Politics and economics in National Socialist Germany," in Woolf, ed., *The Nature of Fascism* (fn. 2), 165-95.

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political forces in their own right, whose leadership cadres had goals of their own. The central question here will be what those leadership cadres wanted to do with their societies—in particular, whether they wanted to continue with the process of modernization or whether they sought to oppose or even undo it. The emphasis, that is, will be on goals rather than, as with most theories of totalitarianism, on methods.

I

Although many writers have attributed anti-modernist attitudes to the Nazis, the relationship of Nazism to the process of modernization as a whole has yet to be fully examined. Rejection of the deleterious social and psychological effects of that process has, after all, been no monopoly of the Nazis. Even many proponents of modern change have decried the moral relativism, the anonymity, and the alienation that have accompanied it. Defenders of modernization have regarded these as regrettable by-products of progress; most critics of that process have considered them as grounds for slowing down or halting change. The Nazis drew much more far-reaching conclusions. In their eyes, modern industrial society was wholly and unavoidably incompatible with what they held to be the only true wellspring of social life: the folk culture. Just as their diagnosis was more drastic, so was their remedy. Whereas other opponents of modernization sought merely to slow down or halt that process or, at the most, to turn the clock back to what were seen as happier or sounder times in the recent past, the Nazi leaders were bent on nothing less than a fundamental transformation of existing social reality. Recognition of this has led some to describe the Nazis as "revolutionaries." This seems inappropriate, however, in view of the progressive, forward-looking connotations that have become attached, rightly or wrongly, to the word "revolution." While most visionary revolutionaries of modern times have looked to the future, to a new world, the Nazis sought their models in the past. They looked, to be sure, not to the historic past, but rather to a mythic and eclectic version of the past. What they proposed was an escape from the modern world by means of a desperate backward leap toward a romanticized vision of the harmony, community, simplicity, and order of a world long lost. Their thinking thus seems best characterized as a utopian form of anti-modernism—utopian in the double sense of being a visionary panacea and being unrealizable.

There was, of course, no formal or official Nazi utopia. What is referred to here are the kinds of schemes and the sorts of precepts

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found in the writings and utterances of the leadership cadre of National Socialism. While virtually all the Nazi leaders sought precepts for the future in the past, there was little agreement on exactly what these precepts should be, beyond a general commitment to restore to the German people an ethnic purity that was imagined to have existed in the past. At least two major strands of Nazi utopianism can be identified. One was represented by the Party's so-called "left wing." Its adherents looked for precepts to the late Middle Ages and early modern times. They believed the cure for the ills of modern industrial society lay in a revival, in revised form, of manorial and corporate relationships, in the reconstruction of an elaborate web of responsibilities and restrictions. Although they referred to their anti-capitalist outlook as "socialism," it had little connection with the mainstream of modern socialist thought. They aimed not at the conquest and further development of modern industry under new auspices, but sought instead to halt its growth and, in some cases, even to dismantle it, at least partially. Most of their aims were not framed in terms of the interests of the industrial working class but were designed instead to rescue the *Mittelstand*, the old middle class of tradesmen, artisans, and small entrepreneurs.[9] Clearly, the Nazi "left wing" belongs in the venerable tradition of backward-looking, regressive anti-capitalism, not in the tradition of modern socialism.

Regardless of how anachronistic their goals were in the light of demographic realities, the "left-wing" Nazis at least proposed concrete economic and social remedies for economic and social problems. The same cannot be said of the other principal variant of Nazi utopianism, that embodied by men such as Hitler, Himmler, and Rosenberg. Their utopias were far more archaic and eclectic, as well as much further removed from reality. For their precepts they looked to the early middle ages, but also to pre-Christian, even pre-civilized, times.[10] As remedies for the problems of the industrial heartland of Europe in the twentieth century they prescribed a revival of the cults of soil and sword. They strove, that is, to free the bulk of the German people from the grip of industrial society and return them to the simple agrarian life. Moreover, they strove to rededicate the German people to martial val-

[9] The two best studies of the Nazi "left wing" are Reinhard Kühnl, *Die nationalsozialistische Linke 1925–1930* (Meisenheim am Glan 1966) and Max H. Kele, *Nazis and Workers* (Chapel Hill 1972). See also the treatment in Dietrich Orlow, *The History of the Nazi Party: 1919–1933* (Pittsburgh 1969).

[10] On the affinity of the Nazi leadership for medieval institutional patterns, see the suggestive article by Robert Koehl, "Feudal Aspects of National Socialism," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (December 1960), 921-33. On the utopian tendencies of Nazism, see Norman Cohn, *Warrant for Genocide* (New York 1966), 169ff.

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ues: to the proposition that war is not merely an acceptable means for the pursuit of political aims, but a positive and essential good in and of itself; that heroism on the battlefield is a necessary and ennobling aspect of life. These Nazis, particularly Hitler, were indifferent to legislative and institutional adjustments of the sort proposed by the "left wing" of the Party. They sought instead to transcend existing reality at one blow and substitute for it a radically different social order. And, of course, it was they, or perhaps more accurately, it was Hitler who triumphed and shaped the vicious and calamitous history of the Third Reich.[11]

In terms of socioeconomic issues, the "left-wing" Nazis have usually been—mistakenly—regarded as the radical component of the Party. It is true that their schemes for a reordering of Germany's economic life alarmed many bankers and industrialists at the time. But it was Hitler and his henchmen who, in the long run, were bent upon changes of an incalculably more radical sort. This has been obscured by the widespread readiness to accept the peacetime years of Nazi rule as an accurate expression of the regime's aspirations. Since little in the way of fundamental economic or social changes was effected in the prewar Third Reich, most observers have concluded that there was no serious intention to seek such changes. There are strong indications, however, that for the decisive leadership group of the regime, most particularly Hitler himself, the peacetime years were only a preparatory phase, a staging ground so to speak, for a far-reaching transformation of German society to be effected in the wake of a Nazi military triumph. In this connection, Hitler's war aims are of key importance. It is now abundantly clear that he was in no sense, as Marxist-Leninists still insist, a mere tool of the "monopoly capitalists" who launched the second World War to enable German big business to indulge its allegedly insatiable appetite for plunder and exploitation at the expense of the human and natural resources of other countries. Instead, from all indications, Hitler was very much his own master. Moreover, his central and overriding war aim throughout was to conquer *Lebensraum*—arable soil in eastern Europe.[12] As has been widely recognized, this

[11] There are indications, however, that elements of the "left wing" survived what have usually been regarded as its conclusive defeats, and persisted in influential positions until the end of the Third Reich; see Alan Milward, "French Labour and the German Economy, 1942–1945: An Essay on the Nature of the Fascist New Order," *Economic History Review*, XXIII (August 1970), 336-51.

[12] On the remarkable consistency of Hitler's foreign policy views and actions from 1924 on, see Eberhard Jäckel, *Hitlers Weltanschauung* (Tübingen 1969), 29-57; Axel Kuhn, *Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm* (Stuttgart 1970).

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Raumpolitik had an economic rationale, if a highly impractical one: it was designed to end Germany's dependence on imported foodstuffs and thereby eliminate the need to produce industrial goods for export. What has not been sufficiently noted is the extent to which the pursuit of *Lebensraum* was intended by Hitler and his henchmen to serve a socio-ethical purpose as well. By reducing Germany's need for industry and thus for industrial workers, and by providing fertile soil upon which these displaced workers and others could be resettled, the acquisition of *Lebensraum* was expected to open the way to a vast new wave of German eastward colonization comparable to that of the Middle Ages. Millions of Germans were to be freed from enslavement to factories that would no longer be needed to produce export goods required to pay for imported foodstuffs. They were to be liberated from the corrupting, debilitating industrial cities, which, in the opinion of the Nazi leaders, had come to threaten the very survival of the folk.[13] Resettled on the land in the east, these colonists were expected to revert to the simple, pure folkways of their ancestors, becoming once more a sturdy yeomanry and an inexhaustible reservoir of warriors for future wars.[14] With racial purity thus supplemented by cultural purity, German society would at last be restored to health.

Although these Nazi schemes were unrivalled in their ruthless audacity, the same hostility to modern industrial society that gave rise to them can be found elsewhere. Numerous precursors to the utopian

[13] Hitler's scorn for modern industrial cities has not received the attention it deserves. In his unpublished book of 1928 he described them as "abscesses on the body of the folk (*Volkskörper*), in which all vices, bad habits and sicknesses seem to unite. They are above all hotbeds of miscegenation and bastardization. . . ." See Gerhard L. Weinberg, ed., *Hitlers Zweites Buch* (Stuttgart 1961), 61f. On the sources and importance of the anti-urban component of Nazi ideology, see Klaus Bergmann, *Agrarromantik und Grossstadtfeindlichkeit* (Meisenheim am Glan 1970). Unaccountably, Bergmann asserts in his conclusions, without evidence, that Hitler did not fully subscribe to the rural utopianism of the movement (355). Recently, Hitler's enthusiastic participation in plans for the postwar reconstruction of Berlin have been cited as evidence of lack of hostility toward big cities on his part: Barbara Miller Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918–1945* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968), 189. However, Albert Speer, who worked closely with Hitler on these plans, repeatedly specifies in his memoirs, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York 1970), that Hitler's interest in the Berlin of the future was limited to its awe-inspiring, monumental government district. When discussion turned to projects designed to make the capital city as a whole a more liveable place for its millions of inhabitants, the *Führer*'s attention wandered, and he sought to change the subject.

[14] For the importance accorded to this project in the Third Reich, see Robert Koehl, *RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939–1945* (Cambridge, Mass. 1957). For Hitler's wartime views on German colonization in the east, see Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens, trans., *Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941–1944* (New York 1953), *passim*. On Himmler's ideas, see Josef Ackermann, *Heinrich Himmler als Ideologe* (Göttingen 1970).

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anti-modernism of the Nazis have been identified in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Germany.[15] Moreover, the growing body of scholarship on what has been described as "cultural fascism" indicates that the same general sort of tendencies were apparently present all across Europe, particularly in artistic and literary circles.[16] It is customary to explain these tendencies in terms of the nefarious effects of such intellectual influences as romanticism, social Darwinism, and the writings of Nietzsche. But cannot the popularity of such attitudes perhaps be more adequately explained as the expression of a genuine crisis of popular culture, taking that term in its deepest and broadest sense? After all, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked, for most of western and central Europe, the great watershed of modernization, when the changes wrought by that process began to affect the life of the populace at large in a direct fashion. It was then that the old and settled patterns of life were first disrupted and displaced on a large scale. Only then, for example, did society's center of gravity shift from the countryside to the city; with unprecedented rapidity, millions were torn loose from the customary patterns of agrarian life and thrust into an alien urban world. In that same process, venerable cultural values were subjected to widespread challenge and discreditation. Traditional religion in particular lost ground rapidly; secularism, previously reserved almost exclusively for the privileged and educated, became a mass phenomenon for the first time. Many of those thus torn loose from their cultural and societal roots found a new secular point of reference in the socialist movement. But others remained uprooted and adrift in a threatening, alien world for which they were ill-prepared. It seems scarcely surprising that some of the latter proved to be susceptible to movements vehemently hostile to that world.

This crisis of popular culture was still further heightened by the first World War during which the impact of modernization challenged even the ancient and deep-seated cluster of values based on martial valor. Rooted in mankind's prehistoric past, the heroic ideal remained

[15] See George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology* (New York 1964), and Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair* (Berkeley 1961).

[16] For examples, see John R. Harrison, *The Reactionaries* (New York 1967); Alistair Hamilton, *The Appeal of Fascism* (New York 1971); Robert Soucy, "Romanticism and Realism in the Fascism of Drieu la Rochelle," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXXI (January-March 1970), 69-90; William R. Tucker, "Politics and Aesthetics: The Fascism of Robert Brasillach," *Western Political Quarterly*, XV (December 1962), 605-17; Tucker, "Fascism and Individualism: The Political Thought of Pierre Drieu la Rochelle," *Journal of Politics*, XXVII (February 1965), 153-77; Rene Winegarten, "The Fascist Mentality—Drieu la Rochelle," *Wiener Library Bulletin*, XII (Winter 1967/68), 37-43; Winegarten, "The Temptations of Cultural Fascism," *Wiener Library Bulletin*, XIII (Winter 1968/69), 34-40.

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into modern times a far more fundamental part of the popular culture of Europe than is generally recognized; even Christianity, despite its antithetical ethical tenets, made little headway against the martial code, having chosen many centuries earlier to effect an accommodation in order to gain influence over the holders of power in the warrior societies of Europe. Pacifism, or at least opposition to international conflict, was a growing force by the early twentieth century, buttressed by the rejection of war by the socialist parties. But the enthusiastic response of the masses to the outbreak of fighting in 1914 revealed that pacifist convictions were still limited largely to a thin stratum of intellectuals. However, what pacifist agitation had failed to accomplish was achieved to a remarkable degree by the war itself. For the first time the impact of industrialization on warfare became massively manifest, and the anonymous and methodical slaughter made possible by modern weapons evoked a widespread rejection of traditional martial values. Belief in the merit of individual heroism, in combat as a contest of strength and willpower that pitted man against man, was rendered absurd in the eyes of millions through the dominance of the battlefield by the machine gun, long-range artillery, and poison gas. Those who recognized this had made the first step toward emancipation from one of the most retrograde components of traditional culture. But others, for reasons still not fully explained, emerged from the carnage of the war with their faith in martial values still intact.[17] For them, denunciations of war and the heroic ideal amounted to an infuriating desecration of a lofty and noble code. In Italy and Germany this resentment was further heightened by frustration and shame over the outcome of the war and the peace settlement; this may help to account for the fanaticism of those adherents of Italian Fascism and National Socialism that have aptly been labeled "military desperadoes."[18]

II

The crucial problem for the purposes of this inquiry is whether, if German National Socialism can accurately be characterized as an expression of utopian anti-modernism, the same was true of Italian Fascism. Was there a kinship between the Nazi drive for *Lebensraum* and the Fascists' quest for a revived Roman Empire, astraddle the Medi-

[17] For a suggestive attempt at an answer, see James H. McRandle, *The Track of the Wolf* (Evanston 1965), 51-79.

[18] Wolfgang Sauer, "National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?" *American Historical Review*, LXXIII (December 1967), 411.

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terranean?[19] Was a similar desire to effect a return to the soil behind Mussolini's pledge to "ruralize" Italy, "even if it costs billions and takes half a century"?[20] Were the Fascists, like the Nazis, as committed to the martial ideal as would seem to be indicated by Mussolini's famous formulation: "War is to man what maternity is to a woman"?[21] Or, alternatively, does Mussolini's propagation of the doctrine of "productivism" indicate that he was in reality a modernizer, bent upon propelling Italy into the forefront of the new age by accelerating the process of modernization?[22] These questions remain unresolved. Only a few writers have confronted them thus far, and their answers differ, often diametrically. Some have viewed the Fascists, like the Nazis, as extreme opponents of the modern industrial world;[23] others have portrayed them as at least would-be modernizers.[24]

Since the problem of Italian Fascism's relationship to modernization has only recently begun to be considered, it is to be hoped that further inquiries will yield a clarification. Those who undertake such inquiries would do well, however, to keep in mind certain essential distinctions that can be made with regard to Nazism and modernization. The German case would seem to indicate, for example, that a positive attitude toward the products of modern industry should not necessarily be equated with approval of the larger process of modernization. Despite his denunciations of the "materialism" of modern society, Hitler relished speeding through the countryside in his powerful Mercedes-Benz convertible or descending dramatically out of the clouds in a chartered airplane. Neither he nor his associates displayed any inclina-

[19] In *Mussolini's Early Diplomacy* (Princeton 1970), Alan Cassels attributes the Fascist regime's drive for territorial expansion on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and in East Africa to a desire for "national glory and living space for Italy's surplus population . . ." (391). Cassels characterizes this policy as an arrogation of the "Crispian tradition," but it would be worthwhile to examine whether the Fascists' motives may not have more closely resembled those of the Nazis than those of the liberal imperialists of the late nineteenth century.

[20] Quoted in Carl T. Schmidt, *The Plough and the Sword* (New York 1938), 43.

[21] Max Gallo, *L'Italie de Mussolini* (Verviers 1964), 243.

[22] On Fascist "productivism," see Sarti (fn. 8), 22f.; also Charles S. Maier, "Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European ideologies and the vision of industrial productivity in the 1920s," *Journal of Contemporary History*, v (No. 2, 1970), 40-45.

[23] Nolte (fn. 2); Sauer (fn. 18). Italian scholars have, virtually without exception, dealt with Fascism as an isolated national problem, ignoring all except the Marxist theories of fascism as a generic phenomenon. A departure from this pattern may be found in the recent survey of theories about fascism by Renzo De Felice, *Le interpretazioni del fascismo* (Bari 1969).

[24] Sarti (fn. 8); Alan Cassels, "Janus: The Two Faces of Fascism," The Canadian Historical Association, *Historical Papers* (1969), 165-84; A. James Gregor, *The Ideology of Fascism* (New York 1969); Edward R. Tannenbaum, "The Goals of Italian Fascism," *American Historical Review*, LXXIV (April 1969), 1183-1204.

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tion to dispense with indoor plumbing or central heating. Most were, in fact, fascinated by technology and, despite their hostility to industrial society, stood in awe of German industry. It is revealing, however, that this awe derived not from a recognition by the Nazi leaders of industry's potential for improving the nation's standard of living. It resulted instead from their realization that industry was a source of immense power that could be harnessed for the pursuit of their own antimodern utopias.[25] Moreover, the Nazis accorded to the products of industry, such as automobiles, airplanes, tanks and other modern weapons, a curious sort of autonomy, viewing them largely in isolation from the social, economic, and political concomitants of the processes that made them possible. In other words, the Nazis wanted to have the products of industry, but without an industrial society. Something of this same tendency to attribute an autonomous existence to the material products of industrial society seems to have characterized the Italian futurist movement, to which Mussolini was for a time apparently favorably inclined.[26] It would be interesting to learn whether, and to what extent, he and other Fascist leaders subscribed to similar attitudes.

On the basis of the German experience, it also seems dangerous to assume that even the implementation of what appear objectively to be modernizing policies is proof that a regime is committed to modernization. Once the Nazis came to power, they generally allowed most of the manifestations of modernization they had excoriated while they were an opposition movement to continue with little interference, at least during the peacetime years. Despite continuing rhetoric to the contrary, industry grew still bigger in the Third Reich, German cities became still larger, the flight from the land persisted, and women continued to be drawn into the labor force.[27] This seeming paradox has puzzled a good many observers, but there is a simple explanation. How, after all, was it possible to obtain vast stretches of *Lebensraum* for the purpose of de-urbanizing and de-industrializing Germany in

[25] Albert Speer, in his memoirs (fn. 13), relates that Hitler objected to industry on the grounds that it gave rise to communism and bred an intelligentsia, something the *Führer* regarded as undesirable (309). Yet Speer records that, upon his appointment as Munitions Minister in 1942, Hitler advised him to circumvent the bureaucracy whenever possible and deal directly with industry, since that was where the best brains were (202). According to Speer, Hitler abandoned his original plan to de-industrialize the occupied territories of the East only when he came to realize the necessity of utilizing industrial installations there on behalf of the German war effort (309).

[26] See James Joll's essay on Filippo Tommaso Marinetti and Fascism in his *Three Intellectuals in Politics* (New York 1965), 133-84.

[27] For the best analysis, see David Schoenbaum, *Hitler's Social Revolution* (New York 1966).

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the mid-twentieth century other than by conquest? And how was such conquest possible except by resort to a vast industrial war machine? The Nazis, that is, practiced modernization inadvertently in order to pursue their fundamentally anti-modern aims.[28] For them, modernizing policies were not ends in themselves but mere means to another goal which, once realized, would render them largely unnecessary. Might there have been something of this behind the apparent modernizing measures of the Fascist regime in Italy as well? Could those policies also have been only means toward a similarly backward-looking utopian goal in the form of the oft-proclaimed revival of the Roman Empire? Might not such policies have been designed merely to ready Italy for the warfare which Mussolini and other Fascists, like the Nazis, so lavishly praised as an intrinsic and elevating aspect of human culture?

It is, of course, conceivable that Mussolini and his associates were simply political opportunists who were indifferent to modernization, or that Italian Fascism was a mixed case, containing both modernist and anti-modernist elements and following no clear line, or a vacillating one. It is also conceivable that Fascism may have undergone a transformation after the achievement of power, possibly through a shift in strength in favor of a pro-modernist faction. Like all governing groups in twentieth-century Europe, the Fascists had to cope with rising material and social aspirations awakened in the populace by earlier stages of modernization—aspirations that were especially acute in Italy because of that country's severe demographic and economic problems. As elsewhere, there were undoubtedly strong incentives in Fascist Italy for at least an accommodation with modernization. The Nazi leadership successfully withstood such temptations, doggedly pursuing its anti-modern utopian schemes into a disastrous war. In the course of their much longer reigns, on the other hand, such rulers as Franco and Salazar were to allow their non-utopian forms of anti-modernism to be considerably eroded by modernizing measures. Is it possible that the same could have been true of the Fascists? Or might the ultimate plunge into war at the side of Nazi Germany indicate that they had never abandoned the pursuit of utopian precepts derived from a vision of Italy's past, but had instead only been temporarily deterred by Italy's weakness and vulnerability?

If it should prove that the Fascists, like the Nazis, did in fact represent a particularly extreme form of anti-modernism, the next task

[28] *Ibid.*, 288.

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would be to explain why this became the focus of potent political movements in Italy and Germany, whereas in most of Europe it remained a diffuse set of attitudes held by a few intellectuals or, at most, the rallying point for hapless splinter parties. With regard to causal factors of a socioeconomic nature, the theory of modernization may be able to provide a conceptual framework more satisfactory than the Marxist doctrine of "monopoly" or "late" capitalism, which posits a basic identity between all capitalist societies, including those in which no allegedly fascist movement has assumed importance. One finds a number of suggestively parallel features if one looks at the shape and pace of modernization in Italy and Germany (omitting from the comparison the backward *mezzogiorno*), that seem to distinguish their experiences from those of other major European nations. In both countries, the process of change began relatively late and proceeded rapidly but unevenly. Certain sectors of the two economies and certain regions of the two countries were transformed swiftly, rapidly displacing or disadvantaging large numbers of people involved in older modes of production and distribution. On the other hand, some sectors and regions were only partially affected, leaving intact sizeable vested interests which feared further changes and were hostile to those that had already taken place. In both countries, in short, the shape and pace of modernization may have been such as to produce especially large reservoirs of hostility toward that process. Conversely, similar factors may help to explain the failure of utopian anti-modernism to assume political importance in other European countries. May not modernization in Britain have been too long-established, too thoroughgoing, and too far advanced to allow such a widespread reaction? And may not France have escaped for the opposite reason, because modernization had proceeded with comparative slowness there in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, possibly leaving French society less affected by rapid transformations of the sort experienced in Germany and northern Italy?[29]

It is inadequate, however, to seek an explanation for the existence of widespread anti-modernist sentiments solely in material terms. Many middle-class Germans who cast their ballots for the Nazis cannot be classified, either economically or socially, as "losers" in the process of modernization. Nevertheless, their political behavior may not neces-

[29] For comparative data on the rate of change, see Surendra J. Patel, "Rates of Industrial Growth in the Last Century, 1860–1958," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, IX (April 1961), 316-30. On the obstacles to change in France, see John E. Sawyer, "Strains in the Social Structure of Modern France," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Modern France* (Princeton 1951).

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sarily have been unrelated to modernization, for there are strong indications that they perceived in a negative light those processes of change from which, by any objective measure, they themselves derived material and even social benefits.[30] A number of historians have provided penetrating studies of certain aspects of Germany's cultural, social, and political heritage that contributed to this negative response.[31] Unfortunately, the theorists of modernization have accorded little attention to what might be termed a subjective, or "soft," side of that process. Yet it may well be that people's perceptions of the changes wrought by modernization are just as important in determining political responses as is modernization's "hard" side of objective social and economic effects.

This is not to imply that everyone who joined the Nazi or Fascist parties, voted for them, or supported their regimes harbored utopian anti-modernist views, even if it should prove that such an outlook did predominate among their leaders. Presumably, hostility toward the manifestations of modernization can be as vague and inchoate a sentiment as any other, so that even those followers who may have been anti-modernists might not necessarily have been adherents of the utopian variety. Moreover, given the limitations of human perception and the capacity of men for self-delusion, as well as the calculated efforts of the Nazi and Fascist leaders to make their movements appealing to as many people as possible by toning down their views before certain kinds of audiences, it seems quite possible that some of their followers may not have been anti-modernists at all. Certainly both movements garnered considerable support because of their adroit exploitation of intensely emotional issues that had little direct connection with underlying processes of technological and societal change, such as the lost war in the case of Germany, and the allegedly lost peace in that of Italy, as well as the economic crises in both countries. The two movements, that is, became significant political forces as a consequence of their tactical success in mobilizing coalitions of malcontents; by no means all or even most of these malcontents necessarily subscribed to, or were even aware of, the full implications of the ideological predilections of the leadership cadres.

Their acquisitions of power, in turn, cannot be attributed to acceptance of utopian anti-modernism by the bulk of the citizenry, since

[30] See the illuminating analysis of middle-class political behavior in a small German town in William Sheridan Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power* (Chicago 1965).

[31] See Mosse (fn. 15) and Stern (fn. 15); also Herman Lebovics, *Social Conservatism and the Middle Classes in Germany* (Princeton 1969); Klemens von Klemperer, *Germany's New Conservatism* (Princeton 1957).

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both movements came to power as minority groups, although the Nazis were far stronger in 1933 than the Fascists had been in 1922. Still, it might be worthwhile to consider the extent to which their successes can be explained in terms of the exploitation, by extreme anti-modernist forces, of a stalemate between rival groups of modernizers. Both the Fascists and the Nazis gained power by taking advantage of political opportunities that arose when the parliamentary machinery of the two countries became paralyzed, in large measure as a consequence of a deadlock between those who wanted to continue modernizing under the untrammeled auspices of private enterprise and those who wished to move in the direction of a greater degree of state control. In Germany as in Italy this deadlock accorded decisive political importance to groups that might be described as conservative and reactionary anti-modernists—those who wished to slow down the process of change or to turn the clock back somewhat, but not to impose a utopian remedy. These groups, badly underestimating the Nazis and the Fascists, entered into what they mistakenly assumed would be partnerships with them; instead, they installed them in power. In both cases, this crucial if short-lived alliance of anti-modernist forces was facilitated by the catalytic effect of the threat represented by the presence of utopian modernizers—in Germany in the form of the Communists, in Italy in the form of the Communists and the militant elements of the Socialist Party.

III

If it should prove that both Nazism and Italian Fascism represented, at least insofar as their leadership cadres were concerned, political manifestations of utopian anti-modernism, there would be a working definition of paradigmatic fascism in terms of fundamental socioeconomic issues to replace the now discredited "agent theory" of the Marxist-Leninists. There would then be a criterion that could be employed to evaluate the numerous other movements and regimes also alleged to be fascist. Since the existing literature on these other putative fascisms is seldom addressed to fundamental socioeconomic issues, no attempt can be made here to apply that criterion in a comprehensive fashion. But in some cases, such as the Norwegian *Nasjonal Samling* led by Vidkun Quisling, and the Spanish *Falange*, previous studies clearly suggest extreme anti-modernist tendencies.[32] On the other hand, certain

[32] On Quisling, see Paul M. Hayes, "Quisling's Political Ideas," in Laqueur and Mosse, eds. (fn. 2), 145-57; also Hayes, *Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling, 1887–1945* (London 1971); also T. K. Derry, "Norway," in Woolf,

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purported fascists seem to have been quite free of such tendencies. Jacques Doriot, Oswald Mosley, and Juan Perón, for example, can hardly be characterized as anti-modernists of any sort, much less utopian anti-modernists. Indeed, all three were, at least in terms of their aspirations, enthusiastically in favor of modernization.[33] How, then, can one explain their affinity with Fascist Italy and/or Nazi Germany? The answer may lie in an error of perception, but an understandable one. Doriot, Mosley, and Perón looked to Italian Fascism and Nazism for precepts only *after* those movements had come to power. And, as noted above, both the Nazis and the Fascists implemented many modernizing policies after attaining power—even if, as in the German case and possibly that of Italy, only as the means to anti-modernist ends. Is it not possible that Doriot, Mosley, and Perón saw the Nazis and Fascists merely as dynamic, effective, non-socialist, authoritarian modernizers? If so, how many other alleged fascists of the 1930's and 1940's, in Europe and elsewhere, were also only would-be modernizers who fell victim to the same error of perception?

A good many widely held beliefs about who was a fascist and who was not might thus be overturned if utopian anti-modernism should prove to be a central and common characteristic of the Italian and German movements. The implications for traditional thinking about fascism as a generic phenomenon would be far more dire if, as also seems possible, such a definition were inapplicable to Italy. For if Italian Fascism should, upon closer examination, turn out to have been predominantly pro-modernist, then the two paradigmatic manifestations of fascism would stand opposed to one another on what many now hold to be the fundamental issues of modern times.[34] One, that is, would have been committed to furthering the process of modernization by repressive, authoritarian methods, the other to employing similar meth-

ed., *European Fascism* (fn. 2), 217-30. On the *Falange*, see Bernd Nellesen, *Die verbotene Revolution* (Hamburg 1963), and Stanley Payne, *Falange* (Stanford 1961); such tendencies seem to have been most evident in the JONS faction led by Onésimo Redondo y Ortego and Ramiro Ledesma Ramos.

[33] On Mosley, see R. J. A. Skidelsky, "Great Britain," in Woolf, ed., *European Fascism* (fn. 2), 231-61. On Doriot, see Gilbert D. Allerdyce, "The Political Transformation of Jacques Doriot," in Laqueur and Mosse (fn. 2), 56-74; also Dieter Wolf, *Die Doriot-Bewegung* (Stuttgart 1967). On Perón, see George I. Blanksten, *Peron's Argentina* (Chicago 1953), and Tomas Fillol, *Social Factors in Economic Development: The Argentine Case* (Cambridge, Mass. 1961).

[34] This has been argued by Alan Cassels (fn. 24), who has suggested that in backward countries such as Italy, fascism was a forward-looking agent of modernization, while in advanced countries, such as Germany, it was backward-looking and nihilistically regressive. However, Cassels encounters difficulties in applying this thesis to the putative fascism of eastern Europe. In addition, as suggested above, the cases of Mosley and Doriot seem to contradict his formula.

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ods but as a means of reversing that same process through a fanatical and ultimately suicidal pursuit of an unattainable, archaic utopia. If this should indeed be the case, there would be grounds for arguing that, in terms of underlying socioeconomic issues, Italian Fascism and Nazism do not belong in the same category at all. And if the paradigms of fascism are revealed as fundamentally different, what basis is there any longer for a generic concept? It should not be forgotten that the generic category in political analysis is at bottom metaphoric, a borrowing from biology. Nor should it be forgotten that biologists have abandoned or revised their application of the term genus wherever they have recognized that what had previously been regarded as constituent species were in actuality set apart by basic differences.

Even if one does not choose to look at the problem in terms of the theory of modernization, there are still other grounds for asking whether fascism is a valid or useful concept. Anyone who reads many studies of fascism as a multinational problem cannot but be struck by the frequency with which writers who begin by assuming they are dealing with a unitary phenomenon end up with several more-or-less discrete subcategories.[35] Regardless of what criteria are applied, it seems very difficult to keep fascism from fragmenting. In spite of this, there has been a general reluctance to consider what must be regarded as a definite possibility: namely, that fascism as a generic concept has no validity and is without value for serious analytical purposes. Generic terms in the social sciences are in no way sacrosanct in and of themselves. They are constructs designed to facilitate communication and analysis. Their use always involves the sacrifice of a certain amount of accuracy, since even the best never fit perfectly all the individual cases to which they are applied. But so long as they provide illumination by adding perspective and revealing larger patterns, that sacrifice is worthwhile. When, however, a generic term begins to confuse and confound rather than clarify, then its use ceases to be justified. It is time to consider whether that is not the case with fascism.

The generic term fascism is in origin neither analytical nor descriptive. It was coined not in the serenity of the scholar's study but in the heat of political battle.[36] Its principal authors were Marxist opponents of

[35] See, for examples, George L. Mosse, "Introduction: The Genesis of Fascism," in Laqueur and Mosse (fn. 2); Sauer (fn. 18); Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Phenomenon of Fascism," in Woolf, ed., *European Fascism* (fn. 2); Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism* (Princeton 1964).

[36] On the history of the term itself, see Ernst Nolte, ed., *Theorien über den Faschismus* (Cologne 1967); Wolfgang Schieder, "Faschismus," in C. D. Kernig, ed., *Sowjetsystem und demokratische Gesellschaft*, II (Freiburg, Basel, Vienna 1968), 438-77.

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the Italian and German movements, which they mistook for twin agents of "finance capital." Since Italian Fascism was initially the more important, they employed its name, transforming it into a generic label. In the absence of any other designation for what appeared to many contemporaries to be a multinational phenomenon, it quickly gained general acceptance, even by many of those against whom it had been originally directed. Invoked by countless politicians and hardened into print by the mass media, it was uncritically adopted by scholars. In many respects, it is a typical product of our garrulous and hasty age, which assigns generic labels to social phenomena even before they have assumed full shape. Yet from the vantage point of today, it seems quite conceivable that it was from the outset a construct based on merely superficial similarities, such as common organizational forms and tactical styles, common political enmities, and common international interests. These may have seemed to many contemporaries adequate grounds for generalization, but they may also have obscured far more fundamental differences.

In the light of these unresolved questions, it seems unwise to continue with studies of fascism that start with the assumption that there must have been such a generic phenomenon. It seems more appropriate to consider carefully whether some or even all of the movements and regimes alleged to have been fascist may not be classified more meaningfully in some other way. One possibly illuminating criterion, though by no means the only one, is the relationship of these putative fascisms to the process of modernization. For if the essence of what has hitherto been described as fascism should be found to lie in an extreme revolt against the modern industrial world and an attempt to recapture a distant, mythic past, it should be kept in mind that there is no guarantee that such movements may not arise again. It would be indeed unfortunate if, in our vigilance against a rebirth of the familiar forms of what has been thought of as fascism, we should be led to overlook the emergence of new varieties of utopian anti-modernism quite different in appearance from earlier ones.

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INEQUALITY AND INSURGENCY IN VIETNAM: A FURTHER RE-ANALYSIS

By DENNIS PARANZINO

I

IN an examination of the ecological correlates of the Vietnamese insurgency, Edward Mitchell suggests the existence of some disquieting relationships between certain indicators of land tenure arrangements and insurgent activities.[1] Briefly, he finds that the degree of control that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam exercises at the provincial level is positively associated with inequality. Areas that appear to have the most unequal land tenure arrangements are precisely those over which government control is greatest.

The implications of this result, if we take them seriously, are disquieting for two reasons. First and most important, they call into question the desirability of an important class of land reform programs. If a program is basically redistributive, with redistributions transforming existing land tenure systems into new arrangements that are characterized by greater equality of landholding, then the relationships observed by Mitchell should offer pause. The present policy orthodoxy seems to be that redistributions of this nature directly increase the welfare of rural populations, with the further result of enhancing the political stability of these populations. A policy such as the recent "land-to-the-tiller"[2] reform, which is ambitiously designed to end tenant farming, is certainly seen as an asset in the struggle for Vietnamese political stability.[3] Mitchell's results, however, would seem to suggest that this reform could or should be interpreted as a liability from the standpoint of control by the Government of Vietnam, since, if tenancy is ended, we could expect the new land tenure arrangements that would emerge to exhibit less inequality. Second, and of less direct importance, is the question, what do we know about the social origins of political stabil-

[1] Edward J. Mitchell, Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam, *World Politics*, XX (April 1968), 421-38.

[2] The essentials of this program are outlined in MacDonald Slater, "The Broadening Base of Land Reform in South Vietnam," *Asian Survey*, X (August 1970), 724-37; and in Roy L. Prosterman, "Land-To-The-Tiller In South Vietnam: The Table Turns," *Asian Survey*, X (August 1970), 751-64.

[3] See Prosterman, *ibid.*, 751-52, for a recounting of some favorable political and journalistic reactions to this measure.

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ity? The implicit theory that appears to underlie what has here been characterized as present policy orthodoxy is the notion that economic wealth and political stability are positively related. This is a notion that also has wide currency in the social science literature. The Feierabends, Russett in several places, and Tanter have all found a negative relationship between indicators of wealth and indicators of political violence.[4] Previous research on the specific question of land tenure arrangements and instability, also by Russett, has revealed a positive association between inequality and violence.[5] The more unequal the tenure arrangements, the more likely political violence. Further, Russett interprets his effort as being an attempt at a partial examination of the larger question of the relationship between the distribution of wealth in a polity and political stability.[6] He limits himself to measures of land tenure inequality because of the lack of data on more general measures. Whether we are linking the overall level or the distribution of wealth to political instability, identical arguments appear to be implicit. Higher levels of wealth for the individual, whether induced by higher levels of social output, by broader distribution, or by both, are seen as a stabilizing force. The Mitchell analysis would certainly seem to indicate that, at a minimum, Vietnam is an aberrant case.

It may be useful at this point to discuss the design and results of the Mitchell study in some detail. A population of Vietnamese provinces[7] was coded for the degree of control exhibited in each one by the Republic of Vietnam; against this variable a step-wise regression of social structure variables was performed. After deleting the variables whose coefficients were not significant[8] individually at the .05 level, the equation Mitchell obtained is that of equation (1) where, by province,

[4] Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948–1962: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, x (September 1966), 258-62; Bruce M. Russett, *Trends in World Politics* (New York 1965), 136-37; Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964), 277, 319-21; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1955–1960: Turmoil and Internal War," *Papers, Peace Research Society*, III (Philadelphia 1965), 159-83.

[5] Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 442-54.

[6] *Ibid.*, 444. Gurr has found a positive relationship between the exclusion from economic opportunity of social groups on the basis of ascribed characteristics and political violence. See Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indicators," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (December 1968), 1104-24. The Gurr measure characterized as "economic discrimination" might also be interpreted as an indicator of the distribution of wealth in society.

[7] The provinces of the Central Highlands have been excluded from the Mitchell analysis. A listing of the included provinces can be found below in footnote 16.

[8] We shall also report t statistics, even though we are dealing with a population and not a sample.

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C is the percentage of secure hamlets . . . (1965);
OOL is the percentage of all land that is owner-operated;
CV is the coefficient of variation of the distribution of landholdings by size;
VL is the percentage of land subject to transfer that was formerly Vietnamese-owned;
FL is the percentage of land subject to transfer that was formerly French-owned;
PD is population density;
M is the percentage of area of good mobility;
$\overline{R^2}$ is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom . . . .[9]

Corresponding t statistics will be reported in parentheses below the regression coefficient. This method of presentation will be maintained in subsequent equations.

$$(1)\quad C = 6.47 - .36OOL + 28.3CV - 1.36VL + .89FL - .37M + .09PD \qquad \overline{R^2} = .68$$
$$\qquad\qquad (-2.35)\quad (4.81)\quad\ (-4.13)\quad (2.50)\quad (-3.09)\qquad\qquad (3.38)$$

$$(2)\quad C = -6.03 - .18OOL + 25.6CV - 1.09VL + 1.11FL - .13M + .09PD \qquad \overline{R^2} = .55 \qquad F(6, 19) = 6.06$$
$$\qquad\qquad (-1.09)\quad (3.68)\quad\ (-2.87)\quad (2.73)\qquad\qquad (-1.22)\quad (3.01)$$

The parameters of equation (1) are incorrectly estimated. The properly estimated version of this equation is equation (2). The only substantial changes in the value and significance of the parameters are for the variables OOL and M. The signs of the coefficients are identical in both equations.

Ignoring the differences between the two equations, let us reexamine the interpretation of equation (1).[10] The variables OOL, CV, VL, and

[9] Precise definitions of the variables, the original data sources, and the data matrix can be found in Mitchell (fn. 1), 425-30. Variables found to be unimportant were per capita rice production, ethnic composition, and region.

[10] The variables M and PD will be included in subsequent analyses, even though they will not be treated substantively. Criticisms of the construction of M are in Jeffrey M. Paige, "Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Re-Analysis," *World Politics*, XXIII (October 1970), 24-37; and Robert Samson, *The Economics of Insurgency in The Mekong Delta of Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970), 231-32. The sign of the coefficient of M leads to the counter-intuitive conclusion that more mobility implies less GVN control. The positive sign of PD is interpreted to indicate that areas of population concentration would be "easier for a conventional army and police force to protect." Mitchell (fn. 1), 435.

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FL are all seen as indicators, albeit of somewhat different dimensions, of the concept of inequality. In the case of *OOL* the underlying dimension is relatively straightforward. Given whatever land tenure arrangement exists, measurement is directed towards the extent to which owner-operation of land obtains. The variable *CV* is characterized as being an indicator that, when applied, would be "particularly sensitive" to large landholdings.[11] The dimension of inequality that presumably is measured is the relative concentration of landholdings in terms of plot size. *FL* is seen as a complementary observation on this concentration dimension of inequality. This interpretation of *FL* follows from the argument that, while French land has been expropriated, it has not been redistributed to individual operators.[12] Mitchell suggests that this land was earmarked for state-owned agricultural enterprises. More recent data confirm the argument that the land has not been, to any substantial degree, redistributed. (Only approximately 6 per cent has been.)[13] It is in this sense that *FL*, along with *CV*, is a measure of the concentration of landholdings. While this interpretation of *FL* is at least intuitively plausible as a measure of concentration, I have some doubts concerning such a status for *CV*. Mathematically, *CV* is:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N_j} \frac{(X_{ij}-\overline{X_j})^2}{N_j} \Big/ X_j$$

where X_{ij} is the size of the i^{th} landholding in Province j, $\overline{X_j}$ is the provincial mean size landholding, and N_j is the total number of landholdings in that province. Should all landholdings have equal size, the term

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N_j} (X_{ij}-\overline{X_j}) = 0$$

and hence also *CV*. The more unequal the plot sizes, the larger *CV*. It can be seen, however, that an areal unit of, say, only five landholdings which were enormous but of nearly equal size would have a very low score on this measure. This measure would seem to be more correctly understood as a measure of the homogeneity/heterogeneity of land-

[11] Mitchell, *ibid.*, 426.

[12] The instrument of expropriation for both *VL* and *FL* was the "Diem Ordinance 57." Details concerning this ordinance can be found in Stanford Research Institute, *Land Reform in Vietnam Working Papers*, I, Part 2 (Menlo Park 1968), E5-E11.

[13] Computed from figures given in Stanford Research Institute, *ibid.*, I, Part 2, B73. Slater (fn. 2), 729-31, suggests that the post-1968 pace of the redistribution of *FL* has greatly increased. The evidence for the period of concern, however, seems to confirm Mitchell's position concerning the redistribution of this land.

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holdings. How such a result could be interpreted as an indicator of inequality is unclear. It is possible that, while logically the measure would be better understood as a measure of homogeneity/heterogeneity, it would be, as has been asserted, "particularly sensitive" to large landholdings. Should this be the case, we might expect *CV* and *FL* to be correlated positively. The actual correlation is positive but quite small, $r = .28$. The last of the land tenure variables, *VL*, is also difficult to characterize conceptually. Its justification in Mitchell's usage is based on the argument that a substantial portion of the formerly Vietnamese-owned land has been redistributed, and hence this variable should be a negative indicator of inequality. It would seem that this variable, along with *OOL*, would measure the owner-operator dimension. Since the extent of redistribution of this land by province is unreported for the period in question, the exact relationship between this variable and *OOL* is impossible to gauge. The simple correlation between them is $r = -.45$. The observation on *OOL* was made after some of this land had been redistributed. Mitchell's interpretation of the land tenure variables as indicators of inequality are summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Variable	*Posited Relationship with Inequality*
OOL	−
CV	+
FL	+
VL	−

On the basis of the analysis of the results of equation (1), Mitchell concludes that, "If our interpretations of what land tenure variables measure are correct, then the information contained in their coefficients can be easily summarized: *greater inequality means greater control.*"[14] If we were to accept the crucial notion of the foregoing quotation, interpretation of the variables, equation (2), though somewhat different from Mitchell's, would seem to support similar inferences with respect to inequality and control.

II

A prerequisite for taking the Mitchell results seriously is an understanding of the relationship between the land tenure variables as in-

[14] Mitchell (fn. 1), 432; emphasis in original.

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dicators of inequality and the relationship between the concept of inequality and insurgency. The connection between inequality in the economic sense and insurgency or other forms of political instability is easily made, and, as we have previously noted, supported by some evidence. Such an interpretation is, however, inconsistent with the results so far presented. The inequality indicated by the land tenure variables is interpreted as being sociological in nature, involving status, authority relationships, and individual norms. Mitchell argues that, "In this [Vietnam] and other historical precedents, the behavioral interpretation is similar. There exists in the areas of unequal distribution a powerful landlord class exercising firm control over a conservative peasantry which has thoroughly rationalized the inevitability of the existing situation."[15] In effect, the land tenure inequality that is indicated by the variables *OOL, CV, VL*, and *FL* is then taken itself as an indicator of social structure. It is this social structure that is interpreted as being resistant or prone to insurgency.

When coupling this interpretation of the variables in general with the particular result concerning *OOL*, one disenchanting implication seems to suggest itself. If social structure is the key variable in determining stability, and the central dimension of the social structure in question is the landlord-tenant relationship, then land redistribution in favor of the owner-operator would be seen as having a destabilizing consequence. An observer could admit the plausibility of this potential consequence, but still be in favor of land reform by justifying his position through the hypothesis that the welfare effects to the peasant will somehow offset the potential destabilizing effects of an alteration of the social structure. The Mitchell results do not even allow us an empirical basis for this argument. Not only is the coefficient of *OOL* in both of the previous equations negative, but the bivariate relationship between *C* and *OOL* is negative with the simple correlation being $r = -.32$. An empirically based argument in favor of land reform is not possible on the basis of the Mitchell results.

It is clear that one could plausibly suggest that the statistical relationship between the land tenure variables and control by the Republic of Vietnam is an artifact of any number of things. We might have measurement error, misspecification, faulty identification, or temporal instability of the observed relationships.[16] Criticisms of this type have

[15] Mitchell, *ibid.*, 437.

[16] Misspecification and identification are concepts used in econometric work. The first case implies that relevant variables have been excluded from the model. Samson (fn. 10), 232, and Paige (fn. 10), 33-34, have suggested problems of this nature resulting from the omission of certain geographic and historical factors. Faulty identification

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been or could be easily set forth. At any rate, there are possibilities that would support an artifactual interpretation of the observed relationships.

Although these and other possibilities are plausible, we would wish that this apparent anomaly concerning the usual interpretation of the relationship between land tenure systems and political instability could be resolved in some theoretically meaningful terms. We shall begin to attempt this resolution by first focusing on the economic aspects of the measure *OOL* as it varies across provinces.

III

Paige suggests in a critique of the Mitchell study that the included provinces can be partitioned into four economically homogeneous regions: the Mekong Delta, the Southern Coastal Lowlands, the Northern Coastal Lowlands, and the Southern Plateau.[17] Further, he suggests that an error is made by not taking into account the effects of economic geography in the analysis. In particular, he feels that "lumping together" the three rice cultures with the mixed rice-rubber agricultural economy of the Southern Plateau is one of the more blatant aspects of this error. Even within rice cultures, he points out, the regions differ markedly, ranging from the high yields of the Delta to the subsistence yields of the Northern Coastal Lowlands. In addition there is some evidence to suggest that these latter two regions differ markedly with respect to the amount of labor required per hectare of rice, with the Delta requiring much less than the Northern Coastal Lowlands.[18] If these regions are as economically homogeneous internally as has been suggested, but are heterogeneous as a whole, we might expect some misleading relationships if these regional effects are not controlled.[19]

in models of this type (reduced form) refers to situations in which the independent variables are not truly predetermined or the dependent variable is itself a cause of one or more of the independent variables. Samson has argued that the relationships observed by Mitchell could be explained by the hypothesis that causality runs from GVN control to the land tenure variables (232). The values of the land tenure variables are not determined "independently" of the extent of GVN control. A discussion of misspecification and identification can be found in Arthur S. Goldberger, *Econometric Theory* (New York 1964), 194-200, 306-18.

[17] Provincial boundaries are for the year 1960. Northern Coastal Lowlands: Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, and Phu Yen. Southern Coastal Lowlands: Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuah. Mekong Delta: An Giang, An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Dinh Tuong, Kien Giang, Kien Hoa, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, Long An, Phong Dinh, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long. Southern Plateau: Tay Ninh, Binh Puong, Bien Hoa, Long Khan, Phouc Tuy. Paige (fn. 10), 31.

[18] Paige, *ibid.*, passim, 28-33.

[19] Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York 1970), 60-68; Hayward Alker, "The Long Road to International Relations

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For example, we might expect that a given degree of *OOL* prevailing in the Delta would have a different effect on *C* than would the same degree in the Northern Coastal Lowlands. If these effects were sufficiently different, then the value of the regression coefficient could be seriously distorted.

Let us assume that we accept the Paige classification of provinces by their economic geography. Let us further assume that the economic possibilities for the individual operator, other things being equal, in the rice-growing regions can be rank-ordered from best to worst as follows: the Delta, the Southern Coastal Zone, and the Northern Coastal Zone. While the lower extreme point of this ranking, the Northern Coastal Lowlands, seems reasonably noncontroversial, some question might be raised with respect to the other rankings. Our ranking of the Delta above the Southern Coastal Lowlands was done on the basis of an inferred indicator of economic possibilities.[20] The rice regions were ranked on the basis of the extent of large agricultural holdings prevailing at the time of the enactment of the "Diem Ordinance 57." This ordinance expropriated all rice holdings of over 100 hectares and is the basis of the measures *VL* and *FL*. It is assumed that landholdings of such size, whether they are held for rental purposes or for large-scale agricultural enterprise, reflect the economic desirability or value of land. We can then rank the rice provinces by the percentage of expropriated land to all land. By this criterion we get the ranking that we have suggested: the Delta (34.5 per cent), the Southern Coastal Lowlands (9.5 per cent), and the Northern Coastal Lowlands (.3 per cent).[21]

In an agrarian society, land is undoubtedly wealth. It would seem that, in agrarian Vietnam, what one is dealing with is essentially a two-factor economy of land and labor.[22] In such a context, we would expect those peasants who own their own land to be wealthier than those who

Theory: Problems of Statistical Nonadditivity," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), 623-55; Leo Hazlewood and Dennis Paranzino, "Regions, Regionalism, and Violence," Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, March 1971.

[20] Paige (fn. 10), 31-32, suggests an economic interpretation of this indicator for one region, the Northern Coastal Lowlands.

[21] Regional totals of expropriated land were computed by Paige, *ibid.*, 30. A similar ranking of the rice regions can be obtained by aggregating hamlet-level data for the difference between net income and expenditures into regional means. See Robert H. Stroup, *Rural Income and Expenditure Sample Survey of Vietnam* (Agency for International Development, July 1967), 52-53.

[22] Samson (fn. 10), 234, argues this position for the Delta. It is in all probability equally true for the other agricultural regions of Vietnam.

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do not. Correspondingly, we would expect the overall level of welfare of owners to be higher than that of non-owners. This need not, of course, be the case. Overwhelmingly, the most common form of agricultural enterprise in Vietnam for the non-owner of land is some sort of tenancy arrangement. If the landlord provides large amounts of capital and managerial guidance, it is conceivable that the tenant would be better off than the small individual operator. There is little evidence, however, in Vietnam that the landlord plays such a role.[23] In the absence of such beneficial effects from tenancy it is obvious that the tenant would be better off if he owned the land he worked. We would argue that, when controlling for regional effects, the degree of OOL in a province can be used as an indicator of peasant wealth.

We can now think in terms of some implicit deprivation paradigm and argue that provinces that are lower on our measure of rural wealth, OOL, will tend to have more instability when regional controls are introduced than those that are higher.[24] At least in the rice regions we may now expect OOL to vary positively with government control. To investigate this hypothesis, let us define a set of "dummy variables" for the rice regions with variable $R_1 = 1$ if a province is in the Northern Coastal Lowlands, and $R_1 = 0$ if it is not. R_2 and R_3 are similarly defined for the Southern Coastal Lowlands and the Delta, respectively. Our hypothesis can be captured by transforming the Mitchell model of equations (1) and (2) into the form of equations (3) and (3a).

$$(3)\quad C = b_0 + b_1 OOL + b_2\,(OOL{*}R_1) + b_3\,(OOL{*}R_2) + b_4(OOL{*}R_2) + b_5 CV + b_6 FL + b_7 VL + b_8 PD + b_9 M$$

or

$$(3a)\quad C = b_0 + OOL\,(b_1 + b_2 R_1 + b_3 R_2 + b_4 R_3) + b_5 CV + b_6 FL + b_7 VL + b_8 PD + b_9 M$$

The total effect of OOL and C is now equal to the general effect b_1 plus the regional effects b_2, b_3, and b_4. From our method of defining the regional variables, at most one of these regional effects can be non-zero. The coefficients of the various regions are summarized in Table 2.

[23] Jeffrey Race, "How They Won," *Asian Survey*, x (August 1970), 640; William Bredo, "Agrarian Reform in Vietnam: Vietcong and Government of Vietnam Strategies in Conflict," *Asian Survey*, x (August 1970), 739.

[24] The best statement concerning deprivation theories of political violence is in Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton 1970).

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TABLE 2

COEFFICIENTS OF *OOL* BY RICE REGION FOR SUBSEQUENT EQUATIONS

Region	*Coefficient of OOL*
Northern Coastal Lowlands	$b_1 + b_2$
Southern Coastal Lowlands	$b_1 + b_3$
Delta	$b_1 + b_4$

In effect the relationships between *C* and *OOL* are now free to vary by region. Equation (4) is the estimation of equations (3) and (3a).

$$(4)\quad C = \underset{}{-27.25} \underset{(-2.15)}{-.41OOL} + \underset{(2.05)}{.38\,(OOL{*}R_1)} + \underset{(2.27)}{.46\,(OOL{*}R_2)}$$
$$+ \underset{(2.39)}{.51\,(OOL{*}R_3)} + \underset{(4.24)}{38.94CV} \underset{(-2.36)}{-.85VL} + \underset{(1.14)}{.50FL}$$
$$\underset{(-2.08)}{-.22M} + \underset{(2.72)}{.08PD} \qquad \overline{R^2} = .641 \qquad F = 5.96\ (10, 16)$$

The significance of the regional effects is quite large and indeed the entire equation is significant at the .001 level with all individual coefficients, except that of *FL*, significant (one-tailed test) at the .05 level. While our predictions concerning the rank order of the relationships between *C* and *OOL* have been maintained, the derived relationship between these variables for the Northern Coastal Lowlands is negative, contrary to our expectations. In addition, the coefficients of *OOL* for all rice regions are small. While the effects are significant, they are not substantial. Large changes in the owner-operator aspect of tenure would seemingly have little effect on control. Let us defer, for the moment, further discussion of the magnitude of the coefficients of *OOL*.

Table 3 contains the intercorrelations of all the variables utilized in this study. If we ignore the presently undefined variable *EXLI*, the most substantial intercorrelation among the predictor variables is between *VL* and *FL*, $r = .74$. This correlation is substantial enough to warrant that the possible effects of multicollinearity should be examined.[25] This examination should be attempted, particularly because of the manner in which the coefficients of these variables have been interpreted. Mitchell suggests that, "If it is primarily redistribution that distinguishes the two types of land, then it is quite possible that redistribution has had a negative impact on control. At the least, the view

[25] The problem of multicollinearity is treated in Goldberger (fn. 16), 192-94, and in J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York 1963), 201-7.

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TABLE 3

CORRELATION MATRIX OF ALL VARIABLES

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. C	—										
2. OOL	-.32	—									
3. CV	.60	-.24	—								
4. VL	.05	-.45	.07	—							
5. FL	.30	-.25	.28	.74	—						
6. M	-.08	.06	.22	-.08	-.12	—					
7. PD	.13	-.30	-.24	.31	-.09	-.02	—				
8. OOL*R_1	-.48	.60	-.56	-.41	-.37	-.03	-.25	—			
9. OOL*R_2	.33	.06	.36	-.26	-.01	.34	-.28	-.18	—		
10. OOL*R_3	.18	-.18	-.14	.59	.53	-.16	.39	-.44	-.31	—	
11. EXLI	.10	-.35	.16	.92	.92	-.08	.09	-.40	-.12	.58	—

that redistribution has had a positive effect is sharply contradicted."[26] With a fairly high level of intercorrelation between *FL* and *VL*, there are conditions under which this phenomenon of opposite signs is artifactual. If none of the shared variance between *FL* and *VL* is in turn shared with *C*, then no problem arises. When the shared variance of *FL* and *VL* is also shared with *C*, we must be uncertain about the coefficients b_6 and b_7 in both Mitchell's and our models. If all or nearly all of the shared variance between *FL* and *VL* is shared with *C*, then the following most unfortunate situation could arise. Since both variables are in effect measuring the same thing, to get the least-squares fit, the coefficients themselves, b_6 and b_7, are not independent. Indeed, they will be inversely related. In observing b_6 with a negative sign and b_7 with a positive sign, all that we may be seeing is this inverse effect.[27] We can partially test this line of argument through equation (5), which is merely equation (4) with *FL* deleted.

$$(5)\quad C = -32.62 - \underset{(-2.22)}{.42}OOL + \underset{(2.45)}{.44}\,(OOL{*}R_1) + \underset{(2.88)}{.54}\,(OOL{*}R_2)$$
$$+ \underset{(3.38)}{.63}\,(OOL{*}R_3) + \underset{(5.06)}{43.11}CV - \underset{(-2.22)}{.55}VL - \underset{(-2.44)}{.25}M$$
$$+ \underset{(2.44)}{.07}PD \qquad \overline{R^2} = .634 \qquad F(10, 16) = 6.42$$

[26] Mitchell (fn. 1), 432. In a footnote he suggests that there may be other factors distinguishing this land that could force a reinterpretation of the coefficients of these variables.

[27] As it turns out, the correlation between the coefficients b_6 and b_7 in equation (4) is $r = -.82$.

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The difference in predictive power between the model of equation (4) and that of equation (5) is an inconsequential .007. In addition, as we have predicted, the deletion of the variable *FL* with a positive coefficient has led to a lessening of the negative effects of *VL*. An equation identical to equation (5), except for *FL* replacing *VL*, produces an $\overline{R^2} = .543$, a reduction in the amount of explained variance of 10 per cent; but the coefficient of *FL* becomes negative. This sign reversal is precisely what would be predicted from the common underlying scale hypothesis. At this point it would seem that the justification for maintaining *FL* as a predictor variable is quite uncertain.

IV

So far we have shown that when either *VL* or *FL* is deleted from the model of equation (3), the coefficient of the remaining variable is negative in both cases. Let us take our argument a step further and create a common scale for both variables. This is an important step. If the deletion of the variables in question and their replacement with a new index variable explains roughly the same or more variance, then Mitchell's argument concerning the different effects of the original variables would, in my opinion, be impossible to maintain.

One method of common scale construction is to assume linearity and additivity, and to extract a principal component from *VL* and *FL*.[28] Let us do this, and label the component that emerges the expropriated land index (*EXLI*). From Table 3 we can observe that the standardized scores on this index correlate identically with *VL* and *FL*, $r = .92$. The amount of variance explained by these correlations is 85 per cent. It seems safe to argue that *VL* and *FL* do scale linearly. Equation (6) is the substitution of *EXLI* for *VL* and *FL* in equation (3).

$$(6)\quad C = \underset{}{-39.41} \underset{(-2.04)}{-.39OOL} + \underset{(2.42)}{.45\,(OOL{*}R_2)} + \underset{(3.10)}{.59\,(OOL{*}R_2)}$$
$$+ \underset{(3.23)}{.65\,(OOL{*}R_3)} + \underset{(4.96)}{43.76CV} - \underset{(-1.98)}{4.60\,EXLI}$$
$$\underset{(-2.48)}{-.26M} + \underset{(1.89)}{.05PD} \qquad \overline{R^2} = .616 \quad F(8, 17) = 6.02$$

This equation is not much inferior to equation (4). The difference between the $\overline{R^2}$s is .025, or a loss of 2.5 per cent in explained variance.

[28] For a discussion of the technique of principal components see Rudolph Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis* (Evanston 1970).

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More importantly, the sign of the index is negative. Again, the significance of the equation is beyond the .001 level, and the individual coefficients are all significant at the .05 level. It now seems reasonable to assume that *VL* and *FL* are observations on the same variable, and therefore we shall interpret equation (6) as our best model.

Two results emerge from this analysis that differ sharply from Mitchell's. First, the relationship between *OOL* and *C* is a positive one for all the rice regions when we interpret equation (6) [or (5)]. In equation (4) the coefficients are positive for two of the rice areas and mildly negative for the Northern Coastal Lowlands.[29] It must be remembered that equation (4) includes confounding effects deriving from the inclusion of the two highly intercorrelated variables *VL* and *FL*. There is also some evidence, from the observed ranking of the coefficients of *OOL* by rice regions, for the notion that not only does a plot give the operator a stake in society, but also that the more economically attractive the plot, the larger the stake. Second, there is no evidence of supposed beneficial effects of large estates. We find in equations (5) and (6), evidenced by the signs of *VL* and *EXLI* respectively, support for the proposition that the past existence of large estates implies less control. Indeed, equations (5) and (6) seem almost to imply a "common-sense" approach to government control: redistribute the land.

The coefficient of *CV*, which has remained strongly positive in all the models, appears to be the only inequality variable that is still consistent with Mitchell's interpretation of inequality being positively associated with control. The meaning of the variable is quite uncertain to me. The correlations in Table 3, between this variable and the other land tenure variables, are all in the intuitively correct direction, but the largest is only $r = .28$. If *CV* were simply a measure of tenure inequality, stronger relationships would be expected. In the absence of these relationships it is difficult for me to interpret the very clear association between this variable and control by the Government of Vietnam.

Since we have opted for the model [equation (6)] that no longer gives *VL* and *FL* separate variable status, the small coefficients of *OOL* are no longer troublesome. The effects of the redistribution of land to the individual owner-operator would flow not only through the coefficients of *OOL*, but also through the coefficient of *EXLI*. Redistribu-

[29] The coefficient of *OOL* for the mixed rubber-rice culture of the Southern Plateau is b_1. This coefficient is clearly negative in equations (4)–(6). An interpretation which would be consistent with our argument, but for which no data are available, is the speculation that in this region an individual farms if he cannot become a plantation worker. Being a plantation worker would be a superior economic opportunity. *OOL in this region would then be a negative indicator of peasant wealth.*

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tion of this expropriated land would have the joint effect of lessening the very substantial negative influence of large landholdings while enhancing the positive influence of *OOL*.

The situation implied by equation (6), given our interpretation of the tenure variables, is very close to the usual explanation of the origins of rural insurgencies. People tend to rebel in economically backward and landlord-dominated areas where landlords are economically exploitative or superfluous.[30] They would react positively to land reform programs that emphasize the owner-operator. The better the economic opportunity provided by their own plot, the higher the level of political stability. Contrary to the Mitchell findings, the evidence seems to imply that greater equality is positively associated with government control.

[30] Donald S. Zagoria, in "The Ecology of Peasant Communism," *American Political Science Review*, LXV (March 1971), 149-50, suggests that if landowners perform some indispensable function they need not be resented. He argues that "In regions of large-scale capitalist enterprise, on large plantations, or under any conditions where it is perfectly clear to the landless that they have neither the skills nor the capital to replace the landowner, inequities are not likely to be a source of great resentment."

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Review Articles

COLD-WAR REVISIONISM: A Critique

By J. L. RICHARDSON

Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943–1945*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968, 685 pp. £4.20. New York, Random House, 1968, $12.95.

Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam*, London, Secker & Warburg, 1966, 317 pp. 35s. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1965, $7.50.

Gar Alperovitz, *Cold War Essays*, Garden City, New York, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1970, 150 pp. $1.45.

David Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold War*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1967, 465 pp. 50 p. New York, Hill and Wang (published under the title, *The Free World Colossus*, 1965, $6.95; revised editions, 1970 and 1971).

THE writings of the so-called Cold-War revisionists have had a powerful impact in recent years. In the case of the new generation coming to political awareness, analogies drawn or suggested between Vietnam and the period of the origins of the Cold War carry immediate conviction: many others have had their image of contemporary history challenged or even shattered, and those not persuaded by the revisionist case would acknowledge that important questions have been raised. Undoubtedly circumstances have favored the revisionist critique.

The revisionists, however, have been fortunate that their works have not been subjected to the same critical scrutiny which they have directed at the decisions, statements, and even the casual utterances of the early Cold-War leaders. This article will attempt such a critical analysis, focusing on the early period of the Cold War in Europe: it was in relation to Europe that the Western image of the Cold War as the containment of Communist expansionism was formed, and it is here that the revisionist challenge is most striking. Except perhaps for the Korean war, there has never been so clearly defined a Western image of the Cold War in Asia: countering the orthodoxy (which one might term the Dean Rusk view) there had always been a vigorous dissenting school which held that Asia was being misperceived in Eu-

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ropean terms. The radicalism of the revisionist critique consists in the rejection of this sort of distinction between the European and Asian arenas of the Cold War, and the insistence that it is the original Western image of the Cold War in Europe which is at fault.

There is inevitably a problem of demarcation in seeking to define the revisionist school. Most recent studies of the Cold War depart in some degree from earlier conceptions which were strongly influenced by participant accounts, as authors come to perceive "the Cold War as History," to borrow the title of a recent work. It is in accordance with the prevailing usage, however, to define the revisionists as those who would replace the traditional Western image of the Cold War, not with a different kind of explanatory model, but with another image of the same general type: that is to say, one which ascribes primary responsibility to one of the two parties to the conflict.

This may be distinguished from two other types of interpretation: (a) those that see the Cold War as an inevitable clash between the two emerging superpowers, whose historical experience, economic and social systems, and ideologies rendered their aims, expectations, assumptions, and policies incompatible; and (b) those that, sceptical of the feasibility of unravelling longer-range causal connections and ultimate responsibilities, would see the Cold War as the unintended consequence of the interaction of the two powers, a conflict spiral beyond their control, involving internal politics deeply in their relationships, but nonetheless a product of avoidable decisions and over-reactions.[1] Needless to say, most works combine the three types of interpretation: only the most extreme protagonists of historical inevitability or inadvertence will rule out some element of contingency on the one hand, or wider determinants on the other; and questions of responsibility always arise—most fruitfully when they are posed within a relevant long-range and short-range context, least fruitfully when they amount to no more than the search for "guilty men."

The works under discussion may be seen as the hard core of the re-

[1] Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (London 1967) emphasizes historical determinants. The second approach has not been worked out systematically but pervades much of the literature. There are traces in Alperovitz, *Cold War Essays*; it is suggested by an excellent short history which reflects both revisionist and traditional insights, Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1966* (New York 1967). American domestic determinants, economic and ideological, are examined in the writings of Lloyd C. Gardner: *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (Madison 1964), and *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949* (Chicago 1970).

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visionist school. They lay heavy stress on the responsibility of the leaders of one side, the American; there is a striking disregard for context. They may also, hopefully, be seen as "first-generation" revisionists. That is to say, if earlier historical controversies offer an analogy, the first, polemical generation gives way to more discriminating successors who discard the excesses but retain what is of value in the revisionist critique. Despite first impressions, this process has scarcely begun in the case of the works in question: the impressive scholarship of Kolko and Alperovitz does not lead them to avoid excesses that are less surprising in an overtly polemical work of synthesis, such as that of Horowitz.

It is not possible to examine all the issues raised, and much of Kolko's detailed research, in particular, will remain a valuable stimulus. This article will examine revisionist treatments of six issues, central to the early Cold War, which exemplify very general, pervasive weaknesses in the handling of evidence and the testing of hypotheses.

(1) The role of Eastern Europe in the Cold War: (Was American opposition to a Soviet sphere of influence the decisive first phase of the Cold War? Was Soviet policy reactive, i.e., was the tightening of Communist control a response to Western hostility rather than an original Soviet intention?);

(2) The breakdown of East-West cooperation (1945–46), with special reference to Soviet-American economic relations and policy towards Germany;

(3) The American decision to drop the atomic bomb, and the subsequent deadlock over nuclear control (the Baruch Plan);

(4) Soviet objectives beyond Eastern Europe, especially in Germany and France;

(5) The final division of Europe in 1947: (Was this due to American policy, in particular the choice of ideological war as against East-West collaboration? Was this the great lost opportunity of the postwar period?);

(6) The founding of NATO, and Western rearmament: (Was this the product of exaggerated fears of an unreal threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, or a sensible precautionary policy?).

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The article will then take up some of the wider issues raised by the revisionist studies.[2]

The following discussion is not dependent on a specific definition of the nature or the starting point of the Cold War. Lacking the discipline provided by the outbreak and termination of "hot" wars, writers on the Cold War have felt free to set its starting point at dates as diverse as 1917–19, 1938–39, 1945, or 1947–48, in accordance with their general view of the contest. Much of the confusion, however, arises from failure to distinguish between the state of hostility and conflict which has characterized the relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers since 1917, and the phase of this relationship that is termed the Cold War. It would promote clearer discussion if this phase were specified, for example, as the period during which international politics was dominated by the bipolar conflict between two blocs led by the superpowers, a conflict so intense as to rule out most forms of collaboration, and characterized by the breakdown of communication between the two sides, a climate of fear, suspicion, and repression within each superpower, and a fear of war hanging over the world, especially Europe. So defined, the conflict had its origins in the period of the Bolshevik Revolution and Western intervention, the appeasement policy of the late 1930's, and the breakdown of wartime collaboration in 1945–46; but it did not reach the intensity of Cold War until 1947–48, then began to ease fitfully in the mid-1950's, and by the mid-1960's had been replaced by what has been termed a détente or "limited adversary" relationship not unlike many great-power relationships in the past.[3]

[2] Earlier discussions of the revisionist literature include: Paul Seabury and Brian Thomas, "Cold War Origins" (two articles), *Journal of Contemporary History*, III (January 1968), 169-98; Henry Pachter, "Revisionist Historians and the Cold War," *Dissent*, XV (November-December 1968), 505-18; Charles S. Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins," *Perspectives in American History*, IV (1970), 313-47. Revisionist authors discussed in one or more of these, in addition to Alperovitz, Horowitz and Kolko, include D. F. Fleming, W. A. Williams, Isaac Deutscher, P.M.S. Blackett, and Konni Zilliacus. Charles Maier's article discusses some of the themes of the present article, with less emphasis on Europe but greater attention to the general assumptions and perspectives of the revisionist school. Some of my conclusions are very close to his: but as they are approached by different routes, and as this paper was first drafted before his article appeared, I have left them to stand as originally formulated.

[3] The question of dating the start of the Cold War, and its dependence on different definitions of the conflict, is discussed by Paul Seabury, *The Rise and Decline of the Cold War* (New York 1967), 4-10. The definition offered above raises problems for the revisionists insofar as it points to 1947–48 rather than 1945 as the start of the Cold War. But this is not an attempt to resolve the issues verbally: it is open to the revisionist to argue that the main causes of the lapse into Cold War by 1947–48 are to be found not in the events of those years, but in the events of 1945 or earlier.

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Eastern Europe

> The transformation of the historic assumptions of United States policy into a strategy aimed specifically at preventing leftist control—spontaneous or Soviet imposed—in Eastern Europe is easily documented now that archives for 1945–46 are being opened. It is clear that the United States applied every kind of pressure in the diplomatic arsenal—short of a land invasion—to prevent the institution of left governments (Alperovitz, *Cold War Essays*, 97).

Much has been made of the remarkable meeting between Truman and Molotov on April 23, 1945, when Truman, eleven days in office as President, decided, in accordance with the advice of Harriman, Deane, and Forrestal, to take a hard line over the Polish issue, thereby risking a diplomatic break with the Soviet Union. Negotiations in Moscow between Molotov and the American and British Ambassadors had reached a deadlock over the implementation of the Yalta agreement to reorganize the Soviet-sponsored provisional Polish government. Whether the Soviet stand was in violation of the Yalta Agreement was disputed among the American leaders, but on this point Kolko argues convincingly that both sides had hardened their positions since the hard-won Yalta compromise, both tending to revert to their former positions (p. 390). Truman's first exercise in personal diplomacy had been prefaced by his remark to his advisers that "he intended to go on with the plans for San Francisco and if the Russians did not wish to join us they could go to hell."[4]

However, so far was this from foreshadowing the actual course of American policy that Harry Hopkins was sent to Moscow to attempt to resolve the deadlock which had developed in Soviet-American diplomacy, especially over Poland. In these talks the United States conceded the most substantial of the points at issue by agreeing that the reorganization of the Polish government should be limited to the addition of a small number of Western-oriented leaders to the Soviet-sponsored government, rather than recreating the government on a new basis. The outcome of the Hopkins mission casts serious doubt on the hypothesis of the "delayed showdown" in American diplomacy advanced by Alperovitz.[5] In accepting a Communist-dominated government and in rapidly moving to recognize it (July 5), the U.S. was tacitly abandoning any attempt to press for Soviet disengagement from

[4] Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York 1951), 50.

[5] Alperovitz accepts the importance of the concessions on Poland, but argues that the Americans hoped to reverse the position after the dropping of the atomic bomb (*Atomic Diplomacy*, p. 89). This is difficult to reconcile with prompt recognition or the failure to attempt such a policy after Hiroshima, indicated below. At most it was a vague aspiration or a form of face-saving.

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the most significant state in Eastern Europe—the state in which the West was best placed diplomatically to press its demands.

The somewhat more sustained Western diplomatic offensive in the wake of Hiroshima and Nagasaki must bear the main weight of sustaining the revisionist contention that the American effort to deny Russia a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe amounted to the initiation of the Cold War by the West. The case is a weak one. It is clear enough that the bomb affected the psychological climate: Truman spoke against spheres of influence in the Balkans, Byrnes and Bevin condemned the arrangements for elections in Bulgaria and Hungary (resulting in their being postponed), and the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September reached a deadlock, ostensibly over procedural issues, but more plausibly through Soviet opposition to the Byrnes-Bevin insistence on free elections in Eastern Europe as a condition of the recognition of the remaining governments.

But there was no showdown. There was, indeed, an attempt to precipitate one. On August 21, King Michael of Roumania, after having received encouraging American hints, called for his government's resignation and appealed to the United States, Britain, and Russia to assist in the formation of a new government under the Yalta Declaration. Despite pleas for prompt action by the American representative in Bucharest, Washington limited itself to expressing general support and placed a ban on contacts with Roumanian politicians. Byrnes informed the American representative that

> Principal concern of US Govt at present juncture is, as you know, to keep the road open to a solution of Rumanian political crisis which will be acceptable to all three Allied Govts. We hope no action will be taken which might seem to give ground for Soviet suspicion that crisis was brought about by "Anglo-American intervention." . . . We do not think that any advice or assurances should be given to the King regarding his present difficult position. . . .[6]

The stage had been set for a diplomatic showdown, but the United States drew back, foreshadowing the Western response in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The weakness of Communist support in Eastern Europe in this period has been widely noted. Stalin had acknowledged privately at Potsdam that "any freely elected government would be anti-Soviet and that we cannot admit."[7] In the election in Hungary in November 1945 the Communists could win only 17 per cent of the vote, against 57

[6] Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1945*, V (Washington, D.C. 1967), 594. For documents on the crisis, see pp. 565-609.
[7] Philip E. Mosely, *The Kremlin and World Politics* (New York 1960), 214.

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per cent for the Small Farmers' Party. Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party was thought to enjoy similar support in Poland.

The Western governments did little to exploit this situation. Their protests led to the postponement of elections in Bulgaria and Hungary, which had the unintended effect of relaxing some of the pressure on Moscow. American attempts to influence the course of events in Poland in the second half of 1945 were ill-coordinated and ineffective. In particular, there was little pressure for elections. The State Department sought to attach economic conditions to projected loans to Poland, conditions which seemed unrealistic to Ambassador Lane, but it discouraged him from formulating political conditions. U.S. policy-makers could agree on discouraging Polish applications for credit, but this was a tacit acceptance of inability to influence an adverse situation.[8]

The Western governments drew back in alarm from the breakdown of the September meeting of Foreign Ministers, and from Washington and London there emerged a chorus of assurances that the two governments accepted Russia's need for friendly regimes on its borders.[9] At the December Council of Foreign Ministers, progress was made towards draft peace treaties with the former Axis satellites, and the Polish pattern was repeated in the case of Roumania: that is to say, after face-saving additions to the government, Britain and the United States extended formal recognition.

The behavior of the Western powers, then, is not consistent with the hypothesis of a serious attempt to reverse the military verdict of the war. Rather, the United States and Britain were the victims of conflicting advice and pressures, hence their policy oscillations. The position was well summed up by W. H. McNeill in what remains the best work on the period:

> It was surely a misfortune that the effort at world pacification in 1945–46 should have been entrusted to men so firmly rooted in their respective national backyards as Byrnes, Bevin and Molotov were. . . . It does not appear that the Americans and British ever fully and frankly faced the contradiction between the two parts of their programme for Eastern Europe. Friendliness for Russia and 'democratic' government were incompatible in most of the countries in question; but Byrnes and Bevin either did not know or professed not to admit the fact.[10]

[8] *Foreign Relations* (fn. 6), 374-76, 388-93, 411-16, 419, 422.

[9] Thomas (fn. 2), 185-86, cites speeches by Acheson, Byrnes, Eden, Macmillan, and Bevin in October-November 1945 and February 1946.

[10] W. H. McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict 1941–1946*, a volume of *Survey of International Affairs 1939–1946* (London 1953), 698, 700.

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It is clear that certain policy-makers in both capitals were aware of the contradiction, and that much of the advice from the State Department as well as the Foreign Office was that Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe would have to be accepted. This theme, running through a number of the American papers prepared for the Yalta and Potsdam meetings, has been neglected by the revisionists.

> Politically, while this Government probably would not oppose predominant Soviet influence in the area [Poland and the Balkans] neither would it wish American influence to be *completely nullified.*
>
> In order to attain [a] position . . . where there are some elements *not completely subservient to Moscow*, it could be made clear to Stalin that we cannot accord diplomatic recognition to regimes such as those in Bulgaria and Roumania until they have been fundamentally changed. . . .
>
> While the Government may not want to oppose a political configuration in Eastern Europe which gives the Soviet Union a *predominant influence* in Poland, neither would it desire to see Poland become in fact a Soviet satellite and have American influence there *completely eliminated.*
>
> Mikolajczyk does not expect the full freedom which he would like for Poland and the Polish people. On the other hand he is hopeful that through the strength of the Peasant Party *a reasonable degree of freedom* and independence can be preserved now. . . . he freely accepts that Poland's security and foreign policy *must follow the lead of Moscow.*[11]

The defensiveness of tone and modesty of expectation suggest that it was not a question of challenging the Soviet position but of seeking a modicum of influence within its framework; to some, conceivably, the democratic fundamentalism in American policy was a conscious attempt to make the most of a weak hand. The policy is best understood as a negative one—to prevent total Soviet control—rather than a policy aimed at positive goals, the realization of political democracy or the achievement of a major export market. The economic objectives of U.S. policy in Eastern Europe, overemphasized by Kolko to an implausible degree, found their place as the main means by which the policy-makers hoped to establish some form of counterweight to Soviet power. The Open Door was not "the only inflexible objective of American policy" (pp. 402-3)—its implications were for geographical reasons

[11] Briefing Book Paper for the Yalta Conference; Briefing Book Papers for Potsdam on the former Axis Satellites and on Poland; Telegram from Harriman to Secretary of State, June 28, 1945; in Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, D.C. 1955), 234; *The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945*, I (Washington, D.C. 1960), 360-61, 715, 728. (Emphasis added.)

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quite different in Eastern Europe from elsewhere—but was the condition which policy-makers attempted, understandably enough, to attach to the extension of credit for reconstruction.

The second Eastern European issue raised by revisionist studies is whether the communization of that region, far from being the unfolding of Stalin's design, was not indeed a reaction to hostile Western policies. "In fact we now know," Kolko writes, "that the Russians . . . had no intention of Bolshevizing Eastern Europe if—but only if—they could find alternatives" (p. 619). Horowitz develops Deutscher's contention that the totalitarian single-party system was established only after the Truman Doctrine in 1947 (pp. 86-90). In evaluating this thesis it is necessary to make a distinction (blurred in most revisionist analyses) between effective control by the various Communist Parties and the full-fledged Stalinist system of the monolithic bloc. The Stalinist extreme, which did not long outlast his rule, can plausibly be presented as his characteristic reaction to the climate of international tension which had developed by 1947—plausibly, not certainly, since so little is known of Soviet decision-making, and it is possible that his compulsion to eliminate independent centers of power within the Soviet system might have led Stalin to the Cominform, the break with Tito, and the Eastern European purges even in a less tense international context.[12] Much of the tension, after all, was a consequence of the way Stalin chose to react to Western moves not in themselves hostile to the Soviet sphere, such as the Marshall Plan: the recovery of Western Europe could not be considered anti-Soviet unless it was assumed that the Soviet Union had a legitimate interest in its economic collapse.

There is much more evidence bearing on the question of Communist control before the final Stalinist phase. Horowitz, following Deutscher, offers the curious argument that the Soviet seizure of massive war booty and reparations from the former allies of Germany shows that Stalin expected these countries to remain capitalist, so unpopular did Soviet policy render the Communist Parties. The opposite is far more plausible: given this unpopularity, only the Communists could be relied on to cooperate with the Soviet Union, hence their political dominance became an imperative of Soviet policy. How else could friendly governments be ensured?

But it is not necessary to rely on *a priori* reasoning. It was widely recognized at the time that the Communist parties were able to secure a dominant political position through controlling key ministries, above

[12] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, rev. ed. (New York 1961), 51-64, points to stresses in Soviet relations with Eastern Europe (the problems of "domesticism") as a reason for the formation of the Cominform.

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all the Ministries of the Interior (the police), and through gaining effective control of the coalitions which governed each country from 1944–45 to 1947–48. Hugh Seton-Watson draws a distinction between the genuine coalition which governed for an initial period in four of the countries: Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and the "bogus coalition" which succeeded it, in which "the governments still contain non-communist parties, but these are represented by men chosen no longer by the party membership but by the communists."[13] The genuine coalition gave way to the bogus coalition in Bulgaria as early as January 1945, in Roumania in March 1945, in Hungary in February 1947, and in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. In Poland there were elements of the genuine coalition when Mikolajczyk was in the government (1945–46), though Communist control of the government was a primary objective of Soviet policy from the time of the liberation, and it was secure from the outset.

Even during the period of the genuine coalition the presence of the Soviet occupation forces enabled the Communists to prevail over their partners; for example, despite their lack of support in the December 1945 election in Hungary, they were able to insist that a Communist be appointed Minister of the Interior.[14] During this phase, moreover, parties which had retained their independence and support were undermined and eventually broken up through systematic campaigns involving the intimidation and arrest of leaders and the disqualification of candidates. Such campaigns took place above all against Mikolajczyk's Polish People's Party and against the Small Farmers' Party in Hungary throughout 1946. Thus the surviving independent political forces were broken during the year before the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

Brzezinski shows that Soviet and East European theorists, presupposing Communist domination but not a monopoly of power in the new governments, devised a doctrine of the People's Democracy as a transitional type of state. "Those are not capitalist states in the ordinary meaning of the word. But neither are they socialist states. Their development in the direction of Socialism is based on the nationalization of the chief means of production and on the very character of those states."[15]

The only exception to the pattern was Czechoslovakia, where popular support for the Communists was greatest, and where the genuine coali-

[13] Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, 2nd ed. (London 1952), 170.
[14] *Ibid.*, 194.
[15] Brzezinski (fn. 12), 32, citing an article by E. Varga.

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tion survived until early 1948, though under extreme stress; the polarization of the conflict in Czechoslovakia could indeed be traced to the international polarization of 1947, but in every other case Communist control was either established in early 1945 or consolidated in 1946. The conclusion is inescapable that, whatever Stalin's ultimate motivation, his method of achieving Soviet security in Eastern Europe was to establish political structures in which Communist control was beyond challenge. Whether the destruction of all independent parties was intended from the outset or a response to their popularity in Poland and Hungary cannot be determined, but given Stalin's attitude to independent political forces beyond his control, it is plausible to suppose that there was a general intention to neutralize and, if necessary, destroy such forces once the regimes had consolidated themselves. There is little to be said for Kolko's hypothesis that the Russians had no intention of "Bolshevizing" Eastern Europe; they did not (except in Czechoslovakia) appear to entertain any alternative.[16] The reality, rather, was that, due to the special character of the Soviet system, its demand for security could be satisfied only by far greater infringements on the independence of the countries of Eastern Europe than other great powers have chosen to impose on states in their security region, and this has been the basic reality in postwar Eastern Europe in 1945–46, just as in 1948, 1956, and 1968.

The Breakdown of Economic Cooperation

It is now clear that the failure to establish significant links between the Soviet and Western economic systems was a major factor in the onset of the Cold War. Two proposals for such links were under discussion in the early part of 1945 but had been abandoned by the time of the Potsdam conference: large-scale American loans to assist Soviet reconstruction, and reparations from Germany in the order of magnitude demanded by the Soviet leaders. In the absence of either kind of agreement, as Kolko points out, there was "nothing to trade to make actions and realities meaningful in terms of rewards as well as penalties" (p. 401).

This issue has received greater emphasis in revisionist than in earlier

[16] In his discussion of Hungary in 1944–45 Kolko cites Seton-Watson to the effect that the Communists did not have full control, but neglects Seton-Watson's evidence that they were striving for it and that some of the non-Communists in key positions were dependent on the Communists. The situation was not unlike that described by Wolfgang Leonhard in the Soviet zone of Germany, where the Communists controlled what at first appeared "bourgeois" local governmental authorities. See Wolfgang Leonhard, *Child of the Revolution* (London 1957), 287-372.

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accounts, and it is one which *prima facie* accords with the revisionist standpoint, since the United States could have assisted generously in the reconstruction of the war-ravaged Soviet economy and failed to do so. But the revisionist accounts convey a distorted impression of the decision-making and divert attention from the actual circumstances and the significance of the failure to establish a bridge between the two systems, suggesting as they do a policy of crude economic pressure based on Harriman's advice, culminating in the abrupt cutoff of lend-lease on V-E Day (Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*, p. 36; Kolko, p. 500).

There is still much that is unclear in the American decision-making on the projected loan, following Molotov's request for a $6 billion credit at 2¼ per cent interest in January 1945.[17] Both Roosevelt, prior to Yalta, and Truman, prior to Potsdam, indicated that they would raise the issue with Stalin, but neither did so. Harriman's viewpoint was more complex than the revisionists suggest, and his policy was not adopted. Although it is true that Harriman consistently argued (1944–45) that postwar credits should be used as a form of political pressure, he did not advocate the passive withholding of credits, but rather an active policy of using offers of credit as a lever to influence Soviet policy. "We should do everything we can to assist the Soviet Union through credits in developing a sound economy. . . . the sooner the Soviet Union can develop a decent life for its people the more tolerant they will become."[18] He contested Washington suggestions that the loan would be of only marginal importance to the Soviet economy and urged Washington to hasten its reply to Molotov.[19] However, as frictions increased, Harriman tended to fall in with the reluctance in Washington to proceed with the loan, argued for priority to Western Europe and proposed only small loans to Russia and Poland, despite his earlier realization that only a large credit offered any prospect of influencing the general direction of Soviet policy.

Harriman's inconsistencies may have been a response to the changing climate of opinion in Washington, but they also throw some light on fundamental obstacles to the projected loan. It is difficult to conceive of a successful negotiation of economic or political conditions for a major loan (compare the arduous negotiations over the special loan to Britain in 1945–46). What little evidence there is suggests that the Soviet

[17] The fullest account is Thomas G. Paterson, "The Abortive American Loan to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1943–1946," *Journal of American History*, LVI (June 1969), 70-92. See also Martin F. Herz, *The Beginnings of the Cold War* (Bloomington 1966), 153-74; Kolko, 333-40 and 499-502.

[18] *Foreign Relations* (fn. 6), 946 (telegram to Secretary of State, January 6, 1945). See also recommendations by Harriman, 845, 996.

[19] *Ibid.*, 994-96, 1009.

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leaders would have been as sensitive to suggestions of conditions as in the later negotiations on the Marshall Plan.[20] The alternative would have been an unconditional offer in the expectation that friendly relations would follow. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's proposed $10 billion credit was closer to this, but Roosevelt showed little interest. Official Washington was moving away from this approach to relations with Moscow, which had underlain Roosevelt's policy on lend-lease but was meeting with mounting criticism.[21]

The reasons for the American failure to respond to Molotov's request, then, appear to be as follows. The lessons drawn by the decision-makers from their relations with Moscow counselled against a "special relationship" with Russia that would dispense with conditions for assistance. At the same time, the decision-makers sensed the hopelessness of an attempt to negotiate conditions. The Administration was understandably reluctant to seek to persuade Congress to make unprecedented sums available under unprecedentedly favorable conditions. In terms of the new international system that was emerging, Russia and America could only be close partners or rivals, and a relationship of rivalry was already appearing, or reappearing; it is difficult to suppose that the circumstances were such that the offer of assistance could have transformed rivalry into partnership.

Washington's failure to offer a loan brought the reparations issue into the forefront of East-West economic relations. There was a hardening of American reparations policy between Yalta, when Roosevelt had accepted the Soviet proposal of $20 billion in reparations as a basis for discussion, and Potsdam, when the Americans reverted to Britain's Yalta position of rejecting any fixed sum for reparations and insisted that the cost of essential imports should be the first charge on German exports, ahead of reparations.[22] The American policy at Potsdam was

[20] See, for example, the Soviet reaction to the cutoff of lend-lease. Although there appears to have been no attempt to negotiate with the Soviet leaders on political conditions for credits, Ambassador Lane met with an angry response when he broached the issue with the Polish government. *Ibid.*, 415.

[21] See George C. Herring, Jr., "Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–1945," *Journal of American History*, LVI (June 1969), 93-114. Herring shows that the cutoff of lend-lease in May 1945 followed a deliberate decision to terminate the exceptionally favorable conditions which applied to Russia, and was in general accordance with Harriman's "quid pro quo" approach, but his account places emphasis on congressional pressures to terminate lend-lease and overzealous execution of the cutoff—factors neglected by the revisionists—and he shows that Harriman and the State Department were shocked by the manner in which the cutoff was executed.

[22] This had been a consistent principle of American reparations policy prior to Yalta. See Paul Y. Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions* (Birmingham, Alabama 1963), 431.

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that each occupying power should obtain its reparations deliveries from its own zone, but it was proposed that, since the greater part of the industry, especially heavy industry, was in the Western zones, part of the reparations from these zones (eventually agreed on as 25 per cent) should be supplied to the Soviet Union (10 per cent free of charge, 15 per cent in exchange for deliveries of foodstuffs). Whatever its intention, the effect of this policy was to increase the independence of the occupation zones at the expense of the theoretically supreme body in Germany, the Allied Control Council, and thus to move towards the division of Germany.

Kolko presents the policy as a deliberate choice of zonal autonomy in full awareness that it amounted to an abandonment of four-power control. "In fact the conference laid the structure and foundations for German partition and the United States created the basis for a truncated Germany's return to world power" (p. 575). The Americans were already looking toward the restoration of industrial Germany as a major economic power: they therefore deliberately avoided the four-power collaboration sought by the Russians, and opted for the partition of Germany.

This interpretation postulates a degree of consistency and clear-sightedness not characteristic of American policy at the time, and pre-dates the final partition of Germany. This was not crystallized until after the French prevented the establishment of a central German administration, and General Clay suspended reparations deliveries to Russia in April 1946 in retaliation for Russia's failure to deliver foodstuffs as agreed at Potsdam. This last, and decisive, step came shortly after the most notable four-power agreement in Germany: the agreement on the level of industry to be authorized. This was potentially the basis for implementing the reparations agreement, as the remaining industry would now be available for reparations.

There were differences among American policy-makers in mid-1945, but there is no evidence of a deliberate political decision at this stage in favor of long-term partition. Much of the pressure for zonal autonomy came from the military, who were thinking in terms of short-term administrative considerations.[23] American decisions on reparations appear to have been governed by immediate concerns: to avoid economic and social breakdown in the Western zones of Germany, with the accompanying specter of communization; to avoid financing massive reparations payments through subsidizing the necessary level of economic activity; and to find some basis for agreement consistent with those priorities after it had become clear that they ruled out a sum

[23] *Ibid.*, 418-20, 432-33, 435.

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of the order of $20 billion, still demanded by the Russians. Byrnes's opting for zonal reparations offered the chance for a practical agreement in which the West could not lose, since it controlled the main potential reparations, but there is no evidence that he foresaw all the long-term implications, or that the American leaders had abandoned the views stated in the Briefing Book Paper on Germany prepared for Potsdam:

> The U.S. zone of occupation is deficient in food and is almost completely lacking in coal and in other major industrial materials. Its operation as a closed economic entity would be utterly impracticable. . . . The economy of Eastern Germany can be readily assimilated into an Eastern economic sphere. In contrast, acceptance by the Western powers of the task of finding a place for a Western German economy would create extensive difficulties. . . .[24]

Bruce Kuklick also sees American reparations policy as a major factor in the partition of Germany, but traces it back from its immediate sources to that familiar villain of Cold War historiography, the Open Door policy. The "first charge" principle, he argues, was more than the commonsense maxim which it appeared to be: the exports which were to have precedence over reparations to offset the imports ruled "necessary," would, unlike reparations, be goods which Germany could sell competitively. This would promote German development with a view to participation in the multilateral trading world of American wartime planning: it was this which was to take precedence over Soviet reconstruction. "In clinging to their idea of a world economic system dominated by the United States, they prevented the possibility of any sort of cooperative regional arrangement with the U.S.S.R. and pursued a policy which contributed fundamentally to the division of Europe."[25]

This interpretation, like Kolko's, moves far ahead of the circumstances of 1945. It neglects the restrictiveness of early occupation policy towards the German economy, and the pressures of the economic emergency with which the Western Allies were confronted in Europe. The Americans were not thinking ahead to the period of competitive exports: what they were insisting on was a supply of goods or equipment that might otherwise be earmarked for reparations, sufficient to pay for the imports judged essential. The American policy may be criticized as ungenerous towards the Soviet ally, but cannot reasonably be taken as tantamount to the later policy, announced by Molotov in

[24] *Foreign Relations* (fn. 11), 440-41.
[25] B. Kuklick, "The Division of Germany and American Policy on Reparations," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXIII (June 1970), 293; see also 281.

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July and by Byrnes in September of 1946, of promoting German recovery beyond the restricted levels agreed at Potsdam. In the history of the occupation, "Potsdam" stands for stringent restrictions, while the Molotov and Byrnes speeches initiated the competitive restoration of Germany.

In pressing such hindsight interpretations, the revisionists divert attention from a development of central importance to the Cold War, the failure to establish significant Soviet-American economic relations. The economic division of Germany foreshadowed at Potsdam resulted from the opposition between Soviet and Anglo-American priorities, the former seeking above all the maximum German contribution to Soviet reconstruction, the latter seeking to pay the minimum to avert economic and social breakdown in Western Germany. But the more fundamental economic issue was that of direct American credits to Russia (indirect financing by way of reparations was not a viable alternative). The division of the world into two economic systems was inevitable: the decision on the loan ensured that there would be very little economic cooperation between them.

Atomic Weapons: Hiroshima and the Issue of International Control

In any view the discovery of nuclear weapons and the subsequent nuclear arms race represent a major element in the Cold War, especially in its initial phase when, notions of deterrence still unformulated, the first reaction to atomic weapons (their effects typically exaggerated) was shocked awareness of the new vulnerability of human society; fears associated with nuclear weapons and the revelations of espionage were to contribute to the climate of hysteria in the early years of the Cold War.

Alperovitz sees the atomic bomb as a fundamental influence on American diplomacy in 1945, encouraging Truman's anti-Soviet stance and providing the basis for his diplomatic strategy of the "delayed showdown." Although he asserts that there is insufficient evidence to establish the presence of a reverse relationship—the influence of anti-Soviet diplomacy on the decision to use the bomb—the closing pages of *Atomic Diplomacy* put forward a powerful statement of the thesis that dropping the bomb was not necessary for ending the war, nor even for securing American objectives in the Far East, but was seen by key officials as relevant to the broader Soviet-American relationship and especially to the political outcome in Europe (pp. 14, 236-42). The

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evidence which he assembles does not establish that calculations concerning Europe were a major factor in the decision to drop the bomb;[26] it does, however, reinforce his thesis that greater consideration was given to the political exploitation of the bomb than has usually been recognized.

But even here, where Alperovitz is on relatively strong ground, he fails to establish his central hypothesis that American diplomacy from May to July was shaped by a coherent strategy of settling the outstanding issues through a diplomatic confrontation ("showdown") after the dropping of the bomb. As we have seen, there was in fact no showdown over Eastern Europe: it seems evident, moreover, that there was no planning of a showdown, no thinking through of how, precisely, Washington would exploit the bomb. Rather, there was a mood on the part of some American leaders—an expectation that America's bargaining position would improve, coupled with a desire for a rapid political settlement; it would be more plausible to interpret American diplomacy in the early months of Truman's Presidency in terms of keeping options open, postponing final decisions until the situation was clearer, than in terms of a "strategy" of the kind which Alperovitz postulates. The new President, seeking to master the most demanding of offices at a time when the rush of events might have seemed beyond control, pressed from all sides with competing claims and advice, no doubt welcomed any rationalization for delay on complex issues on which he was still briefing himself; he was in no position to impose a daring long-term plan which required perhaps two decades of hindsight even to formulate.[27]

Vague notions of exploiting the bomb were one reason why the decision whether or not to drop it was not reopened as the military arguments for its use were weakened with Japan's increasing readiness to surrender; but they were probably not the main reason. Alperovitz overstates American awareness of the Japanese situation, and avoids a systematic discussion of the key decisions leading to Hiroshima. Kolko, who does examine the decisions, is much closer to earlier interpretations: the momentum of the atomic program and the expectation of further protracted struggle with Japan set up a powerful bias in favor

[26] Stimson, for example, who was the adviser most concerned with the political implications of the bomb, advised a relatively accommodating approach to Soviet demands in Eastern Europe.

[27] A reading of the early chapters of Truman's memoirs suggests that the postponement of Potsdam was due less to any specific consideration than to his determination to master the issues and options before him, to avoid merely being swept along by events; his interest in the budget (dismissed by Alperovitz) was an important aspect of this.

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of the military use of the bomb; the only real alternatives considered in May were an advance warning to Japan or a demonstration atomic strike, which was rejected as undermining the bomb's "shock" potential, and hence its prospect of ending the war; and in July the American leaders discounted the ambiguous evidence of Japan's peace feelers just because there had been so much similar evidence in the preceding months (pp. 539-43; 549-67).

> Mechanism prevailed. No one seriously explored any of the options—neither Japanese surrender, nor delay, nor withholding the bomb. . . . The United States would take no chances. For precisely the same reasons of mechanism and conservatism, which the Japanese in their own desperate way shared, the Americans decided to use the bomb as a known and now predictable factor of war, an economical means of destroying vast numbers of men, women, and children, soldiers and civilians. Well before August 1945 they had reduced this to a routine (Kolko, 566-67).

On the issue of the international control of nuclear weapons, Horowitz presents the United States as wantonly repudiating the kind of agreement proposed by Stimson in September 1945—direct negotiation with Russia on the non-manufacture of nuclear weapons—in favor of the unrealistically one-sided Baruch Plan, which provided that after a transition period, all sensitive nuclear operations would be managed by an international authority which would take decisions by a majority vote; i.e., there would be no veto.

It is easy, with hindsight, to identify the weaknesses of the Baruch Plan: the Soviet Union could not be expected to entrust its security to a Western-dominated international agency nor to remove its barriers to the substantial number of foreign experts that would have been involved, and the transition period of a continuing American nuclear monopoly was an obvious target for Soviet suspicion. However, it is worth recalling that the Baruch Plan has been discussed nostalgically or approvingly by such diverse writers as D. F. Fleming and Philip Noel-Baker,[28] and that its principal features were those of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, heavily influenced by Robert Oppenheimer, which had been based on the not implausible view that a nuclear arms race could be prevented only by an innovation as radical as the international management of nuclear activities: that nothing less measured up to the magnitude of the task.

Where Horowitz is at fault is in supposing that there was an obvi-

[28] D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins* (London 1961), I, 363-415; P. Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race* (London 1958), 181-201.

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ously more promising means for preventing a nuclear arms race, along the lines proposed by Stimson and by the Soviet Union. But Stimson's was not a full-fledged proposal, but rather an attempt, at his final Cabinet meeting, to argue for a basic reorientation of American policy. Had it been developed more fully, it would have had to provide for a system of inspection to give assurance that materials from "peaceful" nuclear facilities were not being diverted to military ends. The lack of such a system—or a sufficiently convincing one—was the basic Western objection to Soviet "ban the bomb" proposals, which were just as untrustworthy to suspicious Western governments as the Baruch Plan was to the Russians. The Baruch Plan has rightly been criticized as a brilliant propagandist ploy which by its very radicalism and one-sidedness obstructed real negotiation, and indeed there were voices in the West calling for much more modest measures of international control. It is unlikely, however, that there was any basis for agreement on such proposals in this period, given the problems which inspection posed for the Soviet Government. Horowitz overlooks the magnitude of the practical obstacles to an agreement and the unprecedented nature of the aspiration to prevent, by an international agreement between suspicious rival powers, the further development of a new, potentially dominant weapon. The history of disarmament negotiations, before and since, suggests the unlikelihood of such an agreement. Fleming, a participant in American policy-making at the time, was aware of the intractability of the problem: "The trouble was not in the Baruch Plan; it was in the world. Nations which could not come together in sympathy and understanding could not be saved by legalistic formulas."[29]

Soviet Aims in Western Europe

> Stalin was in a bizarre Byzantine way scrupulous, legalistically scrupulous, in his bargains with his bourgeois allies. . . . He had committed himself to respect the predominance of the bourgeois order in postwar western Europe and he carried out his obligations. Long before the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed, Stalin had very effectively saved western Europe for capitalism.[30]

> During the critical period in the history of French capitalism the major party of the Left took upon itself, with the guidance of the Soviet Union, the responsibility of managing and restoring a tottering system during its moment of greatest danger (Kolko, 444-45).

> Only Russian conservatism stood between the Old Order and revolution (Kolko, 450).

[29] Fleming (fn. 28), I, 373.

[30] Isaac Deutscher, "Myths of the Cold War," in D. Horowitz, ed., *Containment and Revolution* (London 1967), 17.

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Kolko and Horowitz follow Deutscher in his image of Stalin as "the most conservative statesman in the world." Yet there is a strange discrepancy between the general picture formulated above and the qualifications which Kolko begins to develop in his account of the Italian and French situation in 1944–45. He concedes that there was no chance of a violent Communist takeover of power with the Allied armies present in France and Italy, and in France with the further factor of de Gaulle's determination to gain unfettered control of the armed forces. The Communists, then, had to work within the system, and their leadership made a virtue of this, overruling opposition from some of the Resistance leaders. As the party of patriotism, reconstruction, and working class unity the P.C.F. (Communist Party of France) could extend its membership and support. For the first time it became a mass party, and was able to play a leading role in the governing coalition: as militant revolutionaries the Communists would have been an isolated minority inviting repression.

Still, the role of the Communists as the party of production and wage restraint is a surprising one and lends some color to the Deutscher-Kolko theses. It appears to have been the product of two strategic choices, essentially choices by Moscow (the P.C.F. being dominated by Thorez and his Moscow-based colleagues): to promote French independence from the United States, which required the recovery of France's economy independent of massive U.S. support; and to induce France to follow an independent, non-Western-bloc foreign policy, which would be assisted if the P.C.F. was both respectable and powerful.[31] And indeed, France sought to play such an intermediary role and was reluctant to abandon it even in 1947.

The French economic and social structure (the "Old Order") was neither as vulnerable as suggested by Deutscher and Kolko nor as close to complete recovery as presupposed in the Communist strategy. Despite Communist efforts to restore production, the need for American credits remained. On the other hand, the still ailing socioeconomic system was able to withstand the onslaught of Communist militancy when, after the open break between the Soviet Union and the West in 1947, the Communists launched their political strikes against the Marshall Plan. Kolko, indeed, is the victim of a myth—perhaps his distinctive contribution to revisionism—the myth of a revolutionary Left on the point of sweeping away the Old Order throughout Europe, but foiled by

[31] See, for instance, A. J. Rieber, *Stalin and the French Communist Party* (New York 1962), esp. 212-37.

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the ruthless repression of Western arms and by Stalin's *Realpolitik*. Although the Resistance movements were imbued with a spirit of radical change, they were neither united nor organized politically; nor were the major political forces in Western Europe revolutionary.

Communist policy in Western Europe in this period was one of building up the strongest possible position within the new economic and political structures whose long-term prospects were uncertain. A central feature of the policy, in Germany as well as in France and Italy, was the attempt to bring about an amalgamation of the Communist and Socialist parties. The unity of the Left had strong appeal to the Socialist rank and file, but was successfully resisted by the Socialist leaders in each country, who feared Communist dominance of the united party which was to be organized along Communist lines of "democratic centralism."[32] Though aware of this strand in Communist policy, Kolko misconstrues it as a willingness to abandon the Party, to submerge its identity (p. 440)—a view which was shared by none of the Socialist leaders.

The Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan, and Soviet policy towards Germany at least until 1948, show that Stalin was not prepared to regard Western Europe as a capitalist sphere in which he would refrain from intervention. Admittedly, the ultimate aims of Soviet policy in Germany in this period remain obscure. Many contemporary Western observers saw Moscow making a bid for the support of German nationalism in 1946, when Molotov announced Soviet support for a centralized German government and major increases in the authorized level of German industrial production; others saw the proposal for a centralized government as an attempt to secure a structure easily amenable to Soviet control. Djilas reports his own puzzlement over confident statements by Stalin and other Soviet leaders in the spring of 1946 that all of Germany would become Communist, a confidence that had been replaced in 1948 by resignation to the division of Germany.[33] Adam Ulam suggests that Soviet policy in Germany was tentative, unclear as to what would best serve Soviet interests, but clearer as to what it wished to avoid: the consolidation of the Western zones into a powerful anti-Soviet state.[34] Certainly the Soviet interest in reparations

[32] *Ibid.*, 212-15; B. D. Graham, *The French Socialists and Tripartisme 1944–1947* (Canberra 1965), 97-101; L. J. Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher* (Stanford 1965), 97-104.

[33] M. Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (Harmondsworth 1963), 119: a passage never cited by the revisionists but conveying the same impression of authenticity as the rest of his memoir.

[34] Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (London 1968), 440-47.

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cut across any attempt to appeal to German nationalism, and Soviet diplomatic proposals in 1946–47 can quite plausibly be read as giving priority to reparations. What can be postulated is that Soviet policy engaged in a number of endeavors, mostly unsuccessful, to keep all-German options open, to build up a power base in Berlin and the western zones of Germany, and to obtain through diplomacy a voice in controlling the economy of Germany as a whole and especially the Ruhr. The Berlin blockade was a last-ditch attempt to pressure the Western governments to refrain from creating a West German state or, failing that, to oust them from Berlin. The Soviet moves prior to this have some resemblance to the earlier Western efforts to achieve a voice in the affairs of Eastern Europe, based on a similar reluctance to concede the region completely to the other side; given the strong position of the Communist parties in France and Italy, these moves gave substance—before the economic recovery sparked by the Marshall Plan—to fears of the spread of communism into Western Europe.

1947: Europe Divided

1947 saw the end of ambiguity: the lines of the Cold War in its main theater, Europe, were now drawn clearly, the landmarks being the Truman Doctrine, the March–April Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow, the Marshall Plan and its rejection by the Soviet Union, and the formation of the Cominform. The picture of these events that emerges from revisionist studies such as that by Horowitz is that of an ideologically militant United States throwing down the gauntlet, the timing and tone of the Truman Doctrine destroying any hope of compromise at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference and provoking Stalin's counter-move—the founding of the Cominform. Moreover, although the Marshall Plan was theoretically open to Soviet participation, in reality Washington officials were determined to avoid this, and succeeded in maneuvering so that the onus for the break would fall on the Soviet leaders rather than themselves (pp. 70-74). Walter Lippmann's contemporary critique of the containment doctrine is enlisted in support of the thesis that the final division of Europe could have been avoided by a more far-sighted American policy: the Marshall Plan, instead of being placed in a context of ideological conflict, could have been combined with a more enterprising diplomacy, and a determined effort could have been made to negotiate a German settlement based not on hardening ideological frontiers but on acceptance of a neutralized region in Central Europe,

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which would have involved the early withdrawal of the American, British, and Soviet occupying forces from Europe.[35]

On examination there is little to be said for this version of the situation in 1947. Whatever the long-term objections to the Truman Doctrine, it did not have the immediate effect on Soviet-American relations that is postulated by the revisionists, perhaps because the combination of negotiation with harsh rhetoric was so much in accord with the Soviet *modus operandi*. At the Moscow Conference it was the Americans, especially Marshall, who were dismayed by the lack of progress, while Stalin was relatively relaxed.[36]

The Marshall Plan, and in particular its rejection by the Soviet Union, was more decisive for the final crystallization of the two blocs in Europe, and there is some truth in the revisionist characterization of American attitudes. Officials feared the loss of Congressional support for the Plan if Russia were to participate, yet did not wish to take the responsibility for excluding her. Ironically, it was a provision advocated by Walter Lippmann which appears to have led to the Soviet rejection of the Plan. This was the requirement that the European states coordinate their own plans for economic reconstruction, taking full advantage of intra-European trade, and submit to the United States a request based on their joint calculations. Molotov's rejection of the Anglo-French proposals to exchange economic data and prepare such a collective proposal, and his insistence on a direct bilateral arrangement with the United States, led to the Soviet withdrawal from the Paris conference on the Plan and insistence that the East European states should also withdraw. This confirmed that there were to be two separate economic blocs in Europe and further restricted the freedom of the "satellite" governments: at the same time, their wavering and perhaps the increasing uncertainty on the part of the French and Italian Communist Parties appear to have precipitated the decision to found the Cominform, which introduced the full-fledged Stalinist "monolithic" bloc. It also initiated a more militant phase of Communist policy, characterized by political strikes in Western Europe and insurgency in Southeast Asia.

Lippmann was the first to admit that his alternative might not have

[35] Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York 1947), discussed in Horowitz, 243-48.

[36] At a meeting between Stalin and Marshall on April 15, Stalin responded to Marshall's pessimism with the suggestion that: "these were only the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance forces . . . when people had exhausted themselves in dispute they then recognized the need for compromise." Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York 1955), 222-23.

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succeeded in restoring a Europe free from occupation by the great powers on its periphery. In calling for "the Marshall Plan purged of the Truman Doctrine," Lippmann did not envisage the withdrawal of all American influence, but merely the withdrawal of American, British, and Soviet troops. Since this was presumably one of the aims of the Foreign Ministers' conferences on Germany, one must ask what incentive Lippmann envisaged using to break the familiar deadlocks of those conferences. He referred briefly to the possible need to pay "ransom" to induce the Soviets to withdraw their armies; and he called on both sides to look ahead to the dangers of building up two rival Germanies as members of the two hostile blocs.

As the issue was never put to the test, it cannot be asserted with certainty that there was no chance of such a settlement. Ten years later, when George Kennan proposed disengagement in his Reith Lectures, the obstacles were even greater: many vested interests in maintaining the two Germanies in their respective blocs had by then developed. But the conditions for a settlement were not at all promising even in 1947. Within Germany there were the problems of four-power agreement on the form of government and the formation of a viable government willing to meet Soviet demands for reparations: there was no reason to suppose that this latter problem would be resolved any more easily than the similar dilemma after World War I (the more willing a government to meet reparations demands, the less the prospect of its viability). In the wider European context, Lippmann (like Kennan in 1957) proposed a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe as well as from Germany. It is difficult to see what *quid pro quo* the Western powers had to offer for Soviet abandonment of control over its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Indeed, one of the surprising *lacunae* in Lippmann's 1947 argument is that, although he put forward a geopolitical explanation in place of Kennan's ideological explanation for Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe, he did not, in his discussion of his proposed German peace treaty, take account of the Soviet Union's security interest in remaining in Eastern Europe.[37] Lippmann's brilliant and wide-ranging critique of American policy in 1947 shows nothing so clearly as the hazards of predictive analysis in international politics. The negative points in Lippmann's critique have more force than his positive advocacy of an alternative, which scarcely deserves to

[37] Indeed, at this point in his analysis he suggests that Soviet insistence on retaining forward military positions would show that Moscow's motive was to dominate Europe. Lippmann (fn. 35), 43-44.

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be elevated into the category of "missed opportunities," as is coming to be done in the revisionist literature.[38]

NATO and Rearmament

> Throughout the period in which communism was a major threat, particularly in France and Italy, little thought was given to the problems of a military nature. . . . There was still some willingness in the West to take account of the incredible devastation visited upon the Soviet Union during the war. Indeed, one of the most significant facts about the formation of NATO is that the process began after the major internal threats to Western European countries were beginning to subside.[39]

If any revisionist hypothesis is coming to acquire the status of the new conventional wisdom, it is that the Soviet Union, devastated by the second World War, never intended to invade Western Europe, whose real problems were socioeconomic, and that the foundation of NATO and the subsequent heavy rearmament represented a massive overreaction. This view follows the analysis of George Kennan, who argued unsuccessfully against the premises which led to the founding of NATO in 1948–49. The Western leaders, it is suggested, were led astray by the Hitler-Stalin analogy and the alarm engendered by the Prague *coup* and the Berlin blockade. A correct reading of these events would have emphasized Soviet caution in the blockade and the Soviet aim of rounding off the East European security zone in Czechoslovakia. It would have been seen that the Soviet "threat" to invade Western Europe was a deterrent one, analogous to the American nuclear "threat" against Russia itself, each aimed at deterring the other from exploiting its asymmetrical military superiority. By 1949, Western Europe was beginning to recover economically, and the Soviet attempt to prevent the formation of West Germany had been defeated: the stability so lacking in the first postwar years was on the way to being achieved.

Hindsight lends plausibility to this analysis, but it is nonetheless highly questionable, not only because it is impossible to say what the consequences of the non-existence of so major a factor in contemporary

[38] E.g., Horowitz, 19. It is possible to suggest a parallel between Lippmann and Henry Wallace, both of whom remained essentially within the mainstream of American policy thinking even when opposed to pressing particular issues as the Truman Administration chose to. Thus Wallace, arguing for a more conciliatory line, insisted on an "Open Door" to trade in Eastern Europe (as, in different words, did Lippmann). See La Feber (fn. 1), 37-39.

[39] Robert Hunter, *Security in Europe* (London 1969), 12. Hunter develops an original reinterpretation of the Cold War as a consequence of the lack of agreed guidelines for conflict management.

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international politics as NATO would have been, but also, more concretely, because it cannot be asserted with confidence that Soviet intentions would have remained unchanged had there been no American guarantee to Europe and no American intervention in Korea (which was based on the same general reading of Soviet intentions). The past two decades in Europe would surely have followed a different course if the Soviet Union had been the only superpower militarily present in Europe.

Moreover, the Western governments were thinking largely in political terms: they were not so much reacting to an anticipated Soviet invasion as seeking a political framework which would promote a sense of security in Western Europe, and thus provide the necessary climate of confidence for the economic recovery to come to fruition—a factor which even Kennan acknowledged. They wished to avoid a psychological situation of inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Harriman's defense of NATO was that without it there would be "a reorientation" in Europe leading to "a restrengthening of those that believe in appeasement and neutrality."[40] A little later this sort of consideration led many to overcome their objections to West German rearmament: the point was not so much the need for German divisions as the need to associate West Germany with the NATO security framework in preference to any alternative.

It is necessary to bear in mind the uncertainty with which Western leaders in 1948–49 contemplated their future relations with the Soviet Union. Decisions were taken in anticipation of the period when America would no longer have a nuclear monopoly: what confidence could there be that Western Europe could then withstand Soviet pressures without an American guarantee? And after Korea, the question was posed in terms of a need for armed forces on the ground, to resist a potential Soviet attack.

But was it reasonable to anticipate hostile Soviet pressures? No doubt Western decisions were influenced by the memory of over-optimistic analyses of Hitler's intentions, but there was sufficient unpredictability in Stalin's policies and a sufficient sense of hostility and mutual incomprehension for prudent leaders to conclude that a military imbalance in Russia's favor would be dangerous.

Given this uncertainty and lack of meaningful communication with the Soviet leaders, Western decisions were based increasingly on the military maxim that policy should be based on an opponent's capabilities rather than his presumed intentions, and on "worst-case" rather

[40] Cited in La Feber (fn. 1), 78.

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than "best-case" assumptions. In this context we can observe the weakness of Kennan's argument against the need for a military alliance:

> The Russians had no idea of using regular military strength against us. Why then should we direct attention to an area where we were weak and they were strong? Time and again, in the ensuing weeks, I said to my colleagues: "All right, the Russians are well armed and we are poorly armed. So what? We are like a man who has let himself into a walled garden and finds himself alone there with a dog with very big teeth. The dog, for the moment, shows no signs of aggressiveness. The best thing for us to do is surely to try to establish, as between the two of us, the assumption that teeth have nothing whatsoever to do with our mutual relationship—that they are neither here nor there. If the dog shows no disposition to assume that it is otherwise, why should we raise the subject and invite attention to the discrepancy?[41]

The reply was all too obvious. Governments could not assume that the dog would remain permanently docile, but had a duty to supply themselves with some form of self-protection. Nor could they, given the many uncertainties, rely on Kennan's assurance that the Russians had no intention to use force. This particular argument, in any case, was greatly weakened by Korea.

The argument, then, is partly that even if the revisionist hindsight analysis is correct, it was not very convincing at the time: the decisions were reasonable in the circumstances, and to act on the opposite set of premises would have been verging on the irresponsible. The greater the uncertainty, the more reasonable the policy of rearmament. The strongest argument for NATO, however, was the need for a power balance and a security system. A decision against a Western alliance would have had momentous consequences for Europe's political and economic future. West Germany would have been subject to strong Soviet influence, and it is difficult to imagine that the various European Communities could have been established. The revisionist thesis appears to be based on a static image of international politics which deserves to be examined in greater detail.

Revisionist Assumptions

Revisionist interpretations typically imply that disturbances in European politics in the early postwar period were due solely to untimely American initiatives. This may be a function of a narrowly bipolar vision of the period: the pawns are of so little interest to the revisionist historian that he does not concern himself with the various actors

[41] George Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950* (London 1968), 407-08.

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within them. The suggestion is not that every history of the Cold War must enter into the details of European politics, but that there should be an awareness of the main political forces and their evolution: the failure of the Resistance to emerge as an effective political force, the realignment under pressure of Communism, social democracy, Christian democracy, liberalism, and conservatism. It is discouraging when cardboard characters, the Left and the reactionaries, are presented as a sufficient account of the mosaic of European politics. Mesmerized by a one-dimensional image of political change, Kolko and his predecessors neglect the multi-dimensional character of Europe's political cleavages, especially significant in the immediate postwar period when, as in the 1930's, there was real uncertainty which kind of political system would win out over much of the Continent.

Underlying the static image, one discerns the ancient fallacy of the harmony of interests, the assumption that conflict—improper and abnormal—must be explained by the presence of a villain. Thus there is the tacit assumption that it was natural for the broad coalitions that governed most European countries in the aftermath of war to continue indefinitely. In fact they were necessarily transitional, and politics was concerned with which kind of regime was to be established, and which forces were to be dominant. Again, the tone of revisionist discussion of the Baruch Plan or Lippmann's alternative to containment suggests that it was natural, after a war which had seen the final collapse of the European international order, to expect agreement between the emerging superpowers on a new basis for international order, and a degree of arms control never achieved in the past; these would have represented extraordinary feats of statesmanship.

The revisionists lack a conception of international order: their bipolar focus is not developed into a concept of the international system.[42] While analysis at the system level alone tends to be unrewarding, neglect of the system is equally so; it was at the root of the failure of many of the classic theories of war, and is the source of much of the revisionist flaying about in search of the guilty. Not to perceive that there was a fundamental problem of international order in 1945 inevitably leads to caricature.

A striking example of the lack of a system perspective is Alperovitz's

[42] The term is used here not to refer to any specific systems theory, but in the manner of Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York 1959); he posits three basic images which underlie interpretations of international conflict: the individual-psychological, the type of nation-unit, and the international system—the milieu in which international politics takes place, whether envisaged as Hobbesian anarchy or as international society.

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speculative essay "The United States, the Revolutions, and the Cold War: Perspective and Prospect" (*Cold War Essays*, 75-121), which sees American Cold War policy in terms of a tradition of anti-revolutionary interventionism, impelled by a common ideological motive. A system approach would suggest that hegemonial intervention in support of business interests, for example, is so different from intervention to restrain a competing great power that one explanation is unlikely to fit both cases. The one is a matter of marginal advantage, the other concerns the basic power relations of the system. This suggests that Alperovitz's remedy (to change grassroots American attitudes) may be no more relevant than the proposals of those classic "utopian" theorists who neglected system pressures in prescribing remedies for the prevention of war.

A further assumption concerns the general character of American foreign policy, viz., the view that it can be understood in terms of an overriding strategy or design. Two examples are Alperovitz's strategy of the delayed showdown and Kolko's view of American policy towards Germany at Potsdam. As we have seen, the one represented a mood rather than a strategy; the other a policy tendency, but not the dominant one. While there are occasions when policy is shaped by long-term considerations—the Marshall Plan would be a good example—it is more typically the product of competing interests and analyses within the executive and pressures from without, and this was surely true of the two examples mentioned. A faulty image leads to the neglect of the more plausible hypothesis.

Related to this is a fault natural to the critic of policy, which a critical historian should, however, overcome: the neglect of the actors' perspectives, the failure to reconstruct their perceptions and problems, or even to characterize them in any detail. Thus Truman, Byrnes, or Harriman are presented as uniformly anti-Soviet; their more aggressive phrases are seized on out of context—perhaps a provocation or a policy argument—and are never juxtaposed with their more conciliatory expressions. Admittedly, there is a dilemma here: to enter into the actor's world, to inquire into his purposes, may blunt the critical edge of polemic. But such an effort of understanding need not lead to identification with the actor, though it will break down simple stereotypes and thus undermine standard criticisms. The historian-critic should be equal to the task of formulating a more subtle critique: the alternative is a failure to test his hypothesis against a rounded view of the main actors.

The question of testing hypotheses bears further examination. First,

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there is the selection of evidence: we have noted the selective use of the evidence in the State Department Papers and other sources. One example is the use of Djilas's *Conversations with Stalin*. Djilas's observations are just as damaging to a simplistic revisionist standpoint as to any other simplistic point of view, but revisionists overcome this difficulty by selecting only the passages that fit the desired interpretation, for instance Stalin's remark that the Germans were not suited to Communism —but not his assertion that all Germany would be Communist.

One cannot avoid concluding that the revisionists violate the basic methodological rule formulated by Karl Popper, that one should seek to falsify rather than verify hypotheses. It is possible to find confirming evidence for most hypotheses; a hypothesis is not seriously tested until it has withstood attempts to disprove it. The style of the revisionist histories leaves an overwhelming impression that this has not been attempted. Rather, there is an amassing of favorable evidence, and a neglect of awkward evidence or alternative hypotheses. Hence the assertion of over-Machiavellian interpretations based on an ingenious construing of a fraction of the evidence. Not infrequently plausibility is achieved only by limiting the discussion to an artificial time period; consideration of subsequent events would expose difficulties for the interpretation. Most striking of all, there is the loss of a sense of the distinction between intended and unintended consequences.

What we have, then, is not so much Cold War history as Cold War polemic. The narrowness of vision appears to stem from the values and assumptions of the writers. As to values, the revisionist writings exemplify certain dangers in the current trend in favor of "commitment" in the social sciences. What is overlooked is that scholarship is itself a value, as well as a discipline, and that its demands represent the essential commitment of the scholar, which may conflict with his other social and political commitments. Revisionists are very conscious of this in commenting on views opposed to their own (cf. Alperovitz on Herbert Feis, *Cold War Essays*, 73). There is value in what might be termed the naive commitment of the historian to follow his material regardless of where it may lead him: "Historians often dislike what happened or wish that it had happened differently. There is nothing they can do about it. They have to state the truth as they see it without worrying whether this shocks or confirms existing prejudices."[43] The revisionists, however, give the impression of quarrying purposefully for material to fit a structure fully designed in advance.

[43] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, Foreword to second edition (Harmondsworth 1964), 7.

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The effect of the value systems of the New Left, typical of the revisionists, is to project back onto the 1940's the conflict of values in America which preoccupies them twenty-five years later. As a consequence, most of the European actors disappear from view and a mythical Left has to be created to represent the forces in conflict with the counterrevolutionary United States. New Left historians lack awareness of the value systems which led socialists and liberals into alignment with Christian Democrats and conservatives against what they perceived to be the overriding totalitarian threat.

The disability of an intolerant value system is accentuated by the commitment to certain images such as the counterrevolutionary character of American policy. In contrast to those who see this largely as the consequence of attempting to apply policies appropriate to Europe (i.e., in line with the predominant values and interests of the Europeans) to the very different societies of, for example, Southeast Asia, the revisionist works back from Vietnam and postulates a simplistic revolutionary situation in postwar Europe in order to be able to assert that the United States has played a monolithic counterrevolutionary role in the whole postwar period.[44]

Directions for Research

Rejection of the image of the postwar period offered by the revisionists does not imply the rejection of every revisionist hypothesis. Perhaps the major revision supported by the evidence is the abandonment of the notion of the American leaders as innocents abroad—the gentlemanly Uncle Sam of the cartoonists. American leaders were much more aware of the political issues than has been supposed, and much more ready to take initiatives to secure American or non-Communist interests: they were not merely responding to Soviet aggressiveness, but anticipated challenges and sought unilateral advantages. "Containment" was not the purely defensive, reactive policy depicted by its supporters and critics alike. The universalist, idealist strand in American foreign policy had hegemonial overtones. Americans were

[44] Horowitz argues for continuity between American policy in Europe and the Third World by suggesting somewhat more subtle similarities; e.g., American resistance to a Lippmann-type negotiated settlement in Europe is likened to counterrevolutionary policies elsewhere (pp. 16-19). For Kolko the case is more straightforward: the U.S. and Britain systematically cut down the Left (as it were, a Greek model for Europe as a whole). He can even assert: "The existence of Soviet power in Eastern Europe permitted more or less natural and indigenous forces to take their logical course, while in Western Europe, American and British power contained these forces directly or indirectly, a containment that became the preeminent unifying element in the Western alliance after 1945, and which also hindered postwar economic recovery" (pp. 169-70).

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insensitive to the problems of the Soviet leaders, hence prone to overreaction.

However, the foregoing critique reflects disappointment that the gleanings are so meager—assuming of course that one is juxtaposing revisionist interpretations not against the world view of John Foster Dulles, but against the mainstream of scholarship on the period. This is not the place to develop the views on Cold War origins implied or sketched above, but it may be useful to indicate some of the areas for further research which are suggested by this analysis.

The first would be the detailed reconstruction, in the light of the evidence now available, of the interaction of the two leading powers, in the spirit of Popper, Taylor, and McNeill: how far would one now be led to modify the picture that emerges from McNeill's masterly survey? American foreign policy is beginning to receive this kind of scrutiny, but the single-actor focus accentuates some of the shortcomings discussed above.

This suggests a second and more thematic approach, the study of the Cold War in terms of the breakdown of an international order—the European states system which provided a framework and a tradition of rudimentary ideas for international order from the seventeenth century until 1914; both were shattered in the first World War and swept away in the second. By the 1950's it had become commonplace to speak of the new bipolar framework, and by the 1960's some new rudimentary rules of the game, perhaps implicit in the foreign relations of the whole period, were more clearly perceived and formulated by the contestants. But in the 1940's it was not clear what the new framework would be, nor how, in the welter of competing universalist doctrines and self-regarding practices, a set of rudimentary understandings could be arrived at. The significance of ideology is usually blurred by attempts to relate it to the motivation of one or the other superpower: from the standpoint of the international system as a whole, its significance was that of a barrier to communication, an "Iron Curtain" that impeded the necessary minimum of understanding.

Ideology was also bound up with the partition of the postwar world between two economic systems. It is very difficult to conceive of any "missed opportunity" for creating a single economic system, and the analysis has pointed to major obstacles to linking the two systems through cooperative relations. The crystallization of the two systems is an area worth further research, especially as it would seem that it was a more fundamental reason for the onset of the Cold War than the quarrel over Eastern Europe.

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The absence of agreement on a framework for the international system of the 1940's explains much of the confusion over which power, America or Russia, was the potential hegemonial aggressor. The revisionists are correct that in the world as a whole the United States was by far the superior power; but in Europe the Soviet Union, despite its wartime devastation, would even more clearly be dominant unless the United States were present as a power, as it had not been in the 1930's. Thus the decisions of 1947 and 1949–50, in which the U.S. resolved, contrary to the prevailing expectation in 1945, to underwrite Western Europe, first economically, then militarily, were indeed major turning points. It is obvious, as the revisionists insist, that war-weary Russia was unwilling to provoke a war with the United States, but it is equally obvious that, without the American presence, Russia could have dominated war-weary Europe.

In the European context, Eastern Europe was not just another anonymous sphere of influence. Long an area of Russian aspiration, it had for the greater part of modern history been divided between two or more powers. In 1945, contrary to the twentieth-century trend towards greater national autonomy, it fell totally under Soviet control—to the Western Europeans, a looming reminder of the Soviet colossus and of their new vulnerability.

This suggests a third promising area for research: an examination of *European* views of the early Cold-War issues in order to discern how much of American policy was in accord with a wider "Western" perception of the threat to liberal values, and how much of it was uniquely American.

Research along the lines suggested would tend to remove the study of the Cold War further from participant accounts by bringing out the significance of factors of which they were not, and could not have been, fully aware: their own perceptions; diplomatic interactions from the standpoint of both sides; and the wider "systemic" implications of their actions in an undefined, newly-forming international system. Such research is not likely to overturn certain hypotheses such as the existence of a basic asymmetry in the Cold War in Europe. However cautiously, Stalin challenged the survival of the capitalist-democratic order in Western and Central Europe in the crucial period of its weakness. Thanks to Berlin and the presence of large Communist parties in France and Italy, he had greater leverage in the West than the United States could exert in Eastern Europe, whatever its inclinations. Research should, however, throw some light on the escalation of Cold-War tension as it came to dominate world politics. A full account would have

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to relate external policy to the internal politics of the superpowers and would have to show the interrelation of the European and Asian theaters of the conflict. In all this the revisionist school has something to offer, but not if it simply reverses the errors of the participants: if American policy has suffered from ethnocentrism, misperceiving Asia in European terms, it is not an advance to perceive Europe as an earlier Vietnam. That is merely to confuse successful policy with tragic miscalculation.

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AFTER MANY A SUMMER?

The Possibilities of Political Change in South Africa

By CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM*

Margaret Ballinger, *From Union to Apartheid: A Trek to Isolation*. New York and London, Praeger Publishers, 1969, 489 pp., $12.50.

Edward Feit, *African Opposition in South Africa: The Failure of Passive Resistance*. Stanford, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967, 212 pp., $7.50.

Ralph Horwitz, *The Political Economy of South Africa*. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967, 512 pp., $10.00.

A GREAT deal has been written about the political system of the Republic of South Africa.[1] The ethnic, linguistic and racial differences of its population, the complex and convoluted history of its political antecedents, the strength and productivity of its economy, its strategic location (both in terms of geography and transaction flows), the inequities of its social and political system, and above all, the seeming uncertainty of its future have fascinated observers of its past and present. The volume of material is impressive; however, because many of the works dealing with South Africa are highly personal or partisan in character or essentially descriptive in nature, they are generally of only marginal or transitory importance to any fundamental understanding of its political system. Moreover, there remain substantial blank spots on our cognitive map of South Africa, and many of the more critical aspects of its situation have been ignored or given the most superficial of treatments.[2] Occasionally, however, works appear which either break new ground or recast our existing knowledge in such a way as to provide meaningful insight into the working of this most interesting of political systems.

One such work is Ralph Horwitz's *The Political Economy of South Africa*. Concerned with tracing the complex interrelationship between Whites and Non-Whites in South Africa and the many connections

* The author is grateful to Richard Dale, Timothy Shaw, Thomas Karis, and Robert Small who read earlier drafts of this essay.

[1] For an overview of the literature written prior to 1966, see Richard Dale, "South Africa and the International Community," *World Politics*, XVIII (January 1966), 297-313.

[2] A comprehensive attempt to delineate the areas of sufficient and insufficient data is to be found in Richard Dale, "Southern Africa: Research Frontiers in Political Science," in C. P. Potholm and Richard Dale, eds., *Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics* (New York, forthcoming 1972).

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between the structure of its economy and the concomitant social and political system, *The Political Economy of South Africa* makes a number of telling observations about the long history of South Africa and attempts to project its most relevant trends into the future. Horwitz indicates, for example, the extent to which the White polity, whether English- or Afrikaans-speaking, has traditionally acted in such a way as to prevent Non-Whites from using economic development as a means to social and, above all, political advancement (76-106). He argues that the elimination of the always tenuous system of qualified franchise which existed in two (the Cape and Natal Provinces) of the four political units that came together to form the Union of South Africa in 1909 was a logical and necessary step in this progression. In order for the political system to remain indefinitely in the hands of Whites, it was necessary to eliminate Non-Whites from the common rolls in Natal and the Cape Province: "To entrench the preferential position of the Whites against any egalitarian changes coming from economic development was ultimately dependent on the total disenfranchisement of the Non-Whites" (76). Seen in this light, such seemingly discrete political acts as the removal of the Africans from the common roll in 1936 and from a separate roll (but with representation on the national level) in 1960, and the removal of the Coloureds from the common roll in 1956 and from their separate roll in 1970, fall into a pattern—one with an intrinsic dynamic of its own, culminating in the political exile of all Non-Whites to their "homelands," i.e., *out* of the national political system of South Africa.

Horwitz is also perceptive in pointing out that while the tremendous economic development of South Africa, especially since World War II, has dramatically increased the amount of physical and economic interaction of the various ethnic groups in the country and spurred a virtual flood of rural-to-city migration on the part of Africans, it has also inexorably prompted the principal decision-makers in the White polity to interject more and more rules for keeping them apart. These rules have hampered economic development and resulted in a significant tampering with the market forces operative in South Africa.[3] In short, the history of South Africa in this century has been the opposition of the polity to the market, and potentially more troublesome perhaps, vice versa: "The special features of the South African economy—migrant labour and the linkage-mechanism by way of administrative direction

[3] This has taken place despite the fact that there have never been enough Whites to fill the skilled positions in the economy and despite the fact that the supply of African labor has never equaled the European demand for it.

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of change rather than market adjustment to change—have consequently been the subject of continuing conflict between the polity and the market" (299). The more the market forces have prompted the coming together of the races, the more the leaders of the political system have struggled to prevent this interaction from having any political significance.[4] To date, the White leaders have been most successful in their attempts to stimulate and maintain economic development without losing control over the political system.[5] In a carefully documented set of chapters, Horwitz indicates just how this has been possible.

For all its success in pointing to some essential and heretofore underemphasized facets of the relationship between economic and political change in South Africa, the Horwitz book suffers from a number of flaws that are typical of much of the literature on South Africa. These are worth examining: taken together, they are the cause of a great deal of confusion about how the South African political system actually operates and what lies in its future.

In the first place, Horwitz consistently overestimates the importance of the historic split between the Afrikaans- and English-speaking segments of the European population and is overly concerned with determining who is primarily responsible for the present system of apartheid.[6] I would argue that this concern leads to a basic misunderstanding of the South African political system and has deflected critical penetration from its workings. Although it is true that most of South African history has been the history of the struggle between these two groups for political hegemony, that struggle has never been over the desirability of segregation (only over the degree), or over the undesirability of Non-White majority rule (only over whether or not there should be token participation by small numbers of Non-Whites in the

[4] For an analysis of the Rhodesian situation which provides some interesting similarities and contrasts, see G. Arrighi, *The Political Economy of Rhodesia* (The Hague 1967). Some of Arrighi's Marxian interpretations, however, seem strained to the point of being precious. For example, he maintains (p. 41) that it was the national bourgeoisie and white workers who "seized" power in the South African elections of 1948. For a more systematic and illuminating study of the Rhodesian political system, see D. J. Murray, *The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia* (London 1970).

[5] Leonard Thompson, *Politics in the Republic of South Africa* (Boston 1966), and Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, eds., *The Oxford History of South Africa: Volume II, 1870–1966* (London 1971). For an analysis of the forces acting for cohesion in South Africa, see Stanley Trapido, "Political Institutions and Afrikaner Social Structures in the Republic of South Africa," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (March 1963), 75-87, and C. P. Potholm, "The South African Political System," in C. P. Potholm, *Four African Political Systems* (Englewood Cliffs 1970), 91-137.

[6] The much-heralded split between the *verligte* ("enlightened") and *verkrampte* ("narrow-minded") wings of the National Party is an outstanding example of this pattern. See Peter B. Orlick, "Divided Against Itself: South Africa's White Polity," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VIII (July 1970), 199-212.

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national political system). The core value upon which the South African polity was founded and nurtured, and upon which it continues to depend, is White supremacy and the maintenance of European control over the polity. Rhetoric to the contrary, there is no evidence that a substantial minority of the White population, irrespective of linguistic background, has ever been prepared to relinquish this control. There has always been, and continues to be, considerable debate over the degree of apartheid necessary in order to maintain European control and over aspects of its application. But these differences do not have any substantial consequences for the future of the political system *qua* system. Both the National and United Parties, which currently hold every seat but one in the Parliament, are committed to the maintenance of European hegemony. The Progressive Party, while it does advocate a multiracial society, nevertheless stands for a qualified franchise—one which would put off into the indefinite future Non-White majority rule. I shall return to this issue in my discussion of Margaret Ballinger's *From Union to Apartheid: A Trek to Isolation*; at this juncture, it should simply be noted that irrespective of the amount of disagreement within the European community as to the best way to ensure European control over the polity, the core value of that maintenance is not debatable.

As presently constituted, the apartheid system rests to a considerable extent on the development of "homelands" for the various Non-White groups in South Africa. The most important of these are the Bantustans where various African peoples are to have their "separate development." Although they are scheduled to offer a circumscribed form of self-government, and occupy 13 per cent of the total land area of South Africa, such Bantustans as the Transkei or Zululand are small, fragmented, rural, underdeveloped, and so poor that they are unable to support their present populations in anything but poverty, let alone those Africans who would theoretically be "repatriated" to them.[7] This has caused numerous observers, including Horwitz, to conclude that they are not economically viable and hence not supportive to the present system.[8]

Yet in terms of the present operation and future direction of the South African political system, I would argue that the Bantustans are *politically* viable, and that this is what matters in the present context.

[7] At this stage at least, the South African government intends to maintain control over the foreign policy, defense, currency, and communications of the Bantustans.

[8] Christopher Hill, *Bantustans: The Fragmentation of South Africa* (London 1964), and Gwendolen M. Carter, Thomas Karis, and Newell M. Stultz, *South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism* (Evanston 1967).

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By creating a number of entities run by Africans that look, in their later stages at least, like the *de jure* independent states of Swaziland and Lesotho, the South African government will have created political insulation of the first order. From the point of view of the maintenance of European control over South Africa proper, it does not much matter whether the Bantustans are self-sustaining in any demographic or economic sense, nor does it matter how, or even whether, these enclaves are strung together in a "federation."[9] What does matter is that the Bantustans enable the European decision-makers to divide Africans along tribal lines to prevent their making common cause for political power, to encourage the more traditional and conservative elements within the African population, and to dilute the pressure substantially for any change that would give Non-Whites a substantial say in the affairs of the state. Particularly in the Southern African context, these Bantustans—however weak and dependent they might be—give the system a measure of legitimacy by giving the Africans a "place of their own," while enabling Europeans to maintain strict control over the national political system.[10]

Finally, Horwitz concludes that there are forces operative within the economic realm which must eventually override the present system: ". . . the *raison d'être* of the political factor remains that economic development should never be allowed to alter White-Black relationships advantageously to the politico-social status of the Non-Whites and disadvantageously to the politico-social status of the Whites. But the South African economy is inescapably integrated in the pursuit of productivity. Economic rationality urges the polity forward beyond its ideology" (427).

Here then is the proposition: despite the heretofore successful efforts of the Europeans to prevent it, at some point in the foreseeable future economic change will produce social and political changes in South Africa which, in turn, will have a cumulative effect on the political system, eroding European hegemony and ultimately giving Non-Whites a decisive say in its decision-making process. There is apparently a great

[9] Interestingly enough, very little has been written or said about what the terminal community will look like under apartheid, although there is a sketch of it in Eschel Rhoodie, *The Third Africa* (New York 1968).

[10] If one takes the total area of those Bantustans scheduled for development in South Africa and Namibia (South West Africa) together with that of the three former High Commission Territories of Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana, the African "share" of Southern Africa south of the Limpopo is nearly 50%. In the early 1960's, it was widely assumed that South Africa would try to incorporate Swaziland, Lesotho, and Botswana into the Republic. Now it seems far more likely that the Bantustans will evolve toward their status as "independent" entities rather than the reverse.

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deal of appeal in the hypothesis that the South African political system is about to be substantially altered by internal, peaceful, economically-induced forces, for this view is currently very much in vogue as journalists, academicians, and statesmen point to signs of "change" within South Africa.[11]

Certainly there is change in South Africa. Just as there is division within the European community as to the best way to maintain White control of the polity, just as the Bantustans are an economic and demographic failure, so market forces are in the process of altering aspects of apartheid. My objections to all of these observations stem not from the fact that they are incorrect, but that many of the conclusions drawn from them are—especially their projected impact on the political system. It seems quite likely, for example, that with the continued economic growth of South Africa, many of the jobs which have previously been reserved for Europeans cannot be filled by them, and there will have to be a relaxation of some aspects of job reservation in such fields as nursing, assembly line production, and the building trades.[12] Whether explicitly or implicitly, the government will acquiesce to these changes despite the considerable opposition from such European pressure groups as the *Blankewerkersbeskormingsbond*. The analysis goes astray when these changes in the economic structure of apartheid are translated as being the opening wedge for the substantial alteration of the political system.

The removal of some of the restrictions on Non-White economic mobility in no way represents a threat to the political system as presently constituted. In fact, as Heribert Adam has pointed out, increased industrialization and economic expansion, far from threatening the politi-

[11] In fact, this assumption is given as one of the bases for current United States policy toward South Africa: "United States Options in Southern Africa," speech by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David D. Newsom at Northwestern University, December 8, 1970, subsequently printed in the *Department of State Bulletin*, LXIV (January 18, 1971), 80-84; Richard Giardina, "Southern Africa and the United Nations: The State Department Responds," paper prepared for delivery at the joint Midwest Political Science Association Convention and the Midwest International Studies Association Convention, April 29–May 1, 1971. See also John Seiler, "Models and Realities in Foreign Policy Formulation: The Southern African Case," paper prepared for delivery at the American Political Science Association Convention, September 1971.

[12] Based on a projected growth rate of 5.5% annually over the next five years, there will be over a million new jobs, including 232,000 that are currently reserved for Europeans. There is no possibility of there being enough Europeans to fill those positions. For a contemporary overview of the South African economy, see D. Hobart Houghton, "Economic Development, 1865–1965" in Wilson and Thompson (fn. 5), 1-48.

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cal system, may actually serve to reinforce it.[13] What will in fact develop is greater Non-White participation in a more integrated economic sphere, coincidental with the maintenance of a totally segregated political sector.[14] For all practical purposes, the changes wrought by the economy will be confined to that context, partly because the traditional means of translating economic advance into political power (such as trade unions or political parties) are denied to Non-Whites in South Africa, and partly because the creation of separate political units for each ethnic group (and within the African group, for each major tribe) channels political pressure away from the national center. One could well argue that the present government in South Africa is able to take a more relaxed view about some aspects of apartheid precisely because it has sufficient control over the total situation to prevent all but minor political repercussions from these socioeconomic changes. I would maintain that the incremental changes predicted for the South African economic situation will not be translated into meaningful political changes; rather, these changes will probably have the reverse impact, by putting off any ultimate confrontation between Whites and Non-Whites and by continuing to strengthen the present system. As Alan Paton and others have observed, in terms of the operation of that system South Africa is a society of gulfs and chasms, but nowhere are these barriers any wider than between political participation and nonparticipation for Asians, Coloureds, and Africans.[15] In fact, the South African political system rests on the assumption that these gulfs cannot be crossed without endangering the entire system, and that Non-Whites, whatever their qualifications, numbers, or intent, cannot be allowed to cross the line between nonparticipation and participation.

How is it possible that the South African political system, so inequitable in its distribution of goods, services, and status, and so oppressive in its denial of political participation for Non-Whites, can maintain itself

[13] Heribert Adam, "Political Implications of Socioeconomic Change in South Africa," paper prepared for delivery at the African Studies Association meeting, October 21-24, 1970. Adam cites a number of important insights provided by Herbert Blumer in his "Industrialization and Race Relations," in Guy Hunter, ed., *Industrialization and Race Relations* (London 1965), 220-53. For a fuller treatment of this subject, see Adam's *Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics* (Berkeley 1971), and my review of it in *African Studies Review*, XIV (September 1971), 341-42.

[14] Adam (fn. 13), 13.

[15] Alan Paton, *The Long View* (New York 1968). These essays, edited by Edward Callan, graphically illustrate the insurmountable problems faced by those who would bridge the chasms.

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intact, especially in the face of economic change?[16] Much of developmental theory would seem to underscore its fragility and short life expectancy. A. F. K. Organski, for example, in *The Stages of Political Development*, outlines a series of interactions among various economic and political variables in order to explain the process of political development.[17] He delineates three models of political response to economic development: bourgeois politics, Stalinist politics, and syncretic politics. In the syncretic pattern, the industrial and agrarian elite form an alliance in order to stave off the political aspirations of the lower classes and to mitigate the turmoil caused by modernization and industrialization.[18] South Africa bears a resemblance to this model, for in the South African context, it is the rural Afrikaners and the urban English-speakers who come together to control the political system and stave off the political aspirations of the lower classes, here corresponding to Non-Whites.

As Organski points out, the syncretic pattern, based as it is upon a compromise, is generally short-lived: the masses soon cross the threshold to political participation, overthrowing the system in the process. In the South African experience, however, there are two variables present that make the syncretic pattern more viable. In the first place, there is far greater agreement between the agricultural and industrial elites (i.e., the Whites) that the lower classes (i.e., the Non-Whites), whether rural or urban, must be prevented from attaining political power. What is more important, the line between political serfdom and political power, being based on race, is far more easily maintained once it is demarcated than was possible in the other syncretic varieties found in Italy, Spain, and Argentina.[19] Thus far, the Europeans in South Africa have been willing to pay the various costs involved in the maintenance of their core values, and the political system which they dominate has proven itself to be both strong and resilient.[20] It has demonstrated a marked ability to survive and seems to have put off its

[16] That the system is profoundly inequitable is documented in the extensive literature on the subject. To list but the most prominent: Albert Luthuli, *Let My People Go* (New York 1962); Nelson Mandela, *No Easy Walk to Freedom* (London 1965); Govan Mbeki, *South Africa: The Peasants' Revolt* (Baltimore 1964); Jordan K. Ngubane, *An African Explains Apartheid* (New York 1963); Bloke Modisane, *Blame Me on History* (London 1963); and H. J. and R. E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa 1850–1950* (Baltimore 1969).

[17] A. F. K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (New York 1965).

[18] *Ibid.*, 122-56.

[19] Organski qualifies the Argentina case, however: *ibid.*, 150-55.

[20] In addition to the works cited in fn. 5, see J. E. Spence and Elizabeth Thomas, *South Africa's Defense* (Los Angeles 1966). Since that study was written, the South African defense budget has risen to over $500 million annually.

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possible overthrow far into the future. By its very longevity it offers a substantial amendment to the pattern of previous syncretic types and to a number of theories concerning the relation between economic development and systemic change.

If the forces stemming from economic development do not seem to offer a realistic hope for the substantial alteration of the South African political system, are there not other, alternative sources of change? The literature on South Africa has generally focused on three sources of potential change. According to the first, there are individuals and groups within the White community who could successfully and peacefully pave the way for Non-White participation in the system by convincing the White electorate that this course of action was desirable on grounds of morality or expediency. According to the second, Non-Whites, primarily Africans, would force the political system, either through peaceful or violent means, to acknowledge their right to participation, or else overthrow it. Finally, it has been suggested that the international community is capable of generating pressures which would convince the South African government to alter its political system, reduce its inequities, and above all, provide for upward political mobility on the part of Non-Europeans. I shall examine each of these in turn.

The notion that certain Whites could provide the moral leadership to convince a majority of the White electorate to liberalize their polity so as to permit substantial participation has long been popular, particularly in the English-language press. Such a belief lies at the heart of Margaret Ballinger's *From Union to Apartheid: A Trek to Isolation.* Indeed it is the wellspring of her personal conviction which marked her long and distinguished career as champion of Non-White advancement in South Africa. Elected to the South African House of Assembly in 1937 as one of the three representatives of African interests, she served in this capacity until 1960 (when African representation came to an end), and steadily fought against the progressive closure of the South African political system. This wordy, discursive, "essentially personal" account of her political career offers little in the way of fresh insights into the history of South Africa. At the same time, it is a valuable record, portraying as it does the problems of those who would attempt to change the core values of white South Africa, and illuminating the will to believe that sustains those who try.

Ballinger has a deep and perhaps noble belief that there were specific points in the recent history of South Africa which, had different leadership been provided and had different decisions been made, could have changed the entire course of that history. She feels that the first of these

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turning points occurred in 1909, when the Act of Union merged Natal and the Cape Province (which had a qualified franchise for Non-Europeans) with the two former Boer Republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (which did not), without extrapolating the common roll to the national political level. The second came in 1936, when the Africans who had been on the Cape and Natal rolls were removed and a new arrangement set up whereby they could only elect three White representatives to the House of Assembly and four to the Senate. A final turning point developed when the Afrikaner-led National Party came to power in 1948 and subsequently implemented apartheid. This view of the reversibility of South African politics has also been articulated by other observers of, and participants in, the South African political system.[21]

It is in no way to denigrate their efforts, or to detract from the courage and dedication of those who fought to open the system up for Non-European participation, to point out that what looked like turning points at the time were in fact portions of a discernible pattern whose impetus and momentum could not be long denied. With hindsight and distance, one can even suggest that these efforts were doomed to frustration. Actually, these "turning points" were deeply imbedded in the context of a centuries-old pattern of racial separation and European hegemony, and it now appears that one of the most prevalent and reoccurring themes in South African history is the fragility of those movements which have sought to reverse the flow toward the closure of the political system.

Societal and territorial segregation, for example, goes back over 300 years. While the coming to power of the National Party meant the codification, expansion, and harsher application of these principles, they have always been an intrinsic part of South African life. It should be remembered that "native reserves" were legally established as far back as the 1840's and subsequently expanded in the so-called Native Land Act of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, long before the Nationalists gained control of the polity. Moreover, the persistent raising of the property and income qualifications designed to minimize and even reduce the numbers of Non-Europeans on the common roll occurred in 1853, 1887, and 1892. Further, while European women were given the vote in 1930, Non-European women were permanently excluded from attaining even a qualified status. The following year, all

[21] Alan Paton, for example, believes that the career of Jan Hofmeyr and his decisions during November 1946 concerning Non-White participation was a critical turning point. Most other writers have concentrated on the coming to power of the National Party in 1948. Gwendolen M. Carter, *The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since 1948* (New York 1959), remains the definitive study of the period.

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qualifications for European voters were abolished even while those for Asians, Coloureds, and Africans were raised, thereby reducing, both relatively and absolutely, the percentage of Non-Whites on the rolls. In 1945, Europeans were automatically registered for successive elections, while those Non-Europeans remaining on the common roll were forced to re-register. It should also be borne in mind that although the question of the common roll has always been an explosive subject in South Africa, the numbers of Non-Europeans involved have been very small. In 1935, prior to the removal of Africans from the roll, in the Cape Province there were 382,103 Europeans, 21,596 Coloureds, 10,628 Africans, and 1,401 Asians; in Natal there were 91,726 Europeans but only 343 Coloureds, 10 Asians, and 1 African.[22]

Against this background, it is not correct, I believe, to assert that "The course of history was amply to prove that all South African politics are native affairs" (225). While the specter of Non-White rule has been a consistent backdrop to South African politics, in point of fact these have not been dominated by a struggle between Europeans and Non-Europeans, nor over the status of Non-Europeans within the political system. Rather, in this century politics have generally revolved around the question of which segment of the European community would control the system. In-group struggles within the European sector of society have accounted for all changes of government since the formation of the Union, and there has never been a national election fought over the issue of whether or not there should be a sharing of political power with the Non-White majority. Instead, most elections have been fought over such concerns as external relations, especially those with Great Britain, the economic situation within the country, and the extent of cultural coexistence between the Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking communities. It is true that in any number of those elections, most noticeably in 1929 and 1948, warnings of a *swart gevaar* (black danger) were constantly evoked, but the issue was never whether or not Non-Whites should be "kept in their place," but how best to keep them there. The Progressive and the Liberal Parties, which have advocated movement toward Non-White participation, have never been able to capture a significant percentage of the European vote.[23]

In essence, what Mrs. Ballinger is recording is the failure of herself

[22] Elizabeth Landis, "South African Apartheid Legislation II: Extension, Enforcement, and Perpetuations," *Yale Law Journal*, LXXI (January 1962), 466-67.

[23] Most of the Liberal Party's support, for example, came from Non-Whites. It has now disbanded under a government ban on multiracial political organizations. For an interesting review of this subject, see Janet Robertson, *Liberalism in South Africa, 1948–1963* (Oxford 1971).

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and others of her political persuasion to gain the support of more than a small fraction of the European community. In its totality, the story must be read as an indication of the firmness with which the Europeans have consistently held their core values of segregation and White control of the polity.[24] If the participation of Non-Europeans in the political system of South Africa, and their eventual control of that system by means of their numerical superiority, rested on the hope that some Europeans in South Africa would press for these changes and that a majority of the European community would peacefully accept them, then it was always a frail and fragile hope, one now crushed and overridden by events.

If neither market forces nor European leadership offer the promise that the political system of South Africa will be altered to include a prominent role for Non-Whites, what chance is there that Non-Europeans themselves, primarily Africans, will be able to modify the system from within, either by peaceful protests or by the use of violence? Here the evidence is more fragmentary. Although we have some substantial works on past African attempts to influence the course of events in South Africa, our knowledge of present movements is far from complete.[25] There are, of course, South African governmental press releases and statements by the African exile movements.[26] But because of the sensitivity of the subject, the difficulties in gathering material, and the problems of verification, there are few academic studies of this aspect of the present situation. One exception to this general pattern is the work of Edward Feit. By focusing on material drawn from various political trials in South Africa, Feit provides valuable insights into contemporary African attempts to change the political system. He has written extensively on both the nonviolent[27] and violent[28] phases of

[24] It should also be noted that even those Europeans bent on liberalizing the body politic in South Africa have often adopted stances that many Africans and other Non-Whites must have found paternalistic. Ballinger, for example, writes: "In the course of the years, I found nothing to modify my belief that a broad-based democratic system progressively embracing politically all the elements in our complex society is not only the way to peace; it is the only way in which we can fulfill our essential destiny which is, at whatever price of pride or privilege, to help carry the torch of Western Christian civilization, with its emphasis on the value of the individual irrespective of race or colour, to the uttermost ends of the earth" (2).

[25] Edward Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope* (Madison 1966); Mary Benson, *South Africa: The Struggle for a Birthright* (New York 1966); and Leo Kuper, *Passive Resistance in South Africa* (New Haven 1960).

[26] Among the most important of these are *Sechaba*, a monthly journal published by the African National Congress, and the *Namibia News*, published by the Southwest Africa People's Organization.

[27] Edward Feit, *South Africa: The Dynamics of the African National Congress* (London 1962), and *African Opposition in South Africa: The Failure of Passive Re-*

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this effort; for the purposes of this review, I shall concentrate on his *African Opposition in South Africa: The Failure of Passive Resistance*, because it most clearly illuminates the difficulties faced by those Africans who would change the political system of South Africa from within.

Feit's central thesis is that, although there were a host of factors arrayed against those who challenged the system in the 1950's, ". . . the failure of the African National Congress can be explained in terms *other than in the odds themselves*" (vii). By concentrating on two major campaigns (the Western Areas campaign of 1953–1955 and the Bantu Education campaign of 1955) of the African National Congress (ANC)—the oldest and largest of African political organizations—he outlines the governmental action, the response of the ANC, the counterresponses of the government, and finally the consequences of this process for African movements bent on altering governmental policy.

The early 1950's had seen an acceleration of African and other Non-White agitation for change and the coming together of various groups bent on the alteration of the status quo. In this context the time seemed propitious for action. Grievances were not lacking. In 1953, for example, the government announced plans to move over fifty thousand Africans from the areas of Sophiatown, Martindale, and Newclare to new townships at Meadowlands and Diepkloof. There was widespread opposition to these proposed forced moves, and the African National Congress sought to organize resistance to resettlement. Its leadership felt that if the government could be thwarted on this issue, the ANC could increase its size and effectiveness and begin an expanded campaign to confront the government.

These hopes were not actualized. The campaign turned out to be poorly planned, poorly organized, poorly led, and ended in total failure. The ANC was not able to prevent the forced relocation; more importantly, it had seriously misjudged the government's capacity for action. The government harassed and jailed many of its leaders, moved in large numbers of police, and forceably evicted those who refused to move. The failure of the ANC in this essentially local campaign might have been compensated for, had not its leaders persisted in what Feit calls their "organizational pathologies" (138). Instead of learning from

sistance (Stanford 1967); see also Peter Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress, 1912–1952* (Berkeley 1971).

[28] Edward Feit, "Urban Revolt in South Africa: A Case Study," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VIII (April 1970), 55-72, and *Urban Revolt in South Africa, 1960–1964* (Evanston 1971).

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their experience, the ANC leadership extrapolated the campaign to the national level by opposing the government's attempt to set up a completely segregated educational system encompassing both public and private schools. The Bantu Education Act of 1953 transferred control over African education from the provincial education departments to the government's central Native Affairs Department. In response, the ANC proposed a boycott of the new school system that went into operation in 1955. (There is considerable evidence that its leadership was divided as to the wisdom of this course of action.) The boycott was a major failure and collapsed when the government issued notices that those parents who took their children out of the new system would not be able to return them to it. In the face of governmental action, the ANC could neither develop nor coerce support for its activities.

Feit concludes that these campaigns signalled the "nadir" of the Congress's effectiveness (189). What is more important, they illustrate the problems faced by this or any other organization bent on the alteration of the status quo in South Africa. The campaigns exhausted its membership, overstrained its already weak communications network, and exposed its lack of financial support and its pathetically small number of full-time organizers as well as the difficulties in coordinating its various branches. More important still, its action-for-action's-sake approach to the issues and its total failure to win even slight concessions from the government cost it credibility with the African masses. Ironically enough, ". . . the Government was able most effectively to make resistance to repression a means of perfecting the very system against which it was directed" (193). In other words, the activities of the ANC actually aided the government by highlighting the weaknesses in its own security capability—weaknesses which were quickly remedied before the African opposition moved into its violent and potentially more important phase.

When the government subsequently banned the African National Congress and its 1959 offshoot, the Pan African Congress, both organizations attempted to go underground. The ANC developed a revolutionary battle arm, *Umkonto We Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation) and the PAC created *Poqu* (Pure); both soon adopted the tactics of violence. In its turn, the government unleashed a massive security operation, rounding up thousands of persons and incarcerating or driving into exile most of the African leadership. By 1965, both organizations had been crushed within South Africa.[29] The problems which had frus-

[29] Feit, *South Africa* (fn. 27), 62-72, and Leo Kuper, "African Nationalism in South Africa, 1910–1964," in Wilson and Thompson (fn. 5), 459-75.

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trated African nationalists while their organizations were legal continued to dog them even as they moved into a more revolutionary phase. So effective was the South African security apparatus in taking advantage of the weaknesses of these groups that by 1966 the ANC publicly admitted that it would henceforth no longer operate extensively in South Africa proper but would concentrate its efforts on Rhodesia, cooperating with the Zimbabwe African People's Union.[30] Since that time, the impetus for revolutionary activity has been further checked by increased governmental surveillance, internal strife within the movement, and the very dynamics of exile operations.[31]

This is not to suggest that there is no revolutionary potential in South Africa.[32] The inequities of its social, economic, and political systems, the systematic exploitation of its Non-White population, and the denial of basic human freedoms are all present. What is lacking is an in-place revolutionary organization capable of harnessing and marshalling these dissatisfactions in order to impinge upon the political center. This is not to say that such an organization will not develop in the future. However, there is currently no evidence that such an organization is being formed. Until one is, the forces working for cohesion and stability in South Africa remain far more powerful than the forces working for its dissolution. Much could change if the surrounding territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia were to come under African majority rule, and were led by governments which were prepared to support the violent overthrow of the South African Government.[33] But for the present, the weak, disorganized, often unsupported

[30] According to Martin Legassick, the ANC leadership felt that the revolutionary situation "essential for an insurrection" simply did not exist in South Africa: Martin Legassick, "The Consequences of African Guerrilla Activity for South Africa's Relations with Her Neighbors," paper prepared for delivery at the African Studies Association meeting, November 1967, 4. Legassick's somewhat hopeful prognosis for African revolutionary activity in Southern Africa has yet to be borne out by events. Other works in this optimistic vein include Russell Warren Howe, "War in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVIII (October 1969), 150-65, and John A. Davis and James K. Baker, eds., *Southern Africa in Transition* (New York 1966).

[31] For a most perceptive account of this aspect, see John Marcum, "The Exile Condition and Revolutionary Effectiveness: Southern Africa in Perspective," in Potholm and Dale (fn. 2).

[32] Feit, for example, finds it "astonishing that recruitment by the underground ANC went so slowly in light of the Africans' unhappy situation." *South Africa* (fn. 27), 61.

[33] The interaction between the Republic of South Africa and the other states of Southern Africa is clearly beyond the scope of this essay. Those interested in this aspect should consult Larry W. Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," *International Studies Quarterly*, XII (September 1968), 231-61, and Peter Robson, "Economic Integration in Southern Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, V (December 1967), 469-90. For an in-depth examination of the situation in Portuguese-controlled Africa, see Douglas L. Wheeler and René Pélissier, *Angola* (New

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groups that seek to alter the South African political system from within are faced with opposition so powerful as to make any chance of success highly problematic.

The foregoing analysis, which has stressed the strength of the South African political system and its demonstrated ability to maintain itself, should not be construed as suggesting that the system is invulnerable. The present South African Government is in control of its internal situation, and in the context of Southern Africa it looms as a power of the first magnitude—one virtually unassailable by the other countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the larger international community's attempts at influencing South Africa—through an easily circumvented arms embargo, haphazard attempts at isolation, and a trade boycott more honored in the breach than in the observance—have thus far merely strengthened South Africa's resolve.

Yet in terms of national power, South Africa is not in a category with such European powers as France or the United Kingdom, let alone with that of the Soviet Union or the United States. Thus it seems clear that if a combination of these powers were to make the alteration of the South African political system a priority item, and were willing to pay the costs of that alteration, they could substantially change the status quo.[34] For example, the South African economy, which bears the costs of internal repression, is not self-sufficient and would suffer almost immediately from any enforced embargo or blockade.[35] More important in terms of systematic alteration, the very engagement of outside forces would substantially affect the passivity of the Non-White population within the country. At the present time, the development of viable revolutionary organizations within South Africa is considerably hampered because large segments of the population simply do not believe that the system can be overthrown. It seems safe to say that this attitude would be dramatically changed with outside intervention; with such a change in attitude, the quiescence of the South African domestic situation could no longer be assured.

In light of these assumptions, some persons and organizations have

York 1971); David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels, eds., *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook* (New York 1969); and John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969). Some views by African nationalists are to be found in Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (Baltimore 1969); Basil Davidson, *The Liberation of Guiné: Aspects of an African Revolution* (Baltimore 1969); and Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle* (London 1969).

[34] Dale (fn. 1), 310-13. This premise, of course, is based on the assumption that the remaining powers would stay neutral rather than support South Africa.

[35] William Hance, ed., *Southern Africa and the United States* (New York 1968). Houghton (fn. 12) indicates that the South African economy is stronger now, however.

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already stated that the great powers *ought* to intervene in order to change the political system of South Africa.[36] Further, a number of factors and situations have been advanced as having the potential to trigger the involvement of external forces. These include South African raids across international boundaries into such countries as Zambia or Tanzania, the occupation of one or more of the former High Commission Territories, a spasm revolt or bloody massacre of Non-Whites in South Africa, international action stemming from the World Court's advisory opinion that South Africa is illegally in control of South West Africa (Namibia), the formation and engagement of an African army of liberation sponsored by the Organization of African Unity, the growth of external pressure groups (such as black Americans) favoring intervention, or simply a gradually escalating commitment to the African nationalist forces in Southern Africa on the part of some of the great powers.[37]

On balance, these possibilities remain highly speculative and conjectural. For the present, the factors inhibiting the involvement of the great powers seem most formidable, far outweighing those pushing for it. Within the confines of this review, there is no opportunity to amplify their contextual richness, but a listing of them is appropriate, if only to highlight the forces operative in support of the status quo in South Africa. In addition to the demonstrated strength of the South African political system and the nonviability of the revolutionary movements, these include:

(1) The basic unwillingness of the great powers to *seek* involvement. The major countries of Western Europe and the United States have a considerable stake in the present economic arrangements with South Africa, including investments, trade, and access to strategic materials.[38] The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, with far more modest stakes in the status quo, have nevertheless regarded

[36] See for example, Colin and Margaret Legum, *South Africa: Crisis for the West* (New York 1964); Ernest A. Gross, "The Coalescing Problem of Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVI (July 1968), 744; Waldemar A. Nielsen, *African Battle Line: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa* (New York 1965), and "Southern Africa: Smoldering Catastrophe," in his *The Great Powers and Africa*; and Ronald Segal, ed., *Sanctions Against South Africa* (Baltimore 1964).

[37] For an examination of these possibilities, including the configurations which surround each, the assumptions upon which each are based, and an assessment of the probabilities of their being actualized, see C. P. Potholm, "Southern Africa at Century's End: Nine Scenarios," in Potholm and Dale (fn. 2).

[38] It has been pointed out that the United States has larger amounts of investment in, and trade with, the rest of Africa than with South Africa. This is true enough, but to date American investment in, and trade with, South Africa have not jeopardized its commercial relations with Black Africa.

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its alteration as a tertiary or even marginal goal for their foreign policy.

(2) The growing détente between the Soviet Union and the United States and their seeming desire to avoid confrontation with each other or with China. In recent years, these two superpowers have been rather consistently engaged in seeking areas of agreement and common interest. It is currently very difficult to imagine their being willing to undertake operations which might jeopardize this process, particularly in light of the low priority each attaches to Southern Africa in general.[39] There is also the concomitant fear of involvement in a situation whose outcome could not be precisely determined beforehand.[40]

(3) The problems of projecting the costs of involvement on the part of the great powers. These costs would have to be borne by the Non-White population in South Africa. Even if a policy of international intervention enjoyed greater appeal than it currently does, the anticipated casualties and deprivations which would be inflicted on the African population as a result of outside intervention would continue to be an inhibiting factor.[41]

(4) The unwillingness of the independent African states to make the liberation of South Africa a priority item. Despite their rhetoric and their resolutions, the independent African states have not indicated any substantial willingness to pay the costs of attempting to overthrow the present government of South Africa, either by peaceful or violent means.[42] Not only have the African states as a group been unwilling to support a trade embargo against South Africa: many have been unwilling to pay their dues to the liberation committee of the Organization of African Unity. Further, following a decade of independence

[39] This is not to say that the Soviet Union does not have a small stake in the training and equipping of various exile groups in Southern Africa, or that, in the event of considerable Chinese activity in the area, the Soviets would be unwilling to increase the level of their equipment; but there is little to suggest that the Soviets are interested in pursuing such a policy. See Paul M. Whitaker, "The Revolutions in 'Portuguese' Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VIII (April 1970), 15-35.

[40] Take, for example, the views expressed by George F. Kennan in "Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIX (January 1971), 218-36, which have been widely hailed within the foreign policy establishment of the United States. A differing opinion has been offered by Larry Bowman in his "South Africa's Southern Strategy and Its Implications for the United States," *International Affairs*, XLVII (January 1971).

[41] Would the overthrow of the system be worth ten thousand dead? A hundred thousand? A million? I find it instructive that while there has been some computation of the projected casualties of an invading force [Amelia C. Leiss, "Efforts to Alter the Future: Military Measures," in Amelia C. Leiss, ed., *Apartheid and United National Collective Measures* (New York 1965), 131-53], there are no publicly available statistics on the probable civilian costs of such intervention.

[42] Some states, such as Tanzania, have been willing to bear considerable costs in order to support the liberation of Southern Africa, but they are conspicuous exceptions.

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and, in many cases, considerable domestic instability, many African governments have turned inward and have become quite status quo oriented themselves. In fact, one can read the Lusaka Manifesto as a strong signal that, without accepting the situation in Southern Africa, the African states are prepared to deemphasize any continuing confrontation with South Africa.[43] In any case, the African states have not succeeded in transmitting to the great powers any significant sense of urgency about the need to alter the South African situation, nor have they attempted much in the way of pressuring those powers to act by threatening to expropriate the investments of their nationals or by breaking diplomatic relations.

(5) South Africa's diplomatic offensive. Buoyed by its economic and security strengths, and encouraged by the weaknesses and divisions of its opponents, the South African regime has broken out of its isolation and increased its contacts with Black Africa. Significantly, the Prime Minister of South Africa extended a "welcome" to anyone who wished to engage in a dialogue with the Republic[44]—a move that has further divided those who oppose apartheid.[45] Whatever the outcome of this initiative, or of South Africa's offers of economic aid and technical assistance, the South African Government seems committed to a policy of keeping its opponents off balance. This by itself further undercuts the possible coalescence of forces of significant magnitude to push the great powers toward intervention.[46]

There are, of course, too many variables present in the textural richness of Southern Africa for us to predict the future course of events exactly, but it seems extremely unlikely that there will be intervention by the great powers designed to overthrow the existing political system of South Africa. And without that intervention it is even more unlikely that there will be any substantial change in the system, for there

[43] Delegates of the East and Central African States, *The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa* (Dar es Salaam 1969).

[44] Information Service of South Africa, "S.A. Ready for Dialogue with Black Nations—Prime Minister," *News from South Africa*, XI (April 2, 1971), 1. The ANC called it a betrayal for the African states to even think of a dialogue: "Dialogue is Betrayal," *Sechaba*, V (February 1971), 2-3.

[45] Although the suggestion of the Ivory Coast that the OAU consider such a course of action was defeated at the June, 1971, meeting of the OAU, six African states (Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malawi, Gabon, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius) supported it; five (Swaziland, Dahomey, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta) abstained from the voting.

[46] For some relevant background material on the formation of South African foreign policy, see Amry Vandenbosch, *South Africa and the World* (Lexington 1970); Jack E. Spence, *Republic Under Pressure: A Study of South African Foreign Policy* (London 1965); and E. S. Munger, *Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy* (Pasadena 1965).

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is little in the past and less in the present to suggest that the European population of South Africa is prepared to give up the core values of its political system, or is about to be forced to do so. It may well be that such a change will occur "in the long run." But for those Africans, Coloureds, and Indians presently under its jurisdiction, this seems at best a scant and distant hope.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX TO VOLUME XXIV

administrative behavior, USSR, *see* Hoffmann
African Opposition in South Africa: The Failure of Passive Resistance, by Edward Feit, reviewed by Christian P. Potholm, IV:613
After Many a Summer? The Possibilities of Political Change in South Africa, by Christian P. Potholm, IV:613
Alperowitz, Gar, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam*, reviewed by J. L. Richardson, IV:579
Cold War Essays, reviewed by J. L. Richardson, IV:579
Analysis of the Allocation of Federal Budget Resources as an Indicator of National Goals and Priorities, An, by L. L. Lederman and M. L. Windus, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
Arab political ideology, *see* Moore
Arms Race Phenomenon, The, by Colin S. Gray, I:39
Ashford, Douglas E., *National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan*, reviewed by Clement Henry Moore, I:106
Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, by Gar Alperowitz, reviewed by J. L. Richardson, IV:579

Baldwin, David A., The Power of Positive Sanctions, I:19
Ballinger, Margaret, *From Union to Apartheid: A Trek to Isolation*, reviewed by Christian P. Potholm, IV:613
Berki, R. N., On Marxian Thought and International Relations, I:80
Biafra, self-determination, *see* Nixon
Binder, Leonard, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*, reviewed by Clement Henry Moore, I:106

Canada's Interest in Foreign Aid, by S. G. Triantis, I:1
China, structure of Communist politics, *see* Thornton
China, war of national liberation, *see* Kataoka
Chinese cultural revolution, *see* Hah and Noble
Cimbala, Stephen J., New Myths and Old Realities: Defense and Its Critics, I:127
Clayton, J. H., ed., *The Economic Impact of the Cold War*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
Cold War Essays, by Gar Alperowitz, reviewed by J. L. Richardson, IV:579
Cold-War Revisionism: A Critique, by J. L. Richardson, IV:579
Commander of the Faithful, The: The Moroccan Political Elite—A Study in Segmented Politics, by John Waterbury, reviewed by Clement Henry Moore, I:106
Communist politics, structure, *see* Thornton
Communist Power in a War of National Liberation: The Case of China, by Tetsuya Kataoka, III:410
Connor, Walker, Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?, III:319
Cooper, Richard N., Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies, II:159
"Correlates of War" Project, The: Interim Report and Rationale, by J. David Singer, II:243
Crook, Isabel and David, *Revolution in a Chinese Village: Ten Mile Inn*, reviewed by Tetsuya Kataoka, III:410
cultural revolution, China, *see* Hah and Noble

Decision to Go to the Moon, The: Project Goals and the National Interest, by J. H. Logsdon, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
defense department, U.S., *see* Cimbala
defense spending, *see* Cimbala
Deterrence in the MIRV Era, by Benjamin S. Lambeth, II:221
Donaldson, Robert H., The 1971 Soviet Central Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite, III:382
Dynamics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, The, by Chong-Do Hah and James Noble, II:182

Economic Impact of the Cold War, The, by J. H. Clayton, ed., reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies, by Richard N. Cooper, II:159
elite, new, in USSR, *see* Donaldson
Enthoven, Alain C., and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969*, reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala, I:127
ethnicity and nation-states, *see* Connor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village, by William Hinton, reviewed by Tetsuya Kataoka, III:410
Fascism and Modernization, by Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., IV:547
Feit, Edward, *African Opposition in South Africa: The Failure of Passive Resistance*, reviewed by Christian P. Potholm, IV:613
foreign aid, problems of, *see* Triantis
foreign policy and economic interdependence, *see* Cooper
foreign policy in Indonesia, *see* Weinstein
Free World Colossus, The (U.K. title: *From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold War*), by David Horowitz, reviewed by J. L. Richardson, IV:579
From Union to Apartheid: A Trek to Isolation, by Margaret Ballinger, reviewed by Christian P. Potholm, IV:613
From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold War (U.S. title: *The Free World Colossus*), by David Horowitz, reviewed by J. L. Richardson, IV:579

Galli, Giorgio, and Alfonso Prandi, *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy*, reviewed by Alan Zuckerman, III:428
Goals, Priorities, and Dollars, by L. A. Lecht, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
governmental authority, legitimacy of, *see* Hopkins
Gray, Colin S., The Arms Race Phenomenon, I:39

Hah, Chong-Do, and James Noble, The Dynamics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, II:182
Hinton, William, *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village*, reviewed by Tetsuya Kataoka, III:410
Hoffmann, Erik P., Social Science and Soviet Administrative Behavior, III:444
Hopkins, Raymond F., Securing Authority: The View from the Top, II:271
Horowitz, David, *From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (U.S. title: *The Free World Colossus*), reviewed by J. L. Richardson, IV:579
Horwitz, Ralph, *The Political Economy of South Africa*, reviewed by Christian P. Potholm, IV:613
Hough, Jerry F., *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making*, reviewed by Erik P. Hoffmann, III:444
How Much Is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969, by Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala, I:127

Ideological Revolution in the Middle East, The, by Leonard Binder, reviewed by Clement Henry Moore, I:106
Ideology, political, among Arabs, *see* Moore
Ilchman, Warren F., and Norman T. Uphoff, *The Political Economy of Change*, reviewed by Raymond F. Hopkins, II:271
Incentives for Political Participation, by James L. Payne and Oliver H. Woshinsky, IV:518
Indonesia, foreign policy, *see* Weinstein
Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Further Re-Analysis, by Dennis Paranzino, IV:565
interdependence, economic, and foreign policy, *see* Cooper
international relations and Marxian thought, *see* Berki
Italy, social structure and political competition, *see* Zuckerman

Johnson, Chalmers A., *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945*, reviewed by Tetsuya Kataoka, III:410

Kataoka, Tetsuya, Communist Power in a War of National Liberation: The Case of China, III:410
Kolko, Gabriel, *The Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943–1945*, reviewed by J. L. Richardson, IV:579
Kuhn, Philip A., *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864*, reviewed by Tetsuya Kataoka, III:410

Lambeth, Benjamin S., Deterrence in the MIRV Era, II:221
Lecht, L. A., *Goals, Priorities, and Dollars*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
Lederman, L. L., and M. L. Windus, *An Analysis of the Allocation of Federal Budget Resources as an Indicator of National Goals and Priorities*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
legitimacy, political, *see* Hopkins

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Leites, Nathan, and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority*, reviewed by Raymond F. Hopkins, II:271
less developed countries, foreign policy, *see* Weinstein
Logsdon, J. H., *The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Goals and the National Interest*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293

Marxian thought and international relations, *see* Berki
Melman, Seymour, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War*, reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala, I:127
MIRV's and deterrence, *see* Lambeth
Mitchell, Richard P., *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, reviewed by Clement Henry Moore, I:106
modernization, and fascism, *see* Turner
Moore, Clement Henry, On Theory and Practice Among Arabs, I:106

National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan, by Douglas E. Ashford, reviewed by Clement Henry Moore, I:106
National Priorities: Demands, Resources, Dilemmas, by Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, II:293
National Priorities: Military, Economic and Social, by M. B. Schnapper, ed., reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?, by Walker Connor, III:319
nation-states, *see* Connor
New Myths and Old Realities: Defense and Its Critics, by Stephen J. Cimbala, I:127
Nigeria/Biafra, self-determination, *see* Nixon
1971 Soviet Central Committee, The: An Assessment of the New Elite, by Robert H. Donaldson, III:382
Nixon, Charles R., Self-Determination: The Nigeria/Biafra Case, IV:473
Noble, James, and Chong-Do Hah, The Dynamics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, II:182
nuclear deterrence, and MIRV's, *see* Lambeth

On Marxian Thought and the Problem of International Relations, by R. N. Berki, I:80
On Theory and Practice Among Arabs, by Clement Henry Moore, I:106

Pacification War in North China, The, by the War History Office [Tokyo], reviewed by Tetsuya Kataoka, III:410
Paranzino, Dennis, Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Further Re-Analysis, IV:565
Patterns of Political Participation in Italy, by Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, reviewed by Alan Zuckerman, III:428
Payne, James L., and Oliver H. Woshinsky, Incentives for Political Participation, IV:518
Peasant Communism in Southern Italy, by Sidney G. Tarrow, reviewed by Alan Zuckerman, III:428
Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945, by Chalmers A. Johnson, reviewed by Tetsuya Kataoka, III:410
Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War, by Seymour Melman, reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala, I:127
political change, South Africa, *see* Potholm
political competition and social structure, Italy, *see* Zuckerman
Political Economy of Change, The, by Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, reviewed by Raymond F. Hopkins, II:271
Political Economy of South Africa, The, by Ralph Horwitz, reviewed by Christian P. Potholm, IV:613
political ideology, Arab, *see* Moore
political legitimacy, of authority, *see* Hopkins
political participation, incentives, *see* Payne and Woshinsky
Politics of War, The: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943–1945, by Gabriel Kolko, reviewed by J. L. Richardson, IV:579
Potholm, Christian P., After Many a Summer? The Possibilities of Political Change in South Africa, IV:613
Power of Positive Sanctions, The, by David A. Baldwin, I:19
Prandi, Alfonso, and Giorgio Galli, *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy*, reviewed by Alan Zuckerman, III:428
priorities, national, U.S., and scarce resources, *see* Sprout

Quandt, William B., *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954–1968*, reviewed by Clement Henry Moore, I:106

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Rebellion and Authority, by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., reviewed by Raymond F. Hopkins, II:271
Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864, by Philip A. Kuhn, reviewed by Tetsuya Kataoka, III:410
revisionism, cold-war, *see* Richardson
Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954–1968, by William B. Quandt, reviewed by Clement Henry Moore, I:106
Revolution in a Chinese Village: Ten Mile Inn, by Isabel and David Crook, reviewed by Tetsuya Kataoka, III:410
Richardson, J. L., Cold-War Revisionism: A Critique, IV:579
Ruler's Imperative, The, by W. Howard Wriggins, reviewed by Raymond F. Hopkins, II:271
Russett, Bruce M., *What Price Vigilance?: The Burdens of National Defense*, reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala, I:127

sanctions, *see* Baldwin
Schnapper, M. B., ed., *National Priorities: Military, Economic, and Social*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
Schultze, C. L., *Setting National Priorities: The 1971 Budget*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
Securing Authority: The View from the Top, by Raymond F. Hopkins, II:271
Self-Determination: The Nigeria/Biafra Case, by Charles R. Nixon, IV:473
Setting National Priorities: The 1971 Budget, by C. L. Schultze, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
Singer, J. David, The "Correlates of War" Project: Interim Report and Rationale, II:243
Smith, K. Wayne, and Alain C. Enthoven, *How Much Is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969*, reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala, I:127
Social Science and Soviet Administrative Behavior, by Erik P. Hoffmann, III:444
Social Structure and Political Competition: The Italian Case, by Alan Zuckerman, III:428
Society of the Muslim Brothers, The, by Richard P. Mitchell, reviewed by Clement Henry Moore, I:106
South Africa, political change, *see* Potholm
Soviet administrative behavior, *see* Hoffmann
Soviet Central Committee, 1971, *see* Donaldson
Soviet Prefects, The: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making, by Jerry F. Hough, reviewed by Erik P. Hoffmann, III:444
Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout, National Priorities: Demands, Resources, Dilemmas, II:293
Structure of Communist Politics, The, by Richard C. Thornton, IV:498

Tarrow, Sidney G., *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy*, reviewed by Alan Zuckerman, III:428
Thornton, Richard C., The Structure of Communist Politics, IV:498
Triantis, S. G., Canada's Interest in Foreign Aid, I:1
Turner, Henry Ashby, Jr., Fascism and Modernization, IV:547

United States, defense department, *see* Cimbala
United States, foreign policy and economic interdependence, *see* Cooper
United States, national priorities and scarce resources, *see* Sprout
USSR, administrative behavior, *see* Hoffmann
USSR, 1971 Central Committee, *see* Donaldson
USSR, structure of Communist politics, *see* Thornton
Uphoff, Norman T., and Warren F. Ilchman, *The Political Economy of Change*, reviewed by Raymond F. Hopkins, II:271
Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, The: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries, by Franklin B. Weinstein, III:356

Vietnam, land reform, *see* Paranzino

war, causation of, *see* Singer
War History Office [Tokyo], *The Pacification War in North China*, reviewed by Tetsuya Kataoka, III:410
war of national liberation, China, *see* Kataoka
Waterbury, John, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite —A Study in Segmented Politics*, reviewed by Clement Henry Moore, I:106
Weinstein, Franklin B., The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries, III:356
What Price Vigilance?: The Burdens of National Defense, by Bruce M. Russett, reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala, I:127

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Windus, M. L., and L. L. Lederman, *An Analysis of the Allocation of Federal Budget Resources as an Indicator of National Goals and Priorities*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, II:293
Wolf, Charles, Jr., and Nathan Leites, *Rebellion and Authority*, reviewed by Raymond F. Hopkins, II:271
Woshinsky, Oliver H., and James L. Payne, Incentives for Political Participation, IV:518
Wriggins, W. Howard, *The Ruler's Imperative*, reviewed by Raymond F. Hopkins, II:271

Zuckerman, Alan, Social Structure and Political Competition: The Italian Case, III:428

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A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXIV
October 1971—July 1972

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CONTENTS

No. 1—October 1971

Canada's Interest in Foreign Aid	*S. G. Triantis*	1
The Power of Positive Sanctions	*David A. Baldwin*	19
The Arms Race Phenomenon	*Colin S. Gray*	39
On Marxian Thought and the Problem of International Relations	*R. N. Berki*	80
Review Articles		
On Theory and Practice Among Arabs	*Clement Henry Moore*	106
New Myths and Old Realities: Defense and Its Critics	*Stephen J. Cimbala*	127

No. 2—January 1972

Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies	*Richard N. Cooper*	159
The Dynamics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution	*Chong-Do Hah and James Noble*	182
Deterrence in the MIRV Era	*Benjamin S. Lambeth*	221
Research Note		
The "Correlates of War" Project: Interim Report and Rationale	*J. David Singer*	243
Review Articles		
Securing Authority: The View from the Top	*Raymond F. Hopkins*	271
National Priorities: Demands, Resources, Dilemmas	*Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout*	293

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

No. 3—April 1972

Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying? *Walker Connor* 319

The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries *Franklin B. Weinstein* 356

The 1971 Soviet Central Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite *Robert H. Donaldson* 382

Review Articles

Communist Power in a War of National Liberation: The Case of China *Tetsuya Kataoka* 410

Social Structure and Political Competition: The Italian Case *Alan Zuckerman* 428

Social Science and Soviet Administrative Behavior *Erik P. Hoffmann* 444

No. 4—July 1972

Self-Determination: The Nigeria/Biafra Case *Charles R. Nixon* 473

The Structure of Communist Politics *Richard C. Thornton* 498

Incentives for Political Participation *James L. Payne and Oliver H. Woshinsky* 518

Research Notes

Fascism and Modernization *Henry Ashby Turner, Jr.* 547

Inequality and Insurgency in Vietnam: A Further Re-Analysis *Dennis Paranzino* 565

Review Articles

Cold-War Revisionism: A Critique *J. L. Richardson* 579

After Many a Summer? The Possibilities of Political Change in South Africa *Christian P. Potholm* 613

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